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Matthew DeMaio 
Advised by Professor Eve Spangler   
 
At the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were united under a single sovereignty for the first time since the end of the British 
Mandate for Palestine nineteen years earlier.  The Palestinian-Israeli conflict returned to 
the contest between two national movements, Palestinian and Israeli, making competing 
claims to the same piece of territory.  Over the course of the ensuing 45 years, the 
discourse of each national movement has been littered with explicit and implicit 
references, acknowledgements and denunciations of the other.  Discourse is the means by 
which national leaders attempt to build a bridge from present circumstances to an 
imagined future.  This study, therefore, takes a critical reading approach to political 
discourse of each national movement with the goal of finding the place of the other in the 
imagined future of each group.  Reading official remarks, constitutions, party platforms, 
speeches and international documents illuminates the changing place of the other in each 
nation’s future vision over the last 45 years of conflict.  By understanding the evolving 
place of the other in national movements that make claims to the same piece of territory, 
we are able to understand the irreconcilability that has characterized the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict since the start of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
1967 and the failure of the Oslo Process to bring about a negotiated solution.
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Introduction 
 In September of 2011, I was watching the United Nations General Assembly in 
my apartment from the upscale Amman neighborhood of Shmeisani.  That night, 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was giving a speech on the occasion of 
his submission of Palestine’s application for full membership in the UN to the Security 
Council.  During the impassioned speech he affirmed that “the goal of the Palestinian 
people is the realization of their inalienable national rights in their independent State of 
Palestine … to resolve the core [of] the Arab-Israeli conflict and to achieve a just and 
comprehensive peace.” He finished his speech by appealing to the member nations in the 
chamber: “Your support for the establishment of the State of Palestine and for its 
admission to the United Nations as a full member is the greatest contribution to 
peacemaking in the Holy Land.”1 
 Immediately after Abbas left the podium, Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of 
Israel, stepped up to deliver his address to the General Assembly. Netanyahu, in between 
warning about the threat posed to the West by militant Islam and nuclear Iran, insisted 
that the Israelis have always been ready for peace but will not allow the establishment of 
a Palestinian state without a commitment by the Palestinians to peace.  He stated that “all 
these potential cracks in Israel’s security have to be sealed in a peace agreement before a 
                                                 
1
 Mahmoud Abbas, “Speech to the UN General Assembly” (UN General Assembly, New York, NY, 
September, 23, 2011).  
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Palestinian state is declared, not afterwards, because if you leave it afterwards, they won’t 
be sealed. The Palestinians should first make peace with Israel and then get their state.”2  
  Both speakers used many of the same words throughout their official remarks but 
came to vastly different conclusions about the process that would bring about the 
universally endorsed but ever-receding two state solution.  The discourse each leader 
used betrayed the deep divide between these two national movements that has made this 
protracted conflict last for more than 65 years.  For the Palestinians, the conflict is being 
prolonged by Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories.  This occupation 
is used by Israel to keep the Palestinians powerless thus enabling the state to expropriate 
more and more land.  It is impossible for the conflict to be resolved with this power 
imbalance which is why the Palestinians went to the United Nations looking for 
recognition of statehood.  To Netanyahu, Palestinian statehood in the West Bank in the 
Gaza Strip as sought by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) impinges on land he 
believes belongs to the state of Israel.  Peace to the current Israeli government depends on 
the renunciation of Palestinian claims to land Israel already holds in the West Bank and a 
written agreement with the Palestinians that would allow a permanent Israeli presence 
throughout the occupied territories.  The two speeches also betrayed how each leader saw 
the other in their own imagined future.  For Abbas, Israel is a state with which Palestine 
will be able to negotiate on equal footing as an independent state.  For Netanyahu, real 
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 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Speech to the UN General Assembly” (UN General Assembly, New York, NY, 
September, 23, 2011). 
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Palestinian independence is unacceptable and any Palestinian self-determination would 
be subordinate to Israeli control.   
 Seeing these two speeches side by side is what inspired the following study about 
the discourse of the Palestinians and Israelis since 1967.  The words of each leader had a 
depth of meaning which spoke not only to the current state of affairs but also to the place 
of the other in the imagined future of each nation.  Discourse is the means by which 
national leaders seek to build a bridge between the present situation and an ideal 
imagined future.  At its heart, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a clash between two 
exclusive national movements that make claims for the same piece of land.  The national 
discourse of each, therefore, is littered with explicit and implicit references, 
acknowledgements and denunciations of the other.  These references convey the place of 
the other in the imagined future that each nation is seeking to build.  A study of official 
discourse over the course of the history of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip will therefore show how the place of the other has changed since historical 
Palestine
3
 was once again united under a single sovereignty in 1967.  By understanding 
the evolving place of the other in national movements that make exclusive claim to a 
piece of territory, we are able to understand the irreconcilability that has characterized the 
course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and gaps that will need to be overcome for a 
peaceful solution to be reached.   
                                                 
3
 Which is henceforth how I shall identify the single zone of control that is Israel, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip; the piece of territory that was once Mandate Palestine. 
4 
 
 This leads me to the question for study: What is the place of the other in the 
imagined future of the Palestinians and Israelis as represented in their respective national 
political discourse. How have those visions changed since 1967?  In order to fully 
explore this question it is first necessary to define its terms.  What do we mean by 
“national,” “Palestinian-Israeli conflict,” and “discourse?” 
 The Palestinian-Israeli conflict began towards the end of the 19
th
 century with the 
Zionist (Jewish nationalist) colonization and settlement of the historical Palestine.  At its 
roots, this conflict is a struggle between two rival nationalist groups who make claims to 
the same piece of land.  The goal of Zionism was the creation of a Jewish state in 
historical Palestine; a goal that has been realized.  The goal of Palestinian nationalism is 
the creation of a Palestinian state in the same territory, which has yet to come to pass.   
When it comes to defining the nation, there is no better person to turn to than 
Benedict Anderson.  First published in 1983, Anderson’s seminal work Imagined 
Communities was groundbreaking in its analysis of the creation of nations and the 
coming of the age of nationalism.  He proposes this definition for the nation: “it is an 
imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”4  
It is “imagined” because, despite the fact that most of the members of the nation will 
never meet or even see one another, they see themselves as part of the same national 
group.  The nation is “limited” because “even the largest of them... has finite, if elastic, 
boundaries beyond which lie other nations.  No nation imagines itself coterminous with 
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 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 2006), 6 
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mankind.”5  It is sovereign because nationhood was created in a time where 
Enlightenment thinking was challenging the legitimacy of divinely-ordained leaders.  It is 
a community because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”6   
Despite the fact that it presents itself as natural and timeless, nationalism is an 18
th
 
century mode of organization that in all cases depends on some level of social 
construction.  Both Palestinian and Jewish nationalism grew out of reactions to outside 
pressures and a set of crucial shared experiences that pushed leaders to imagine 
themselves as members of the communities we see today.  We will trace the emergence 
of these two national movements in the ensuing chapters, but it is vital to state here that 
the goal of this study is not to determine whose national claim to historical Palestine is 
more legitimate or is more historically accurate.  As Benedict Anderson states, nations 
“are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they 
were imagined.”7  However, as we will come to see throughout this study, each national 
movement aimed to delegitimize the nation-ness of the other in order to undercut their 
rival’s claim to the land.   
The conflict has gone through a number of phases.  From the beginning of Jewish 
settlement until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the conflict proceeded in a 
historical Palestine that was unified under a single, initially Ottoman and later British, 
sovereignty.  In the aftermath of the war that created Israel and the Palestinian refugees in 
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 Ibid., 7. 
6
 Ibid., 7. 
7
 Ibid., 6. 
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1948, this territory was divided between three sovereignties.  Israel took 78% of the land 
of historical Palestine and the rest was split between Jordan, which annexed the West 
Bank, and Egypt which took administrative control of the Gaza Strip.  I choose to start 
this study in 1967 because in June of that year, Israel conquered the remaining 22% of 
historical Palestine, uniting it under a single sovereignty for the first time in nineteen 
years.  Israeli control over the land conquered from Jordan and Egypt took the form of 
military occupation.
8
   
Because Israel did not annex this land, this is not sovereignty in the conventional 
sense of the word.  However, as the scholar Achille Mbembe argues “the ultimate 
expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to 
decide who may live and who must die,” in any given territory.9  As the government of 
Israel holds this final say over “who may live and who must die” in the entirety of 
historical Palestine, it is the state of Israel that holds sovereignty over the territory, 
despite a lack of official annexation and international recognition.  Since 1967, Israel has 
expressed this sovereignty in what Mbembe calls “late-modern colonial occupation” 
which is characterized by “seizing, delineating, and asserting control over a physical 
geographical area – of writing on the ground a new set of social and spacial relations.”10  
That is to say, Israel is expressing its de facto control over the occupied territories with 
physical construction of settlements, roads, military bases, closed military zones, nature 
reserves, and checkpoints. 
                                                 
8
 See Ilan Pappé’s upcoming book The Bureaucracy of Evil. 
9
 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15:1 (2003): 11 
10
 Ibid., 25 
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 It is with this reunification of historical Palestine under a single, albeit de-facto, 
sovereignty that our study of discourse begins.  Whereas in the nineteen years preceding 
this unification, the conflict was decidedly interstate, i.e. between Israel and the 
neighboring Arab countries, this period (1967 to the present) for reasons we will cover 
shortly, saw the reemergence of a direct conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis.  It 
is during this phase of the conflict that the discourse produced by each national 
movement is in direct conversation with the other.  As the great French scholar Michel 
Foucault argues, “discourse is not simply that which manifests (or hides) desire – it is 
also the object of desire; and since, as history constantly teaches us, discourse is not 
simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for 
which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized.”11  
Discourse is not simply a description of ongoing events.  It in itself has power.  In the 
context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ability of a Palestinian national group to 
shape discourse about its struggle gives it the ability to influence the actual path and 
strategies of the struggle itself.  Similarly, the ability of an Israeli political party to 
control the discourse about the territories under its occupation is in itself a way to shape 
their future status.   
It is important to note, however, that there almost always exists a gap between 
discourse and reality.  As we will see in many cases throughout this study, just because a 
group changes its discourse does not mean its actions will reflect the discursive change.  
                                                 
11
 Michel Foucault, “The Orders of Discourse,” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. 
Robert J. C. Young, 52-3 (Boston: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1982).  
8 
 
Often in this conflict, discourse will be used to mask and sanitize contradictory actions on 
the ground.   
 The national political discourse analyzed in this study is primarily produced at the 
highest levels of the Palestinian national movement and of the Israeli government.  My 
data will include speeches to international and domestic audiences, party platforms, 
foundational documents of nationalist organizations, peace negotiations and treaties, and 
political resolutions.  And while positions will often be universally held amongst 
Palestinian and Israeli national leaders, neither side is a monolith.  Within each 
nationalist camp there have always existed rival factions, parties and individuals who try 
and shape the official political discourse to reflect their imagined future and goals.  It 
would take a much larger study than this to cover all of these different streams of 
discourse, so instead we will focus on a few major ones.  On the Palestinian side, we will 
focus on Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the three largest factions of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and eventually the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, better known as Hamas, which would emerge in 1989.  On the Israeli side we 
will focus primarily on the Labor party, which grew out of the socialist left wing settlers 
who arrived in historic Palestine in the first twenty years of the 20
th
 century, and the 
Likud party, their right wing rivals who came in the ensuing ten years of settlement.  I 
will not be covering every single document written by these producers of discourse but 
rather the ones that indicate a significant change in each side’s future vision.  This means 
that there will be periods where certain producers of discourse will more or less fall out 
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of the story.  For example, despite the multitude of documents produced throughout the 
Oslo process, few are of serious relevance because no new visions are presented.  Rather, 
older visions are reinforced.     
 I am going to argue that the future visions put forward by various Palestinian and 
Israeli national political leaders since 1967 have always been irreconcilable.  For the first 
twenty-five years of our period of study, the Palestinian and Israeli national groups 
claimed exclusive sovereignty over the entirety of historical Palestine.  These two claims, 
because of their exclusivity, were inherently irreconcilable.  Both sides could not get their 
way. There was an opportunity for this irreconcilability to end, or at least become merely 
contradictory, in 1989 when the Palestinian national movement renounced claims to 
sovereignty over the 78% of historical Palestine that became the state of Israel. Instead, 
the PLO claimed sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.  
However, when Israel recognized the Palestinian national movement in 1993, it chose not 
to make a reciprocal renunciation of claims over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Israel 
continued to see the occupied territories as Israeli land to give (or not give) away.  
Because this Israeli claim over the West Bank and Gaza Strip was enshrined in the Oslo 
Process upon which a permanent peace solution was meant to be negotiated, the claims 
remained irreconcilable.  Israel’s demands for expansion under the guise of its security 
have always claimed more of the land of the occupied territories than the Palestinian 
national movement was willing to cede.  After twenty years of negotiations based on this 
unbridgeable gap, the future visions of Palestinians and Israelis have begun to return to 
their original articulation of 1967.   
10 
 
 The study is structured around significant events or discursive changes in the 
history of the conflict.  The first chapter is a literature review of academic work on 
nationalism aimed at presenting the theory upon which Palestinian nationalism and 
Zionism emerged.  The second chapter tells the story of the conflict from its 19
th
 century 
inception up to the 1967 War, the beginning of our period of study.  Chapter three traces 
the official Israeli, international and Palestinian reaction to the war and lays down the 
baseline future visions from which we will track changes over the course of this study.  
Chapter four describes the articulation of Palestinian nationalist goals after the 1968 
takeover of the PLO by the three main factions we listed above. Chapter five describes 
the period after 1970 when the PLO was forced from its base in Jordan to Beirut and the 
accompanying discursive changes that ensued.  Chapter six tells the story of the rise of 
the right wing Likud party and their time as the first non-Labor government of Israel in 
the state’s history.  Chapter seven begins with the First Intifada (Palestinian revolution 
against the Israeli military occupation) in 1987 and describes the official adoption by the 
PLO of the desire to create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East 
Jerusalem as its capital.  Chapter eight tracks the Oslo Peace Process that came about as a 
result of the Intifada and the rise of the two state solution paradigm.  Chapter nine 
discusses the failure of the Oslo process and the second revolution these failures inspired.  
The epilogue describes what has occurred over the course of the last six months and 
discusses the discursive changes currently taking place in each national movement.  
Finally, the conclusion will outline the discursive changes we will have covered over the 
course of this study reassert that these future visions have always been irreconcilable.  
11 
 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 At its root, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a struggle between two national 
movements that seek to practice self-determination on the same piece of land.  In order to 
fully understand the conflict and the discourse produced by each national movement, it is 
necessary to understand their history.  When we trace the specific histories of these two 
national movements in the next chapter we will come to find that while disparate events 
led to the nationalization of the Palestinian and the European Jewish hopes, the 
nationalization process itself for these two peoples was remarkably similar.  Histories and 
theories of nationalism will be useful here. 
 In the introduction we turned to Benedict Anderson and his seminal work on 
nationalism, Imagined Communities, for the definition of nationhood that we will be 
using throughout this work.  Anderson describes the nation as “an imagined political 
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”1  But Anderson is 
not the only thinker on the subject of nationalism.  Most of his colleagues agree that 
nationalism, despite its tendency to present itself as both ancient and timeless, is a social 
construction with its roots in the 18
th
 century.  The debate, however, is over the extent to 
which the social construction of nationhood is based upon preexisting senses of 
community.  Some thinkers argue that the nations that emerged in the eighteenth century 
were reorganizations of existing communities who were united by a shared ethnicity, 
religion, language, culture etc.  Walker Connor, for example, describes nations as “a self-
                                                 
1
 Anderson, 6 
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aware ethnic group.”2  That is to say, he sees nations as an evolution of a preexisting 
group: once the “members are themselves aware of the group’s uniqueness,” it can 
become a nation.
3
  Others, such as Ernest Gellner, argue that it is the force of nationalism 
itself that creates the nation it claims to discover.  Gellner states that nationalism 
“sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents 
them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures.”4  No matter what side these thinkers 
take on the debate over the origins of today’s nations, few dispute that the emergence of 
these national movements depended on some level of social construction.   
This becomes quite clear when we look at the examples of France and Germany.  
No one would deny that the French and Germans today are well-established imagined 
communities, that is, nations.  However, to assume that this current sense of community 
bond amongst Frenchmen and Germans emerged naturally out of centuries of a shared 
culture and history would be categorically incorrect.  Rather, this shared culture and 
history was created with what Eric Hobsbawm calls “invented tradition.” 5  This invention 
of tradition is an innovative process which relies on
 “
the development of a secular 
equivalent to the church – primary education,” “the invention of public ceremonies,” and 
“the mass production of public monuments.”6   
                                                 
2
 Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is and Ethnic Group, is a...,” in Nationalism, ed. John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 45. 
3
 Ibid., 45. 
4
 Ernest Geller, “Nations and Nationalism” in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  63-64 
5
 Eric Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition,” in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony 
D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  76 
6
 Ibid., 77-8. 
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In France, the revolutionaries used this process of invention to institutionalize the 
French Revolution.  Primary education aimed to transform the peasants not only into 
Frenchmen, but “all Frenchmen into good Republicans.”7  That is, to make them 
members of the French nation.    Public ceremony in the same context, embodied by 
Bastille Day, served to “transform the heritage of the Revolution into a combined 
expression of state pomp and power and the citizens’ pleasure.”8  For the Third Republic, 
the main public monument was the image of “the Republic itself (in the form of 
Marianne which now became universally familiar).”9  This and other monuments “traced 
the grass roots of the Republic... and may be regarded as the visible links between the 
voter and the nation.”10  This allowed the peasants particularly to see themselves as tied 
to the centralized far away state.   
The same process occurred in Germany where the nationalization of what would 
become the German people in the wake of unification depended on the invention of 
tradition.  In the wake of unification, the Second German Empire faced two political 
problems according to Hobsbawm: “how to provide historical legitimacy for the 
Bismarckian (prusso-Little German) version of unification which had none; and how to 
deal with the large part of the democratic electorate which would have preferred another 
solution.”11  The German Empire turned to invented tradition to “establish the continuity 
between the Second and First German Empires, or  more generally, to establish the new 
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 Ibid., 77. 
8
 Ibid., 78. 
9
 Ibid., 78. 
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 Ibid., 78. 
11
 Ibid., 79. 
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Empire as the realization of the secular national aspirations of the German people; and to 
stress the specific historical experience which linked Prussia to the rest of Germany.”12  
This necessitated the combination of German and Prussian histories and the creation of 
national symbols and monuments as a means to symbolically tie the citizens of the new 
state together when all previously had in common was the experience of unification.   
We see, therefore, that even in the cases of nations who seem the oldest and most 
natural, their emergence depended on social construction that took place in the 18
th
 
century.  It is ridiculous, then, to discount nations on the basis that they are new, less real 
or less legitimate than some “natural” counterpart.  That a nationalist movement was 
articulated earlier and a nation created at the end of the 19
th
 century rather than the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century is irrelevant.  All nations depend on social constructions and 
therefore no one nation is more legitimate or less legitimate than any other.  Benedict 
Anderson makes this point very clearly in his work on the subject: “communities are to 
be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they were 
imagined.”13   
As Anderson says, however, nations are distinctive in the way they came to be 
imagined.  In the analysis of the thinkers we have looked at so far, either a dominant 
ethnic group asserts its identity over a wider and more diverse group, or state institutions 
use the school system and invented tradition to transform subjects of empire to citizens of 
a nation.  While these processes certainly did occur in some cases (primarily in Europe), 
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 Ibid., 79. 
13
 Anderson, 6. 
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this is not enough to explain the creation of imagined communities outside of the 
continent.  In the cases we will study, namely Zionism (the Jewish national movement) 
and Palestinian nationalism, there was neither a Jewish or Palestinian central state 
institutions nor dominant ethnic groups to force their will over a population at large.  
Rather, new ways of looking at the world and a shared set of experiences resulting from 
internal and external challenges and changes brought Jews to articulate Jewish 
nationalism and Palestinians to articulate Palestinian nationalism.   
In order to understand this new worldview that allowed for the creation of the 
Palestinian and Jewish nation we must now return to Anderson’s Imagined Communities. 
Anderson in his definition of a nation describes it as “sovereign.”  This notion of 
sovereignty is distinctly 18
th
 century.  It came about as a result of new Enlightenment 
ideas “destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realms.”14  
In the pre-national age, the primary frames of reference for individuals were religious 
communities and dynastic realms.  The religious community was imagined through the 
medium of a sacred language and a written script.  This meant that, unlike nations, the 
religious community was open.  Because individuals were “sacrally malleable,” they 
could gain membership by learning the sacred scrip and by adopting the pertinent 
religion.
15
  However, because the vast majority of the members of any given religious 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 7. 
15
 Ibid., 15.   
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community were illiterate, these communities necessitated hierarchy.  The literate were, 
in essence, spiritual translators who mediated between heaven and earth.
16
   
The decline of the religious community as the organizing force, although it did 
not in and of itself produce nations, allowed for the imagining of a new kind of 
community.  This decline of the religious community, according to Anderson, came as a 
result of exploration of the non-European world which widened the conception of 
possible forms of human life and led to the territorialization of religious community in a 
way that foreshadowed national limits.
17
  Also, the use of the sacred languages, 
particularly Latin in Europe, declined and was replaced by a multitude of vernaculars.  
This led to a fracturing of the once unified religious community which created limits 
where none existed before.
18
   
Also important was the decline of the dynastic realm.  Like the religious 
community, these entities, whose royal leaders gained their legitimacy from god, were far 
more plural and porous than the limited and sovereign states that we see today.  Take, for 
example, the Ottoman Empire which stretched into Europe, Asia and Africa and ruled a 
multitude of ethic and faith groups.  Enlightenment thinking, however, challenged the 
legitimacy of these dynastic realms.  The leaders were forced to look elsewhere for their 
legitimacy to rule.
19
  They would find it in the subjects that would become citizens.   
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When we start to trace the origins of Jewish nationalism in the next chapter we 
will see the direct results of this new worldview.  In late 18
th
 century Poland, for 
example, the Jewish community was largely autonomous with traditional religious 
institutions governing most aspects of everyday life.  It was therefore these religious 
institutions that held together the community.  However, when the Russian empire 
annexed Poland and its sizable Jewish community, tsar Catherine the Great attempted, in 
a quite draconian way, to bring this population into the folds of the state as Russian 
citizens.  She did this by dismantling the mediating institutions that kept the Jewish 
community autonomous and isolated from the state.  The goal was to ensure that Jews 
would interact with the state and its laws the same way as the rest of the citizens of 
Russia and therefore be assimilated into the fold of the nation.  And while anti-Semitism 
prevented this assimilation from actually occurring (as we shall touch on a bit later), the 
tsarist reorganization of the state changed self-perception of the Jewish community.  
Whereas before, Jewish faith and customs united them, the tsarist period taught Jews 
what it meant to be second class citizens of Russia.  The community became based not on 
religious tradition but shared experience.  This did not exclusively make Russian Jews 
turn to Zionism as opposed to any other form of social organization (indeed many turned 
to socialism as a new way of imagining society) but it did allow for a new way to imagine 
the community in which they lived.  The religious community had been replaced and a 
new sort of imagined community was emerging. 
A similar sort of re-imagination occurred amongst the Palestinians of the 19
th
 
century Ottoman Empire, although it occurred on an economic rather than religious level.  
18 
 
The centralization reforms undertaken by the Ottoman administration in the first half of 
the 18
th
 century combined with the entry of the local Palestinian economy into the world 
capitalist markets had a profound effect on the community of the common Ottoman 
Palestinian peasant.  The peasant changed from practicing more or less subsistence 
farming, producing what he needed for his own uses and a small amount extra to trade for 
what he could not make himself.  Instead Palestinian farmers began to grow a single 
cash-crop, usually cotton, which tied him to the whims of global market prices.  He found 
himself now in communion not only with his fellow villagers but also the merchants of 
the coastal cities on whom he depended for his livelihood.  Similarly, the 1834 revolt 
against Egyptian rule that we will recount in the next chapter brought individuals into 
communion that had previously been isolated. Again, this in and of itself did not create 
the Palestinian nation but it did lay the groundwork for the transition from pre-national to 
national imagination.   
What we are starting to see emerge, then, is the “imagined community” aspect of 
Anderson’s definition of nationhood.  He argues that nations are not communities in the 
common sense because true community necessitates face to face interaction.  Rather 
these communities are imagined.  That is to say, “the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”20  Anderson argues that “all 
communities lager than primordial villages of face to face contact (and perhaps even 
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these) are imagined.”21  This psychological bond is central to the creation of the nation.  
Under pluralistic empires, there was no sense that all of the subjects, who practiced a 
variety of religions and lived in various locations, were part of the same community.  As 
we noted above, the sense of community usually came from a shared religion.  Members 
of nations, however, see themselves as equal members of a single group despite the fact 
that they will never see most of their fellow members.  It is enough to know that they 
were born into the same nation.   
Anderson attributes much of the credit for this change in individual imagination to 
the advent of print capitalism.  The decline of the sacred languages was replaced by 
prioritized vernaculars which were, in turn, printed for a wide audience.  This led both to 
a fracturing of the previously existent religious community that relied on the sacred 
language and a unification of those peoples who shared the vernacular languages.  It gave 
individuals a means of communication with their fellow speakers of French or Spanish.  
It standardized these print vernaculars, meaning the languages themselves changed less 
over time than they had previously.  And it gave these print vernaculars power over the 
related lower vernaculars, folding them into the dominant tongue.
22
  This allowed widely 
dispersed people to see themselves as members of the same language community, again 
laying the groundwork for the imagination of a shared national community. 
It is not enough, however, to lay the root of all nationalism at the foot of print-
capitalism.  Nations with the same print vernacular emerged as distinct and different 
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imagined communities.  Here we see the role of an additional factor, shared experience in 
shaping different nationalism and nations.  Anderson discusses the different experiences 
of colonies and their imperial center that led to the establishment of distinct nations.  
Shared experience played a similarly critical role in the formation of Zionism and 
Palestinian nationalism.   
This shared experience leads to the construction of narratives upon which 
nationalism are based.  Discourse itself, the subject of this study, is in many ways an 
extension of narrative which redefines the past and projects a vision into the future.  
Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon eloquently and succinctly describe the form and 
function of narrative in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  They write that 
narrative “does not necessarily tell a true history but rather describes a past that is useful 
for the group to function and even exist. It is a story that is biased, selective, and 
distorted, that omits certain facts, adds others that did not take place, changes the 
sequence of events, and purposely reinterprets events that did take place.  In short, it is a 
narrative constructed to fit the current needs of the group.”23  The Palestinian and Zionist 
narratives present themselves as completely just and correct and seeks to nullify the 
narrative of the other. The narratives have their base in the shared experience of each 
imagined community.  
The shared experience of the Palestinians has its roots in the economic and 
political pressures we outlined above, reaction to invasion in the same time period and 
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perhaps most crucially, reaction to the imperial control and Zionist occupation of 
Palestine in the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  Zionism, which was a minority concern 
amongst the global Jewish community until well into the 20
th
 century, was a reaction as 
well.  The thinkers behind Jewish nationalism were not influenced by colonization of 
their homes, but rather by the nationalization across Europe in the 18
th
 century, the failure 
to assimilate in either Western or Eastern Europe and, most importantly, the constant 
threat of anti-Semitism.  While it was just as likely that Palestinians would find 
themselves fighting for a Syrian nation and the Jews of Europe fighting as full members 
of a French or German nation, the shared experiences we will discuss in the coming 
chapter instead led to Palestinian and Jewish nationalists fighting for exclusive control 
over the same piece of land.  And crucially, as Anderson emphasized, neither nationalism 
is more legitimate and neither one is more genuine.  Each is a social construction based 
on a shared narrative that emerged in roughly the same period.   
There is one fundamental difference in the way Palestinian nationalism and 
Zionism were imagined.  Palestinian nationalism, as we will see shortly, was articulated 
by a population that lived within the land it claimed.  Zionism, on the other hand, was 
articulated by European Jews who lived outside of the land of historical Palestine.  
Whereas Palestinian spacial and temporal ties to historical Palestine were inherent 
because of their presence in the land, the Jews of 19
th
 century Europe had no physical ties 
to their claimed national homeland.  While it is true that Zionism is in part based on the 
narrative that historical Palestine is the promised land of the Jewish people and that there 
has been a continuous, but small, Jewish presence in Palestine since antiquity, these facts 
22 
 
were not in themselves enough for the creation of a Jewish state.  The success of Zionism 
as a national movement depended on the creation of spacial and temporal ties to the land 
in order to demonstrate its Jewishness.  As this could not be done from Germany and 
Russia, colonial settlement in historical Palestine was necessary.  These settlements were 
the physical representation of Jewish national claims to historical Palestine.  This 
colonization came at the cost of the Palestinians who lived in the land.  Despite what 
some Zionists slogans would suggest, Palestine a well-populated territory with a complex 
economy at the beginning of Zionist settlement.   Without this colonization, Zionism 
would not have had a base upon which a Jewish state could be founded.  Palestinian 
presence in the land meant that no colonization was necessary for the narrative of the 
Palestinian national movement.  Rather than mass population transfer and settlement, 
existence in the land of Palestine, the economic and political pressures outlined above, 
and a set of crucial shared experiences provided the base from which Palestinian 
nationalism would grow.  And while arguments can be made that either nationalism is 
more legitimate on the basis of this fundamental difference, that debate is not within the 
scope of this study.  Rather, we will track the development of these two national 
movements and study the period from 1967 when they came once again into direct 
conversation. 
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Chapter 2: The Roots of the Conflict; 1834-1967 
Historical Palestine sits at the far eastern periphery of the Mediterranean Sea.  
Spiritually, Palestine is at the center of the three major monotheistic religions.  To 
Judaism, it is the land promised by God to the Israelites.  Its heart is Jerusalem, where 
Herod’s Temple once stood, of which now only remains the Western Wall, the holiest 
site in the Jewish faith.  To Christianity, Palestine is the birthplace of the son of God.  It 
was the land in which Jesus conducted his ministry and Jerusalem was the site of his 
crucifixion.  To Islam, Palestine was the core of the great Muslim empires of the Middle 
Ages.  The city of Al-Quds, as Jerusalem is known in Arabic, was the place from which 
the Prophet Mohammad ascended to heaven on his Night Journey.  Al-Quds was the first 
direction of prayer for Islam, before it was overtaken by Mecca, and sits only behind 
Mecca and Medina in terms of holiness in the eyes of the Muslim faithful.  
 Geographically, Palestine sits at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and Europe. As 
such, it has been a vital holding for any empire seeking to control the flow of goods and 
people between these three continents in the era before air travel.  At the heart of 
Palestine is the city of Jerusalem.  Its centrality is not lost on the current stewards of the 
city.  In the plaza that surrounds the Israeli city hall on Jaffa Street, just outside of the 
walls of Old City, there is a painted tile version of German theologian Heinrich Bünting’s 
clover leaf map (fig 1).  Printed in 1581, this map literally places Jerusalem at the center 
of the world reflecting both its spiritual and geographic significance.   
24 
 
 
Fig 1 Heinrich Bünting’s 1581 depiction of Jerusalem. 
The territory itself is about the size of New Jersey and is home to about 11 million 
people, 7.8 million inside of Israel and 3 to 3.5 million in the occupied Palestinian 
territories.
1
  As was often the case in the days before nationalism set out to draw hard 
lines over the entirety of the globe, the borders of Palestine were ever-changing.  There 
are, however, general geographic regions that have remained a constant part of Palestine. 
East of Jerusalem is the semi-arid hilly region known officially by the Israeli state as 
Judea and Samaria and in common parlance as the West Bank.  To the south is the Negev 
(Naqab in Arabic) Desert which extends down to Eilat on the shore of the Red Sea.  To 
the west of the holy city is the low-lying coastal plain that extends from Gaza in the south 
to Acre in the north.  To the north of the West Bank are the fertile valleys of the Galilee.   
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 The Ottoman Empire was the last great imperial ruler of the Middle East.  Initially 
a group of Turkic warriors based in Western Anatolia, the Ottomans took Constantinople 
from the Byzantines in 1453 and renamed it Istanbul.
2
  Istanbul would serve as the seat of 
the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution in the wake of World War I.  At its height, the 
empire expanded west into the Balkans in Europe, as far east as modern day Iraq and 
Kuwait and south into Egypt and Algeria in North Africa.  Palestine came under Ottoman 
rule in 1516 and the Ottomans would rule it for the ensuing four hundred years.
3
   
 The foundation of both Palestinian nationalism and Zionism were directly 
connected to the larger culture of nationalism that developed in Europe in the 19
th
 
century.  This culture of nationalism in Europe that was transforming the old empires into 
nation-states provided the model for organizing Ottoman Palestinians and European Jews 
into new imagined communities called nations.  It was inevitable that Palestinians and 
European Jews would fall into this new movement.  However, while the Palestinian and 
Israeli nations now are apparent and self-evident, there was never a guarantee that these 
particular imagined communities would form as we see them today.  As much as nations 
like to present themselves as the awakening of ethnic groups that have existed eternally, 
that Ottoman Palestinians would see themselves as Palestinians and European Jews 
would see themselves as Jewish nationalists was never a certainty.  Had events gone 
slightly differently, Palestinians could have seen themselves as members of a Syrian 
state.  Similarly, Jewish nationalists might have been killing and dying to protect France 
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or Germany as proud citizens.  James L. Gelvin underscores this point brilliantly in his 
excellent history of the Palestinian Israeli conflict:  
That in a world of nation-states Jews would become nationalists was inevitable.  
That they would become Jewish Nationalists was not.  The same with Palestinian 
nationalism, which did not become a mass phenomenon until well into the period 
between World War I and World War II.  That Palestinians would travel a 
nationalist path was also to be expected.  But... the path they travelled to 
Palestinian nationalism was laden with obstacles and detours.
4
 
The Inception of a Palestinian Identity 
 The creation of a singular Palestinian imagined community was partially a result 
of the internal and external pressure on the ruling Ottoman Empire during the 19
th
 
century.  These pressures, which would have profound impacts on the way Palestinians 
saw themselves and their community, were on the one hand economic and on the other 
political.   
The economic relationship was characterized by the entry of Palestine into the 
global market.  In an earlier era, most of the villages of Palestine were small market 
economies that traded in a limited range of goods.  Participants in this economic system 
produced for themselves almost everything they needed.  They would then trade their 
surplus in the local market for the few things they could not make themselves.  During 
the first half of the 19
th
 century, villagers switched from this self-sustaining economic 
model to at market-based economic model.  Rather than only producing what they 
needed, farmers would grow crops for the purpose of sale.  They would then take the 
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proceeds from that cash crop to purchase the goods they no longer made for themselves.
5
  
The demand from the newly industrialized European states for raw materials caused 
prices of certain specialized crops to rise sharply.  This rising of prices in the global 
market is what made many Palestinian farmers turn to the growing of specialized cash 
crops.  Two crops were particularly important in Palestine: cotton and oranges.
6
  The 
scholar Alexander Schölch covers this pivotal period in Palestine’s history in his book 
Palestine in Transformation.  He describes in great detail the development of the 
Palestinian economy in the mid-19
th
 century, before the arrival of Zionist settlers, and the 
role that European demand for Palestinian goods and Ottoman reforms played in the 
socio-economic transformation of the region.
7
  Far from being a desolate and 
uncultivated wasteland, Palestine, according to Schölch, had a vibrant economy emerging 
in the period between 1856 and 1882.
8
  This economic growth would come to have 
significant consequences regarding the development of the residents of Palestine into the 
Palestinian people.  
Such was the lucrative nature of cotton production in the context of the massive 
textile demand during the industrial revolution that it was able to provide the means for 
local warlords to challenge the authority of the massive Ottoman Empire.  James Gelvin 
relates the story of Zahir al-‘Umar, a Bedouin warrior who conquered the Galilee, the 
point of origin of the best quality cotton in the entire empire.  Al-‘Umar expanded the 
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production of cotton in the area under his control and traded the stuff to Europeans for 
weapons and material to renovate his capital city, Acre, and found the city of Haifa.
9
  
After a short period of rule, the Ottomans had enough of al-‘Umar’s insolence and sent a 
force to displace him.  His successor maintained the region’s dependence on cotton as the 
primary export.   
Tying one’s economy to the whims of the international market had its ups and 
downs, however.  The invention of the cotton gin at the end of the 18
th
 century allowed 
the American South to flood the world market with cheap cotton.  This caused prices to 
plummet in Palestine, 90% in the half century after the invention of the gin.
10
   However, 
the onset of the Crimean War in the 1850s caused demand for cotton, and therefore 
prices, to increase. The same occurred in the 1860s when the American Civil War took 
American cotton off the market.  But when the war ended and cotton exportation from the 
southern United States resumed, prices plummeted yet again.
11
   
Palestine’s entrance into the global market did more than just economically tie the 
Palestinian fellaheen (peasants) to the wars of Europe and the United States.  This new 
market economy had drastic psychological effects on the resident of Ottoman Palestine 
that changed the way he or she saw a fellow resident of the region.  Once again Gelvin is 
the perfect person to turn to when describing the effects this phenomenon: 
The expansion of a market economy in Palestine enlarged what one historian calls 
the “social space” of its inhabitants, in effect changing their perception of their 
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lived world as links between cities and countryside, and between inhabitants of 
the region and inhabitants of the world beyond, increased in number and 
importance.
12
 
In other words, just as the advent of print capitalism in Europe allowed the 
subjects of the empire to imagine themselves as coterminous and in communion with a 
new imagined community, the advent of market capitalism redefined the resident of 
Ottoman Palestine’s community.  Whereas before the Palestinian farmer was self-
sustaining, growing barely more than he needs to support himself and his family, his 
entry into the market necessitates he move within a new community. Suddenly the 
Palestinian famer is tied to the merchant class operating in the coastal cities of Jaffa and 
Acre.  Before he never would have met these merchants (he probably still will not meet 
most of them) but now his livelihood depends on the merchant’s ability to sell the cash 
crop he produced.  He now imagines himself as a member of the same community as 
these people he will never meet.  While this entry into the market did not create the 
Palestinian nation on its own, it was an important factor in laying the psychological 
foundation necessary for the building of that nation.   
The other important factor that influenced Palestinian identity formation under the 
Ottoman Empire was political pressure.  Political pressure to modernize the Ottoman 
Empire came from forces both within and outside of the empire’s domain.  Internal 
challenges to Ottoman control of Palestine came from the ruler of Egypt, Muhammad 
Ali.  Muhammad Ali was the son of an Albanian pirate who seized power in Egypt after 
leading a joint British and Ottoman force to remove Napoleon’s troop from the region in 
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1798.
 13
  Muhammad Ali was able to modernize and westernize the state intuitions in 
Egypt which allowed him considerable autonomy as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire.  
These new modern intuitions in Egypt included a by conscription military force, direct 
taxation on the population, the expansion of cash crop cultivation, and public works 
projects like roads and irrigation that expanded the area of cultivatable land.
14
 
Unsatisfied with just ruling Egypt, Muhammad Ali sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to 
conquer Palestine as well.  Control of this territory would give Muhammad Ali access to 
the fertile lands of the Galilee and control over the flow of goods between Europe, Asia 
and Africa.  Ibrahim Pasha’s occupation of Palestine and parts of Greater Syria (the area 
of the Eastern Mediterranean also known as the Levant which is today made up by 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel) began in 1831 and 
lasted for ten years.  Ibrahim Pasha brought the same modern institutions to Palestine that 
his father had introduced in Egypt a couple of decades earlier.
15
  The state monopoly of 
force in Palestine created by Ibrahim Pasha’s disarming of peasants and Bedouin meant 
more security.  This security allowed more land to be cultivated, merchants to make 
stronger ties to European businessmen and an expansion of tourism to Palestine.
16
  This 
allowed for further expansion of social space as illustrated above and provided the 
framework of the modern state structure on which nationalism relies.   
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However, needless to say, the Palestinian peasant reaction to the forced 
conscription enacted by Ibrahim Pasha, which was often a death sentence due to the style 
of battle and poor sanitary conditions of the day, was not positive.
17
  In 1834, about three 
years into his occupation of Palestine, Ibrahim Pasha’s power was challenged by a 
popular Palestinian revolt.  While this revolt did not do enough to unseat Ibrahim Pasha 
from rule in Palestine (that would take a British assisted Ottoman force seven years later), 
it was central in laying the foundation for the conception of Palestinian peoplehood.  It is 
not by accident, then, that Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal begin their book The 
Palestinian People: A History with this 1834 revolt against this foreign rule.  They 
describe it thus: 
The tough rule and the new reforms led to the 1834 revolt’s outbreak in the heart 
of the country, uniting dispersed Bedouins, rural sheikhs, urban notables, 
mountain fellaheen, and Jerusalem religious figures against a common enemy.  It 
was these groups who would later constitute the Palestinian people.
18
   
This is not to say that the revolt of 1834 created the Palestinian people that we see 
today (a mass Palestinian national phenomenon would not be in full swing until the 
period between the two world wars).  Rather, just as the new market forces expanded the 
social space of the Palestinian farmer or merchant, this revolt allowed the individual to 
identify himself as a member of a Palestinian community.  The Palestinian attempt at 
self-determination and independence in Palestine was a long way off, but this became one 
of the shared experiences that would be important to the formation of a single Palestinian 
people.  The Ottoman subject living in historical Palestine in the mid-19
th
 century was 
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beginning to see himself as in communion with his fellow subjects in the region in a way 
that had not existed before the new economic system or modern state structure.   
When the Ottomans finally expelled Ibrahim Pasha a decade after he took control 
of the region, they saw the merits in his new modern state institutions and maintained 
them.  They imposed conscription and sought to maintain security in the region so as to 
continue the expansion of cultivated land in Palestine.  They also built the famous Hijaz 
Railway that ran from Damascus to Medina and made stops in Haifa and Acre.  This all 
allowed for the continued expansion of agriculture and increase of revenue going to the 
Ottoman coffers. 
19
   
However, the Ottomans were not quite satisfied with the status quo.  Internal 
challenges, like those posed by Muhammad Ali, and external pressures from the 
European powers further pushed the Ottomans towards centralization and modernization.  
The imperial authority enacted the Tanzimat, or “reorganization” in 1839 to strengthen 
the Ottoman central government and integrate non-Turkish and non-Muslim subjects to 
stem the growing wave of nationalism sweeping though parts of its domain.
20
  The 
Tanzimat reforms addressed nearly all aspects of rule including the legal system, the 
school system, tax collection, and even the creation of a national anthem, in order to 
make the empire mirror the centralized western empires and states of the mid-19
th
 
century.  By far the most significant aspect of these reforms for the residents of Palestine 
were the changes they made to the system of land ownership. 
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The goal of the new land laws was to reorganize land ownership in a way that 
would streamline the collection of tax revenue throughout the empire.  Before the 
reforms, much of the land of Palestine was state land, known as miri land.
21
  The 
peasant’s relationship to the land was based on a usufruct system of sorts.  He had the 
right to live on the land, till it, and keep what it produced but he had no legal claim to the 
land itself and no right to pass it on to his descendants.
22
  In practice, this state land was 
passed from generation to generation but the peasant had no legal deed that tied his name 
or his family’s name to the piece of land on which he worked.  This was complicated, 
however, by the fact that village land was periodically redistributed about every two 
years.
23
 This lack of documentation and continuous redistribution of land made it nearly 
impossible for the Ottoman officials to determine who was responsible for paying the 
taxes on a particular piece of land.  The answer the Ottoman state came up with to this 
problem was the 1858 Land Code.  This new law allowed a peasant to register the land on 
which he worked with the state, thus legalizing ownership and assuming the tax burden 
for the land.  It also gave the peasant the right to pass the land on to whomever he 
chose.
24
   
The consequences of this land code were immediate and drastic.  The new code 
did not allow for communal ownership of land.  Therefore, village sheikhs, the local 
leaders responsible for distributing lands to the various village families, would register 
the formerly communally owned land in their names.  Additionally, peasants who were 
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unable to pay the registration fee for their land, who were unwilling to pay taxes on their 
land or who feared conscription into the Ottoman army allowed urban notables to register 
the land in their name.  This created a new class of landholders who held huge tracts of 
land throughout Palestine and often lived as far away as Beirut or Damascus.
25
  The most 
famous of these notable families was the Greek Orthodox Sarsuq family of Beirut.  The 
Sarsuqs bought up nearly seventy square miles of very fertile Galilee land and were all 
too happy to sell it for top dollar when the Jewish National Fund came calling a few 
decades later.
26
  The peasants who allowed these urban notables to register their land 
carried on farming it the way they did before, despite the new legal changes.   
A second important law passed in 1867 gave non-Ottoman citizens the right to 
own land in the empire as long as they agreed to carry the tax burden of the land.
27
  These 
two laws would turn out to be a boon for the soon to appear Zionist settlers looking for 
land in Palestine.   
This new classification of land as commodity also fundamentally changed the 
relationship between the peasant and the empire.  This classification (peasant and empire) 
is appropriate for the imperial, pre-national age where diverse groups distinguishable by 
language, religion, ethnicity, and geography were united under a single imperial power. 
This imperial power did not see itself as representative of its subjects; its power came 
from the divine.  The subjects did not see themselves as organically tied to the empire.  
They did not believe that they were of the same community as the kings and lords who 
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ruled them.  Relationships changed at different times across the globe into one of citizen 
and state.  Eventually, as Benedict Anderson describes, enlightenment thinking 
undermines divine rule.  Empires start to get legitimacy by representing the citizens they 
created.  The new citizens begin to imagine themselves as coterminous with other citizens 
of the same state and, maybe more importantly, as fundamentally different from citizens 
of another state.  The Ottomans attempted this transition from empire to state beginning 
in the mid-19
th
 century.  Central to this transition were the tanzimat reforms, among them 
the new land codes.  This new state structure changed the relationship of the Ottoman 
subjects to the empire and to one another.  These reforms sought to standardize the 
interaction between citizen and state by removing traditional forms of rule and mediating 
institutions to ensure that all Ottoman citizens encountered the state in exactly the same 
way.  This attempt was embodied in the Hatti Humayun in 1856.  This law ensured equal 
rights to all non-Muslim citizens of the empire.
28
  As Gelvin says, this new law 
“redefined imperial subjects as citizens who were bound to each other because of their 
residence in a common territory, their commitment to a common set of legal norms, and 
their common loyalty to the Ottoman state.”29  With this new way of conceiving the 
world and the community in which one lives came the ability for Palestinians to begin 
imagining themselves as part of the same imagined community.    
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The Jews of 19
th
 Century Europe 
Just as the Palestinians of the Ottoman Empire found themselves caught up in the 
wave of min-nineteenth century nationalization, the European Jews were similarly 
affected by the nationalist zeitgeist.  Europe during this time period was home to ninety 
percent of the global Jewish population.
30
  This Jewish population was for the most part 
confined to ghettos in the larger European cities and was subject to waves of persecution 
and anti-Semitism.   Within these ghettos, the Jewish community regulated its own 
religious, social, and economic activities in isolation from the wider non-Jewish society.
31
  
As the relationship between the ruled and the ruler changed in Europe, as it had in the 
Ottoman Empire, from one of subject and empire to citizen and state, so did the place of 
Jews in European society.  In a system where all inhabitants are to be citizens of the same 
state, isolated semi-autonomous communities no longer fit.  All citizens would deal with 
the state structure in the same way, without non-state mediating institutions, like those of 
European Jewish communities.  Rather, in a process known as Jewish Emancipation, the 
Jews would be included into the citizenry at large and be encouraged to assimilate into 
whatever nation each state was creating.
32
  The first state to emancipate its Jewish 
community was post-revolutionary France.  In 1791, the Jews of France were offered full 
French citizenship in the hope that they would cease to see themselves as a distinct 
population and instead as members of the French nation.
33
  In the following decades, the 
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British, Swiss, Austrian, Italian, and German states would follow the French example in 
including the once distinct Jewish population as full citizens of the state.
34
  This ideal of 
Jewish assimilation into the nations of Europe was embraced by the majority of the 
Jewish population it affected.  Assimilation progressed rapidly to the point that, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, Jews were able to stand for election into the British parliament.
35
  
But this new destruction of social barriers did not totally reverse the sometimes tacit, 
sometimes explicit, anti-Jewish sentiments that had existed in European history for 
centuries.   
This policy of assimilation, however, was a distinctly Western European 
phenomenon.  In Eastern Europe, where the majority of the global Jewish population 
resided, assimilation, social, and legal equality were not policies, or even distant 
possibilities.
36
  It is therefore understandable why Zionism, a national movement based 
on the idea of Jewish resettlement outside of Europe, was more immediately accepted 
within the Jewish community of Eastern Europe.   
Around the time that the French Republic was granting Jews full citizenship, the 
Russian Empire was passing laws establishing a new system to govern the Jews within 
the borders of its empire.
37
  Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the territory that 
had constituted Poland was divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria. The Russian 
Empire had long endeavored to keep Jews out of Russian territory altogether, and, before 
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the annexation of this partitioned Polish territory, had largely succeeded.  However, the 
desire for territory outweighed the competing desire to keep the empire empty of a 
significant Jewish population and Russia decided to absorb parts of Poland despite the 
Jewish community therein.
38
  This decision to absorb the new Jewish population did not 
indicate a changing Russian attitude towards Jews.  Quite the opposite: Russians looked 
on Jews with suspicion because of their separatism and isolationism (which, ironically, 
was often created by Russian laws preventing Jews from participating in Russian society) 
and therefore the new Jewish population was a problem that needed to be dealt with.  The 
solution of Catherine the Great to this perceived problem was the establishment of the 
Pale of Settlement.  The Pale was an area on the western edge of the empire in which 
Jews were permitted to live.  Jews were only allowed to live outside of the Pale with 
specific permission. Within the Pale, the Jewish community was frequently a victim of 
attacks by its non-Jewish neighbors.
 39
       
Catherine the Great, however, was motivated to create the Pale of Settlement by 
more than anti-Semitism.  From an economic perspective, the state saw a Jewish 
commercial class as potentially beneficial to the underdeveloped western extent of the 
empire.  Also, Russian businessmen feared the competition that an influx of Jewish 
professionals would create.
40
  In a twisted way, the establishment of the Pale sought to 
achieve the same goals of emancipation in Western Europe.  The Pale was seen as a 
means to break down the autonomous intermediary intuitions that dealt with the everyday 
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aspects of Jewish life.  These intermediary institutions had no place in the modern state 
structure where all individual citizens of the state are meant to be subject to the same 
rules and laws.  With these traditional Jewish community and religious institutions 
undermined, it would be possible to make them full Russian citizens (once converted to 
Christianity, of course).
41
  One policy aimed towards Russifying Jews was conscription 
into the imperial army.  The memo that accompanied the order for conscription was 
tellingly titled “Memorandum on Turning the Jews to the Advantage of the Empire by 
Gradually Drawing Them to Profess the Christian Faith, Bringing Them Closer to, and 
Ultimately Completely Fusing Them with, The Other Subjects of the Empire.”  The state 
even opened a number of schools for Jewish students as a means to carry out this process 
of “completely fusing them with, the other subjects of the empire.”42  
Even though the policies aimed at destruction of the traditional Jewish institutions 
were relatively successful in the Pale, assimilation into Russian society never became a 
seemingly achievable reality as it did in Western Europe.  Deeply held anti-Semitism by 
Russians prevented this from coming to pass.  This anti-Semitic feeling manifested itself 
in a number of anti-Jewish riots, known as pogroms, beginning in 1881 and lasting until 
1884.  The victims felt that even though these rioters were brought before the law, they 
had the tacit approval of the tsar for their actions.
 43
  Evidence for this was the passing of 
the anti-Jewish May Laws in 1882 which limited the area that Jews could inhabit and 
lead to many expulsions of those Jews living outside this area.  The laws also limited the 
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land and home owning ability of Jewish individuals and limited the number of Jews that 
could be in a university at any one time.
44
   These restrictions, which were meant to be 
temporary but ended up lasting three decades, changed the demographic profile of the 
Jewish community in the Russian Empire. They resulted in a Jewish community that was 
disproportionately urbanized and engaged in commerce rather than agriculture.  This 
urban population found itself more exposed to the political and social movements 
sweeping through the cities of nineteenth century Europe, movements such as socialism, 
trade unionism and nationalism, which would become so central to the Zionist movement 
in the twentieth century.
45
  Much in the way that the integration of the Ottoman 
Palestinians into the world economy and state modernization allowed for the foundation 
of a new Palestinian community, the Pale and the laws that forced the Jewish 
intermediary institutions out of power changed the self-image of the Jewish community.  
Shared culture and history, not religion, began to be the unifying factor of Jews in 
Eastern Europe and it is upon a sense of shared culture and history that a national 
movement is built.
46
 
The riots and anti-Jewish laws that made assimilation seem impossible naturally 
led to a wave of migration out of the Russian Empire. By far, the preferred destination for 
these migrants was the United States.  In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
450,000 Russian Jews arrived in the United States.
47
  But the pogroms in Russia also 
instigated the first of five major Waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine, known as 
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aliyot.  Literally translated, aliyah means ascent and to this day is used to describe a Jew 
who leaves the Diaspora to settle in historical Palestine.  The settlers of this first aliyah 
could not really be called Zionists as they predated the articulation of Jewish nationalism 
and were therefore religiously and not nationally motivated.
48
  These settlers were aided 
by a proto-Zionist organization known as the Lovers of Zion.  This group set up a number 
of agricultural settlements in Palestine but of the twenty to thirty thousand settlers who 
entered historical Palestine as a part of this aliyah, only three thousand went to inhabit 
these agricultural villages.
49
  These settlements quickly found themselves in dire 
economic straits.  The Lovers of Zion turned to western Jews for cash.  They found 1.6 
million pounds in the pockets of Baron Edmond de Rothschild which propped up the 
settlements, but, as we shall see, did not provide the base upon which the success of the 
Zionist project was built.
50
  Rather, it took the efforts of Theodor Herzl to provide the 
institution framework of Jewish nationalism. 
Herzl and Zionism 
Theodor Herzl was perhaps an unlikely candidate to play the fundamental role he 
would come to play in the early days of the Zionist movement.  Herzl was not the product 
of the Pale but of emancipated Western Europe.  His father was a Hungarian merchant 
who moved his family to Vienna in search of the upward mobility assimilation offered 
Jews.
51
  Herzl himself was highly assimilated.  He did not celebrate a bar mitzvah at the 
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age of thirteen as is Jewish custom but rather a “confirmation.”52  He received a secular 
education, went to law school and, after practicing law for a short period, entered the civil 
service.
53
  He eventually became the French correspondent for a Viennese newspaper.
 54
    
Herzl was not particularly interested in issues pertaining to the Jewish community for 
much of his life.  Nor was he familiar with the writings of the intellectual leaders behind 
the early Zionist groups like the Lovers of Zion.
55
  He was far more preoccupied with his 
journalistic and literary career and wanted to become a contributor to German literature.
56
  
This all changed with what came to be known as the Dreyfus Affair. 
Captain Alfred Dreyfus was an assimilated Jew who managed to rise to a lofty 
position in the French army.  In 1894, Dreyfus was wrongly accused of spying for 
Germany, found guilty of treason, and exiled to Devil’s Island.57  Dreyfus was eventually 
able to prove his innocence more than a decade after his original trial but the damage had 
been done well before that as far as Herzl was concerned.  The initial accusation against 
Dreyfus was a result of anti-Semitism and public calls for his conviction were explicitly 
anti-Jewish.  The French right, who lead the anti-Semitic charge against Dreyfus, 
believed that the granting of rights to Jews undermined the French nation.
58
  Many non-
Jews fought in defense of Dreyfus but to Herzl, who covered the affair for his Viennese 
newspaper, the whole event illuminated the depth of anti-Semitism that existed in open 
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and liberal France.  The Dreyfus affair proved to Herzl that Jewish assimilation into 
European society was impossible.  Two years after the event Herzl published Der 
Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in which he called for the creation of a Jewish state to 
absorb all of Europe’s Jews as an answer to what he called “the Jewish Question.”59  This 
appeal to create a Jewish state was not directed to Jews at large.  Rather, he aimed his 
message to wealthy Western Jews and prominent political leaders who he thought might 
give their financial and political support to an organization aimed at transferring Europe’s 
Jews to a new home.
60
  Initially, Herzl was not married to Palestine as the site of this new 
home.  Amongst the other sites that Herzl was willing to consider were Argentina, East 
Africa
61
 and the western United States.
62
  He did acknowledge that should the Jewish 
state be located in Palestine, the historical religious tie to the land would attract Jews in a 
way that another site would not.
63
  Herzl knew, however, that for Jewish settlement 
anywhere to work there needed to be an institution dedicated to the success of Zionism.   
In order to create this Zionist institution, Herzl issued a call for the leaders of 
local Jewish communities and Zionist organizations to convene in Basel, Switzerland in 
1897.
64
  Of the two hundred or so attendees of this meeting, only a small number were 
the influential western Jewish leaders he wished to attract.  Most of these leaders feared 
that Zionism would put the status and rights of assimilated Jews in danger.  The majority 
of attendees, understandably, were from Eastern Europe, where assimilation was not a 
                                                 
59
 Ibid., 30. 
60
 Ibid., 30.   
61
 Tessler, 47. 
62
 Gelvin, 51. 
63
 Ibid., 51. 
64
 Tessler, 47.  
44 
 
possibility and therefore the status of assimilated Jews was not an issue.
65
  The two most 
significant outcomes of what would come to know as the First Zionist Congress were the 
foundation of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the articulation of the Basil 
Program.  The World Zionist Organization became the institutional structure necessary to 
stimulate the Zionist movement.  The Basel Program codified the goals of this new 
organization.  The Program is not long, only four points, and reads: 
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured 
by public law. 
The congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 
1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish 
agricultural and industrial workers. 
2. The organization and binding together of the whole Jewry by means of 
appropriate institutions, local and international in accordance with the laws of 
each country. 
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and 
consciousness. 
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to 
the attainment of the aim of Zionism.
66
 
This program is particularly important for two reasons.  The first is that it makes 
settlement specifically in Palestine the stated goal of the Zionist movement.  The second 
is that it insists on obeying “public law” (meaning diplomacy) to achieve its goal.  This 
insistence on diplomacy explains the use of the word “homeland” rather than state in the 
Program. The use of this word should not be misinterpreted to mean the WZO was 
abandoning Herzl’s goal of a Jewish state.  Rather, it is more likely that the delegates at 
the conference were looking to assuage the concerns of the Ottoman government which 
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would look aversely on any national movement challenging control over its territory.
67
  
Herzl and the WZO wanted to keep the lines of diplomacy open with the Ottoman sultan 
as a means to set about the colonization of Palestine.  It is clear, as the establishment of a 
state is inexorably tied to nationalism and Zionism is Jewish nationalism, that a state was 
indeed the end goal of the WZO.  The Ottomans were wary of Jewish settlers (as we 
covered previously, a number had arrived during the first aliyah a couple decades earlier) 
and passed laws that only allowed Jews to purchase land in Ottoman territory outside of 
Palestine and only on the condition that they accepted Ottoman citizenship. However, 
because of Ottoman inefficiency and aid from Jews within the empire, the WZO was able 
to circumvent these stipulations.
68
   
Another vitally important development in the early history of the Zionist 
movement was the creation of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 1901.  This 
organization was designed to purchase and develop land in Palestine for exclusively 
Jewish use.
69
  The JNF still exists, owns and develops sizable chucks of land, both in 
Israel proper and in the occupied territories, and has taken on the status of a quasi-state 
institution in modern day Israel.
70
  
It is important to note, however, that Zionism was not by any means a mainstream 
Jewish movement in the early days of the WZO.  Herzl had originally intended for the 
First Zionist Congress to be held in Munich but he was forced to relocate due to 
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opposition from the German Union of Rabbis.  The Union saw Zionism as “antagonistic 
to the messianic promises of Judaism.”71  He also faced opposition from the left, who, 
consistent with the communist worldview, saw the resolution of the Jewish Question in 
terms of class rather than national interest.
72
   Herzl was not daunted by this opposition 
and set about securing diplomatic support for the Zionist project. In 1901, He met with 
Sultan Abdul Hamid, the Ottoman ruler and a year later turned to the British.
73
  The 
British offered Herzl land in what is now Kenya for Jewish settlement; an idea Herzl 
favored and believed would not compromise the potential later establishment of a Jewish 
state in Palestine.  He was staunchly opposed in this by the Eastern European bloc of the 
WZO who remained committed to Palestine as the sole target for Jewish settlement.  
With Herzl’s death in 1904 and the transfer of the WZO’s leadership to this Eastern bloc, 
the Kenya project failed.
74
  Despite this failure, and the failure of Herzl to gain truly 
widespread support for Zionist aims, he is perhaps the most widely recognized and 
influential Zionist in the history of the movement.  His name adorns street signs in towns 
across all of Israel and his reburial in Jerusalem in 1949 was the first state funeral in the 
history of the nascent Israeli state.
75
  The manifestation of Herzl’s commitment to 
Zionism would be the wave of ideological settlers that came to Palestine in the wake of 
his death. 
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The Second and Third Aliyot 
The first aliyah, a result of the Russian pogroms in the 1880’s, is particularly 
interesting when contrasted with the two aliyot that would follow it.  As we noted before, 
these settlers could not be considered Zionist because they were motivated by religious 
rather than national impulses.  The agricultural settlements founded as part of this wave 
of immigration struggled financially and turned to the help of wealthy western Jews such 
as Baron de Rothschild.  Like the settlers, Baron de Rothschild was not motivated 
nationalist zeal.  He was more interested in getting a return on the 1.6 million pound 
investment he made in the agricultural settlements.  In order to do this he set about 
transforming these settlements from communities of subsistence farmers to large single 
cash crop plantations.  The settlers who expected to be independent farmers in Palestine 
found themselves working as hired hands.
76
  Just as the adoption of cash crops by the 
Palestinians around this same time tied the farmer to the global market, Rothschild found 
his plantations subject to the whim of global crop prices.  In search of cheap labor, the 
foremen of the plantations began employing Arabs, often five to ten Arabs for every 
Jewish laborer.
77
  This employment of non-Jews on the supposedly Jewish plantations 
was significant for two reasons.  First, it contradicted the Zionist ideal of Jewish 
agricultural labor, as the right to own and work the land was not one granted to Jews in 
Eastern Europe.  Secondly, the lack of employment opportunities led to 65% of Jewish 
laborers leaving Palestine by 1902.
78
  Around that time, Rothschild had become fed up 
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with his uncertain investment and transferred it to the Jewish Colonization Association, a 
group interested in setting up worldwide settlements for Jews with no particular focus on 
Palestine.
79
   
The first aliyah was significant for future waves of immigration in a few ways.  It 
doubled the number of Jews living in Palestine which provided a framework for future 
immigration.  It also proved that the large-scale plantation model was not effective for the 
Zionist movement.  While this method may have been effective money spinners in the 
case of Algeria, where the French took advantage of cheap labor, it was too at odds with 
Zionism’s goals to successfully build a Jewish national community in Palestine.80  The 
circumstances of the first aliyah, however, did create a unique relationship between 
Jewish settlers and Palestinian Arabs that would not be replicated in the subsequent 
waves of immigration.  During this aliyah, Jewish settlers found themselves receiving 
farming pointers from the Arab laborers alongside whom they were working.
81
  This 
would change in the following years as new, ideologically driven settlers made a 
concerted effort to promote exclusively Jewish labor on Jewish settlements.   
The second aliyah lasted from 1904 to 1913 and the third from 1918 to 1923.  The 
trappings of each aliyah were essentially identical and had it not been for the First World 
War interrupting them, would likely be counted as one and the same.  Like the first 
aliyah, the majority of these new immigrants came from Russia.  Another similarity to 
the first aliyah was the fact that the Jews who immigrated to Palestine were only a very 
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small percentage of the total Jews leaving Eastern Europe during this time period.
82
  The 
second aliyah brought 35,000 Jewish settlers to Palestine, making the Yishuv (the pre-
state Zionist community in Palestine) number 85,000 at the beginning of the First World 
War.
83
   The third aliyah would bring an additional 40,000 settlers after the conclusion of 
the war.
84
 
The experiences of settlers in the second and third wave were vastly different 
from those came in the first.  These new settlers benefited from the institutional structure 
provided by the World Zionist Organization.  They were given advice and assistance 
before leaving Europe and once they arrived in Palestine they learned from the 
experiences of the first wave settlers on the ground.
85
  These new settlers, a significant 
portion of whom were involved in revolutionary action in Europe, brought new 
ideologies to Palestine.  These settlers were influenced by ideals of utopianism and 
socialism and applied these ideologies to the Jewish national project in two important 
ways: the conquest of land and conquest of labor.
86
   
The goals of the Zionist conquest of land are pretty apparent from the name.  The 
idea was to fundamentally impact the land of Palestine through the founding of Jewish 
agricultural settlements.  This meant opening up land for cultivation, draining swamps, 
building roads, and fighting off hostile neighbors.  From this movement comes the oft-
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quoted phrase “making the desert bloom.”87  On the national level, this part of the 
movement was both practically and ideologically important.  On the practical level, these 
settlements were a way of creating spacial ties between the Jewish nationalist movement 
and the land of Palestine through physical construction.  It was a means of proving that 
Zionism, that the Jewish national project, had a legitimate claim to Palestine.  On the 
ideological level, conquest of land was an important part of the negation of the 
experience of exile.  To the settlers of the second and third aliyot, exile was characterized 
by weakness and victimhood.  To David Ben-Gurion, a second aliyah settler who would 
become the leader of the Yishuv and eventually the first prime minister of the state of 
Israel, exile meant “dependence – material, political, cultural, and intellectual dependence 
– because we are aliens, a minority, bereft of a homeland, rootless and separated from the 
soil, from basic industry. Our task is to break radically with this dependence.”88  Ben-
Gurion was alluding to the fact that in Eastern Europe, Jews were often prohibited by law 
from owning and working land.  Therefore, working the land in Palestine was a way to 
“break radically” from the weakness of exile. 
The conquest of labor was rooted in the same desire to break from the curse of 
exile and also had ideological and practical products.  The ideological aim of the 
conquest of labor was to free the Jewish settlers from the tradition of economic 
dependence that held back the Jewish nation in exile.  This mentality, also called Labor 
Zionism, was contingent on not falling into the trap of employing Arab workers that 
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undercut the first aliyah.  This would cause unemployment amongst Zionist settlers, 
decrease in wages and disincentive for potential Jewish immigrants to Palestine.
89
  The 
stated goal of the Labor Zionists was complete separation of the Yishuv economy from 
the Arab economy in Palestine.  The practical results of the Labor Zionist movement 
were the institutions created during the second and third waves of immigration to 
Palestine.  Among these were the Histadrut, the federation of Jewish labor unions, which 
in the proto-state period provided not only resources related to labor but also health care 
and education for its members.
90
  Another important institution founded during this 
period, especially from a symbolic perspective, was the kibbutz.  The first kibbutz, a sort 
of nationalist collective socialist farm, was founded in the Galilee in 1909.
91
  These 
havens of collectivism and egalitarianism would come to dot the Palestinian countryside 
in the pre-state period and a large number have survived on to this day.  They live on as a 
symbol of the ideals of Jewish nationalism, despite the fact that only a small percentage 
of settlers ever lived or worked on a kibbutz.
92
  Also, Zionist political parties came into 
existence during this time period.  Amongst these was the party that would become the 
Labor party which would rule Israel for the first few decades of its existence.
93
  This 
party, whose intellectual ideals are largely based in this second and third wave time 
period, is the producer of one of the two main streams of Israeli political discourse we 
will study after 1967.   
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The Palestinian Reaction to early Zionist Settlement 
While discussing the effects of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 on the 
nationalization of the Arab citizens of Ottoman Palestine, we mentioned that the code 
would come to have significant consequences with the advent of Zionist immigration.  
These consequences began to play themselves out at the turn of the 20
th
 century with the 
second aliyah.  The immediate consequence of the new land code, as discussed before, 
was the new stratification of Palestinian society.  Urban notables registered large tracts of 
land in their name for peasants who could not afford the registration fee or tax on the 
land.  The peasants who allowed others to register the land they farmed maintained the 
prior system of land control by usufruct.  They were for the most part either unaware of 
or unbothered by this new transformation of land into a commodity.  In general, there 
was no reason to be bothered by the new land system.  When the land a peasant farmed 
was sold from one Arab landowner to another, the peasant continued to farm the land as 
if the deed to the land had not changed hands at all.  Just like the old landlord, the new 
landlord needed someone to farm his land in order to make it productive.
94
   
The creation of the Jewish National Fund and related organizations aimed at 
purchasing land in Palestine for exclusively Jewish use led to a new dynamic between 
landlord and peasant.  The settlers of the second and third aliyot were motivated by the 
desire to conquer the land of Palestine.  This meant that when a Jewish land purchasing 
agent bought a piece of land, they expelled the Palestinian peasants who had been 
                                                 
94
 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 99.  
53 
 
working the land under the Arab landlord.
95
  In the eyes of the new Jewish landlord and 
the Ottoman legal code, the new owner had legal control over the land to do with it what 
he pleased.  However, to the Palestinian peasant, whose family may have worked the land 
for centuries, it was an expulsion.  As more land was purchased and these expulsions 
became more widespread, resentment on the part of the expelled peasants lead to action 
against the settlers.   
One significant example of this was the sale of the land of al-Fula.  The land in 
question was about 10,000 dunams (one dunam equals 1,000 square meters) located in 
the Galilee between Jenin and Nazareth.  This piece of land was a small part of the 
holdings of the Beiruti Sursuq family who had bought nearly a quarter million dunams 
from the Ottoman government for a pittance in 1872.  In 1910, they sold the land of al-
Fula to the Jewish National Fund.  The JNF immediately began evicting the Palestinian 
peasant farmers and replacing them with Jewish settlers.
96
  The JNF was met with 
unprecedented resistance from the Palestinian peasants, however.  This resistance was a 
result of a number of factors.  One was witnessing the dispossession in the Galilee area 
that accompanied the foundation a number of second aliyah settlements built over the 
preceding five years.  Another was the political support of a prominent Nazareth based 
politician named Shukri al-‘Asali. Al-‘Asali, having heard about the sale, refused to hand 
over the deed to the land to the new owners and wrote an anti-Zionist open letter which 
was published in a prominent Damascus newspaper.  Not insignificantly, al-‘Asali wrote 
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the letter, which would be republished in a number of regional newspapers, under the 
pseudonym Saladin, the name of the Kurdish hero who rid Palestine of crusaders nearly a 
thousand years prior.  His letter appealed to a number of other unifying patriotic themes 
that were well known to the peasants who were undergoing a slow nationalization.
97
  Al-
‘Asali even went so far as to send a number of Ottoman troops to the village land in order 
to prevent a band of Jewish militia-men, who were acting on behalf of the JNF, from 
removing the peasants from the land.  However, there was little al-‘Asali could actually 
do to prevent the inevitable take over by the JNF, who had the letter of the law, and al-
‘Asali’s superiors, on its side.  The JNF was able, after a short delay, to remove the 
Palestinian farmers from the land of al-Fula and found the settlement of Merhavia.
98
  The 
peasants who were forced from the land did not fade away.  They launched frequent 
attacks on the new settlements and when an Arab villager was killed by an armed settler, 
some local Arabs laid siege to the settlement until the Ottoman authorities arrested a few 
of the settlers.
99
   
 In terms of national identity formation, the sale of the al-Fula land and subsequent 
resistances both by elected leaders and Palestinian peasants was significant.  The whole 
ordeal was covered widely in newspapers across the significant cities in the Levant 
region and al-‘Asali was able to gain election to the Ottoman parliament by campaigning 
on his actions regarding the sale of the land.
100
  To Rashid Khalidi, who recounts this 
incident in his book Palestinian Identity, the significance of the relatively local and small 
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scale issue of the al-Fula land sale in terms of Palestinian national identify formation 
should not be underestimated.  He writes that the issue showed the “importance of the 
dispossession and consequent resistance of the Palestinian peasantry in making the issue 
of Zionism a central one in Arab political discourse before 1914.”101  But the issue and 
the reaction to it, though nationally significant, were still relatively local.  In the wake of 
the First World War and the advent of British control over Palestine, Zionist settlement 
and the Palestinian reaction to it would become truly unified and national. 
World War I  
 The dawn of World War I had drastic consequences on historical Palestine and 
created fundamental changes that would shape the path of the region for decades.  A few 
months after the war broke out in Europe, with the British and French and Russian 
Empires on one side and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires on the other, the 
Ottoman Empire, reluctant to ally with Russia, its traditional enemy, joined the war on 
the side of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.  The loss of the war by the Central 
Powers would spell the end of the Ottoman Empire’s nearly five hundred year reign.  The 
French and English were keen to capitalize on the crumbling of the empire as a means to 
expand their own imperial holdings in the area.  Russia too desired Ottoman land but 
their early exit from the war due to the Russian Revolution meant those territorial gains 
never materialized.  As early as 1915, the allied powers set about making treaties aimed 
at dividing up the land amongst them.  Of the numerous treaties and agreements made, 
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three in particular are of interest to us here: the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration.   
 The Husayn-McMahon correspondence was a series of letters between Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca and the British commissioner of Cairo, Henry McMahon which began 
in 1915.
102
  The British wanted a military challenge to the Ottomans from the Arab 
portion of the Empire in order to weaken the Ottoman war effort.  Sharif Husayn and his 
sons’ interests in assisting the British war effort came from a desire to found and rule an 
Arab state in the Middle East.  The result of the correspondence was an agreement that 
the British would supply Sharif Husayn with gold and weapons and in return he would 
start the so called “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire.  Additionally, McMahon 
articulated support for the creation of Arab states within the borders of the empire.
103
  
Despite the urging of Sharif Husayn and his sons to McMahon to define the borders of 
this would-be state, McMahon was deliberately ambiguous.  He sought to protect the 
aims of the British and French within the region.  Palestine was not explicitly referenced 
in the correspondence.  Sharif Husayn interpreted the rough boundaries described to 
include Palestine but both the British and the French had designs for the region. 
McMahon therefore left Palestine out of any loose agreement.
104
  The revolt itself, due to 
Sharif Husayn’s limited influence on the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire and challenges to 
his authority by the Wahabbi’s in the Hijaz region, was rather minor.105  The Arab state 
the Sharif and his sons believed was promised to them never materialized after the war.  
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A few years later, the Sharif Husayn’s sons, Abdullah and Faisal, were installed as 
leaders of the Kingdom of Transjordan and Syria respectively.  Faisal, however, was 
removed from Syria due to French interests there and installed in Iraq before being 
deposed by a revolution.  Sharif Husayn was himself removed from power in Mecca by 
the Wahabbis about a decade after the war.  The most significant aspect of this agreement 
for Palestine was the understanding by the Arabs that Palestine was supposedly promised 
to the Arab state.  This understanding of Palestine as essentially Arab would shape Arab 
nationalist aims for decades to come. 
 The Sykes-Picot agreement would have more practical consequences on the 
governing of Palestine and the entire Middle East region.  The agreement was named for 
its two principle negotiators, French diplomat Georges Picot and British Member of 
Parliament Sir Mark Sykes.
106
  Begun in late 1915, the secret negotiations were intended 
to determine areas of French and British control and spheres of influence in the Arab 
parts of the Ottoman Empire.  It was ratified in May 1916.
107
  The agreement put the land 
that would become Jordan and parts of Iraq under a British sphere of interest and rest of 
Iraq and Kuwait under direct British control.  The southwestern part of Turkey bordering 
the Levant region, the coast of Syria and Lebanon were put under French control and the 
rest of present day Syria and parts of northern Iraq were put under French control.  
Palestine was designated as an international zone (fig. 2).
108
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Fig 2.  The Sykes Picot Agreement. (Source: PASSIA). 
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The Balfour Declaration was the most significant and lasting document to shape 
historical Palestine that came out of World War I.  Expressing British support for the 
establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, the text of the Balfour Declaration was 
very carefully written: 
Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917. 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the 
following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been 
submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious' rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist 
Federation.
109
 
Significantly, this document fulfilled Herzl’s desire that a Jewish state in Palestine 
would be founded by common law.  Despite the use of the word “home” rather than state, 
Balfour believed a state would be the ultimate result of the declaration.
110
  The last clause 
of the document is especially notable.  It stipulates that “nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice...the rights and political enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”  The inclusion 
of this came as a result of concerns by British law makers and some Zionists that this 
declaration would cause harm to Jewish communities outside of Palestine.
111
  Also 
interesting about that sentence is the clause it balances.  The clause regarding Jews and 
the overall text of the document give support to Zionist national aims and seeks to protect 
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Jewish “political” rights.  The clause that balances it references only the “religious and 
civil rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”  In doing so it fails to 
acknowledge any national community existing in Palestine at the time, be it Arab or 
Palestinian, and it gives no support to political, or national, aims of those non-Jewish 
residents.  The significance of this document in the success of the Zionist project should 
not be overlooked.  Gelvin describes this aptly:  
Nationalisms succeed or fail not because they are true or false but because of 
factors extrinsic to the nationalisms themselves: the adversaries against whom 
they are arrayed, the resources available to them and their supporters, the support 
they receive from the international community.  Thus, it might be stated without 
exaggeration that if it were not for the Balfour Declaration, Zionism might very 
well have gone the way of Confederate nationalism.
112
 
 In other words, the Balfour Declaration gave the Zionist project the base, both in 
common law and practical reality, upon which a successful national movement could be 
built.  Without this base, it is difficult to see a circumstance in which Zionism would have 
successfully created the state of Israel.  This preference towards the Jewish national 
community in Palestine by the British would have far reaching consequences for both the 
Zionists and the Palestinians that eventually could not be overturned, despite a future 
British desire to do so.   
The British Mandate for Palestine 
 The postwar reality in the formerly Ottoman controlled Middle East rendered 
most of the agreements between the great powers obsolete.  Much of the land that was 
supposed to be under French control according to the Sykes-Picot agreement was 
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occupied by British Troops.  The Bolsheviks, who had taken control of Russia during the 
war, renounced all territorial claims made by the tsars in the region and made public the 
secret agreements of the Entente powers.
113
  French and British territorial dreams were 
made even more complicated by Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.”  These postwar 
guidelines called for an end to secret agreements and the right of all peoples to self-
determination.
114
  Also among Wilson’s goals was the establishment of a League of 
Nations to ensure global peace and security, in addition to open markets for the growing 
industrial sector of the United States.  The Entente powers reluctantly agreed to the 
charter of the League of Nations, which reflected Wilson’s Fourteen Points.  However, 
the League of Nations charter in a sense brought legitimacy to French and British 
territorial claims by providing a formula by which these powers could take control of 
territories deemed unready for self-determination.  In what came to be known as the 
mandate system, these powers would be given temporary control of a piece of territory 
with the explicit goal of building social and political institutions that would make these 
countries fit for self-rule.
115
  Once these institutions were established, the imperial power 
would cede control to the people and leave.  Which country would take the reins in each 
mandate was supposed to be based on the opinion of the population within the territory 
designated to be a mandate.   
Unsurprisingly, the British and French had little interest in hearing the preferences 
of the populations, preferring to divide up the territory themselves.  They attempted to 
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block an American delegation to the region.
116
  A delegation, dubbed the King-Crane 
Commission, was eventually convened which interviewed Arabs and Jews in Greater 
Syria.  What they found was that the population wanted the creation of a state in Greater 
Syria, with Faysal, the son of Sharif Husayn, as king and the United States as the 
mandatory power.  They also noted the anti-Zionist feelings of the Arab population and 
recommended a drastic curtailing of Zionist immigration and the creation of a small 
Jewish community within an Arab state.
117
  The report was submitted to the Paris Peace 
Conference but never discussed by the diplomats.  In the end, France took mandatory 
control of what became Syria and Lebanon and the British took control of Iraq and the 
Mandate for Palestine, which initially included modern day Jordan.
118
 
 Following the requirements of the League of Nations, the British submitted a 
resolution that outlined how the mandate for Palestine would be administrated.  The 
British were fully aware of widespread Arab opposition to Zionism but chose to ignore it, 
writing the text of the Balfour declaration into the draft of the mandate. 
119
  The draft 
stipulated that the a “Jewish Agency,” initially meant to be the World Zionist 
Organization, be recognized by the administration of the mandate for the purpose of 
advancing Jewish interests and the establishment of the Jewish homeland.  In 1929, the 
World Zionist Organization ceded its position to the newly created Jewish Agency.  This 
organization, dominated by second and third aliyot leftwing labor Zionists, operated 
essentially as the foreign office of the Jewish community in Palestine, controlled 
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settlement and immigration and established state-like institutions such as schools and 
hospitals.
120
  Understandably, the rest of the population of the mandate had no interest in 
following British state building tutelage.  The Arabs of the mandate, 89% of its total 
population, had little desire to work with an administration bent on establishing a foreign 
state in their midst.
121
  But the Jewish Agency and the British Mandate had more 
opposition than just the Arab population who feared increasing immigration.  The coming 
of the mandate coincided with another wave of Jewish immigration that carried with it 
ideals opposed to the leftist labor Zionism of the previous two decades.  
The Fourth Aliyah and the Revisionist Zionists 
One of these challenges from within Zionism came from the right wing settlers of 
the fourth aliyah.  The fourth aliyah lasted from 1924 to 1928 and brought about 82,000 
new immigrants to Palestine.  These immigrants were not the revolutionaries who came 
in the second and third waves of immigration.  These were middle class Polish Jews who 
fled as refugees to Palestine.  They were older than the settlers of the second and third 
aliyot and did not subscribe to their socialist values.  For the most party, they settled 
themselves in the cities rather than taking to conquering the land of Palestine.  Their 
ideological spokesperson was an Odessa born Jew named Vladimir Jabotinsky, who 
became the driving ideological voice behind the movement that would come to known as 
Revisionist Zionism.
122
  He was turned to Zionism after witnessing the Kishinev pogrom 
in 1903.  Jabotinski saw passivity amongst the Jewish victims of the pogrom and was 
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disgusted.  He decided to take action and began forming militaristic Jewish defense 
groups.  Jabotinski’s Zionism too was characterized by militarism.  He went so far as to 
found a youth group that shared many qualities with the rising number of fascist youth 
groups throughout Europe.
123
  Jabotinski’s intellectual followers would come to found the 
paramilitary Irgun and its spinoff Stern Gang in the early 1930s.  These groups would 
come to carry out numerous terrorist attacks against both the British and Arabs of 
Mandate Palestine.  These included the assassination of a British official in a hotel 
bombing and one of the most infamous events in the 1948 war, the massacre at Deir 
Yassin in which the Irgun and Stern Gang killed over one hundred Palestinians.
124
  This 
much more proactive militaristic approach often set them at odds with the left wing 
Zionists who were in favor of working with the British to establish a Jewish state.  Such 
was this antagonism that the Revisionist set up a rival New Zionist Organization that 
worked independent of the labor controlled Jewish Agency.
125
   
It is this Revisionist Zionist movement that provided an intellectual founding for 
the second creator of discourse we will come to study here, the right wing Likud party.  
Its founder, Menachem Begin was a leader of the Irgun and became the first non-Labor 
prime minister of Israel.  His successor as prime minister was Yitzhak Shamir, another 
Likud politician who led the Stern Gang during the Mandate period and the 1948 War.
126
  
It may be unfair to draw a direct ideological line from the Revisionist Zionist Jabotinski 
to the Likud party of today.  However, it is safe to say that the involvement of the 
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founders of the Likud party in the Revisionist movement means that at least part of the 
Likud ideological underpinning comes from the Revisionist movement inspired by 
Jabotinski and instilled in the immigrants of the fourth aliyah. 
Palestinian National Leadership in the Mandate 
During the mandate period, resistance to Zionist settlement escalated from the 
largely isolated instances described previously.  This escalating resistance coincided with 
the founding of a number of Palestinian nationalist groups that reflected the growing 
independent Palestinian identity that was becoming more and more widespread 
throughout the first decade of the mandate.  In the immediate wake of the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, most Palestinians, as reflected in the findings of the King-Crane 
commission, favored a Greater Syrian state that would include today’s Palestinian 
territories, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.  However, the establishment of the 
mandates cut Palestine from French controlled Syria.  This, combined with the unique 
challenges faced by Palestinians from Zionist settlement, nurtured a latent Palestinian 
nationalist feeling that had been growing since the mid-19
th
 century.
127
   
Two types of nationalist organizations sprung up in the first decade of the 
mandate.  The first were formed by and reflected the aims of notable urban elites and 
professionals.  The second were more populist in nature and appealed to local villagers 
and peasants.
128
  The initial impetus for the urban nationalist groups was the British army 
who helped to found Arab Clubs to enlist support for the Arab Revolt against the 
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Ottoman Empire during the war.  In the wake of the war, local notables took it upon 
themselves to found nationalist Muslim-Christian Associations.  Groups in Palestine were 
also founded by Syrian exiles that were making their way back to Syria after the 
completion of the war.  For the most part, these groups shared common political stances: 
opposition to the mandate, the Balfour Declaration and the separation of Palestine from 
Syria.  It is interesting to note, however, that the Muslim-Christian Associations that were 
founded by local Palestinian notables insisted that in any Greater Syrian state, Palestine 
would be an autonomous territory in a federation.
129
  The populist organizations shared 
most of the sentiments of the elites – opposition to the mandate and the Balfour 
Declaration – but they were led by members of lower strata of Palestinian society and 
were militarily active, forming militias to fight the French in Syria and Zionist 
settlement.
130
  Also, while the elite leaders of the urban nationalist societies were often 
jockeying for political power and prestige with their elite rivals, the message of the 
populists was characterized by calls for equality and opposition to the elite.
131
   
These types of groups came together in the beginning of 1920 at the First 
Palestine General Congress to try to unite the nationalist effort.  They were able to pen a 
leaflet opposing the separation of Palestine from Syria and calling for Arab resistance to 
Zionist settlement but the events of 1920 were perhaps the high point of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement for a number of years to come.
132
  The efforts to unify these various 
nationalist organizations was hampered by reluctance to work with the British to form 
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national institutions due to opposition to British support of Zionism, high levels of 
autonomy amongst religious minorities due to Ottoman policies carried over by the 
British, and bitter rivalries amongst urban elite grappling for political power.
133
  The 
Arab Executive committee of the General Congress met intermittently throughout the 
decade but nothing much came of their efforts.  The recommendations of the General 
Congress were ignored by the British and French which did not help promote the 
expansion of these united political efforts.
134
  Also, the elites that were the driving forces 
behind the organization of these Muslim-Christian Associations saw their power and 
prestige begin to wane as the decade progressed and the more dispersed popular 
organizations came to the forefront of the Palestinian national struggle.
135
  
The Western Wall Riots and the Origins of Revolt 
A failure to provide a single united political front on the part of the Palestinians 
did not mean the end of resistance to Zionist settlement.  On the contrary, tensions 
between the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers rose as the first decade of the mandate 
progressed.  The consequences of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code were coming into stark 
focus for the Palestinian peasant as the Jewish National Fund began to buy up large tracts 
of land from both foreign and local Palestinian landowners.  As the land they had worked 
for generations without holding a title was sold out from under them, Palestinian peasants 
were forced to leave their land by the new Zionist landlords who then put it in the hands 
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of Jewish settlers.
136
  The result of this was a rising landless population, increased 
urbanization, and growing unrest in the countryside of Mandate Palestine.   
 Urban tensions were on the rise throughout this period as well.  They boiled over 
violently in the summer of 1929.  The Western Wall in Jerusalem is the holiest site in 
Judaism as Jews believe it to be the last remaining wall of Herod’s temple.  To Muslims, 
the wall is part of the perimeter of the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam.  
Prior to 1967, the Western Wall was one side of a narrow alley opposite houses 
belonging to Muslim residents of the quarter.
137
  Disputes over control of the wall 
between Muslims and Jews turned violent in August 1929.  Each side feared the other 
wanted to restrict their access to the site.  Jabotinski’s youth group, Betar, exacerbated 
these tensions by marching to the wall and flying the Zionist flag above it.  This sent 
Muslims over the edge.  Thousands of them marched to the wall the next day.  Over the 
ensuing week, riots in Jerusalem, Safad, Hebron and Jaffa killed 133 Jews and 116 
Arabs.
138
  A British investigation found Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem and prominent Palestinian nationalist leader, directly responsible for the 
outbreak of the riots.
139
  As a result, the British outlawed Arab political participation in 
the mandate. 
However, as the subsequent British Shaw Report found, the true cause of the Arab 
unrest in Mandatory Palestine was Jewish immigration and land purchases.  This 1930 
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report, which recommended much stricter regulations on Jewish immigration, was the 
first of a series of events and reports, culminating with the Great Revolt of 1936-39 that 
caused the British government to second guess its commitment to the aid in the 
establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and its overall involvement in the 
Palestine Mandate.  In the wake of the Shaw Report, the British government, fearing the 
loss of tax revenue provided by Jewish immigrants, commissioned another report, this 
time to be penned by Sir. John Hope-Simpson.
140
  He quickly became sympathetic to the 
Arabs and critical of Zionist settlement and labor practices.  The recommendation of his 
report were written into the Passfield White Paper, which criticized the immigration, 
colonization and labor practices of the Jewish community in Palestine.
141
  Zionist 
opposition to this White Paper was swift and furious.  A number of high level Zionist 
leaders resigned and the British cabinet was attacked by members of parliament 
sympathetic to the Zionist cause.  This pressure caused the cabinet to repudiate the 
Passfield White Paper in a letter essentially written by Zionist leaders.
142
   
A few years after the Passfield White Paper, Adolf Hitler became the chancellor 
of Germany.  The anti-Semitic Nuremberg laws began waves of Jewish emigration from 
Germany, most not going to Palestine.  However, Zionist leaders came to an agreement 
with the Nazi government to facilitate Jewish emigration specifically to Palestine and 
were even permitted to establish vocational training camps in Germany for those Jews 
immigrating to Palestine.  The SS officer who facilitated this relationship was Adolf 
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Eichmann.  This was the same Adolf Eichmann whom the state of Israel would put on 
trial as the architect of Hitler’s final solution two and half decades later.143  As a result of 
this emigration from Germany and Nazi controlled Poland, the Jewish population of 
Palestine doubled between 1933 and 1935.
 144
  Over this same period, economic 
conditions worsened for the Palestinian Arabs of the mandate.  Unemployment was high 
and the landless population was growing.  These challenging economic conditions, 
particularly for peasants who had to sell parts of their land to Jews in order to get by, 
combined with Palestinian frustration at the growing strength of the Jewish community 
provided the basis for the Arab Revolt in Palestine.   
The Great Revolt 
As economic hardship intensified for the Palestinians of the mandate, in contrast 
to the booming economy of the Jewish community and its growing strength, and 
increased immigration meant more Zionist land purchases and therefore more 
landlessness amongst Palestinian peasants, unrest was rife in the countryside and the 
villages of Palestine come 1936.  The issue of the landless Palestinian population was the 
central factor leading to the coming revolt. The Palestinian peasants, who caught the 
worst of this economic suffering, were often forced to sell their own land and move to 
cities to find work.
145
  This need to sell to survive was also a consequence of the Great 
Depression that was sweeping the globe at this time.  Most of the Palestinian population 
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of the mandate worked the land.
146
  When the depression came, the prices of the crops 
they produced plummeted.  Because of the terms of the mandate, Britain was not able to 
put protective tariffs on agricultural products to keep prices high.  Mandate Palestine was 
flooded with cheap agricultural goods making it impossible for the peasant farmers to 
compete.  Many small farmers were unable to pay off their debts and were either 
foreclosed on or sold their land to Zionist agencies.
147
  Increased immigration also led to 
more large purchases by the Zionist agencies and as land prices increased, urban 
landowners decided it was the right time to sell.
148
  By the mid-1930’s, thirty percent of 
Palestinian farmers were completely landless.  Of those who still had land, about seventy-
five percent did not have enough to support themselves.
149
  In these hard economic 
conditions, all that was needed to start a revolt was a spark. 
Two sparks came at the end of 1935.  The first was the British discovery of a 
Jewish arms smuggling operation in Jaffa port.
150
  This discovery increased Arab fears 
that the Jewish community was preparing for war and caused significant alarm.  The 
second spark came a short time later when a popular Muslim preacher, ‘Izz al-Din al-
Qassam, was killed in a firefight with British soldiers.
151
  A preacher and registrar of 
marriages in Haifa and the surrounding countryside, al-Qassam used his sermons to 
preach opposition to the British mandate and Zionist settlement.
152
  Such was his 
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popularity that he likely had more than one thousand followers at the time of his death 
and his funeral was the best attended in Palestine’s history to that point.153  Al-Qassam 
quickly became part of the Palestinian national lore.  His revolutionary words and actions 
(he was killed preparing for open resistance) were immortalized in poetry and song and 
he remains an important Palestinian national symbol to this day (the homemade rockets 
of Hamas are dubbed al-Qassams).
154
 
The anti-British, anti-Zionist sector of Palestinian society, galvanized by the death 
of al-Qassam and alarmed by Jewish arms smuggling, called for general strikes and 
greater vigilance by the mandate authorities over arms smuggling.
155
  The British high 
commissioner, though concerned about the growing unrest amongst the Palestinian 
majority of the population, believed that he could appease the Arab notables by reviving 
the mixed Muslim, Jewish and Christian legislative council.  This idea was rejected by 
both the British parliament and Zionist leaders.
156
  In the wake of this failed attempt at 
diplomacy, violence broke out in April 1936 with the killing of two Jews in Nablus.
157
  
Violence quickly escalated as attacks lead to counter attacks and quickly to open revolt.   
The revolt itself proceeded in a two stages.  The first of these was focused in 
Palestine’s cities.  Perhaps surprisingly, the feuding urban notables who had previously 
been able to provide a unified national front to match that of the Zionists came together 
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temporarily to form the Higher Arab Committee.
158
  This committee called for strikes and 
boycotts of Jewish businesses and goods which were organized and enforced by local 
committees in cities across Palestine.  They also organized relief efforts for the families 
of striking workers to minimize the negative effects of these tactics on Palestinians.
159
  
The strikes and boycotts were less than successful.  Jewish business owners were 
perfectly happy to replace their striking Arab workers with Jewish ones, which 
contributed to the Zionist goal of making the economy of the Yishuv separate to that of 
the Palestinians.
160
  The strikes that were successful, such as the one that shut down 
Palestine’s only major port at Jaffa, backfired as well.  The Jewish Agency was granted 
permission to develop Tel-Aviv as a port for Jewish goods, an action that further 
contributed to Jewish independence in Palestine.
161
  Over the summer, the revolt in the 
cities began to wind down and the Arab Higher Committee ceased to exist.
162
 
As the revolt in the cities wound down, the fighting moved to the countryside.  
Armed bands of Palestinian peasants and non-Palestinian Arab fighters numbering 
between nine and ten thousand roamed the Palestinian countryside attacking British 
troops and Zionist settlements.
163
  The British turned to force as a means to bring an end 
to the havoc these armed bands were causing (fig. 3).   
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Fig. 3: British soldiers search Palestinians for arms (Source: American Colony 
(Jerusalem) Photo Dept.) 
 
They brought in 20,000 troops and worked with Jewish squads and Arab peace 
bands organized by a friendly Arab notable family.
164
  British forces punished whole 
villages for sheltering rebels and conducted targeted assassinations, deportations and 
mass arrests in order to snuff out the rebellion.
165
  These anti-insurgency tactics, amongst 
others such as dynamiting the houses of suspected rebels, were eventually adopted by the 
British sanctioned Jewish militia, the Haganah, and the Israeli government after the 
                                                 
164
 Ibid., 113. 
165
 Ibid., 113. 
75 
 
founding of the state, as a means to crush future Palestinian resistance.
166
  By the time 
hostilities ended, thousands of Palestinians in addition to hundreds of Jews and British 
soldiers were dead and most of the Palestinian national leadership was either arrested or 
deported.
167
  The Palestinian population at-large was also disarmed.  The shattered state 
that the Palestinian community would find itself in after the Great Revolt was both a 
cause and a foreshadowing of the disaster that would befall the Palestinians a decade later 
with the 1948 War. 
Between Revolt and Civil War 
Just as the Western Wall Riots inspired British reflection on their role in Mandate 
Palestine, the events of the Arab Revolt in Palestine lead to a number of commissions and 
reports aimed at reevaluating British positions regarding the mandate.  The first of these, 
the Peel Commission, was sent to Palestine during a lull in the revolt to discover the 
causes of unrest in both the Palestinian and Jewish community in Palestine.
168
  The Peel 
Report determined that the rift between the Jewish and Palestinian communities had 
grown to the point where a single Palestine mandate was unworkable and needed to be 
replaced.
169
  Palestinian demands for an Arab state in Palestine could not be reconciled 
with Jewish demands for unlimited immigration.  The Peel Report predicted that as the 
current generation of young Palestinians and Jews are educated in their respective schools 
of nationalism, these rifts would expand along with a stronger desire for political 
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independence and a hatred for whatever should stand in the way of it.
170
  The report 
determined that the only way to reconcile this increasingly volatile situation was to 
partition the Mandate for Palestine into a Palestinian Arab and a Jewish state.
171
  Twenty 
percent of the mandate would go to the Jewish state and most of the rest would go to a 
Palestinian state to be united with Jordan.  Jerusalem and a corridor to the sea would 
remain under British mandate authority (fig. 4).
172
   
The report was not particularly popular amongst Jews, Palestinians or British 
politicians.  The leaders of the Yishuv eventually accepted the concept of partition 
despite strong opposition within the community.  The leaders were not happy with the 
proposed territory of the Jewish state but saw this granting of statehood a legitimization 
of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine.  A sovereign Jewish state would mean limitless 
immigration and as the population increased, these proposed borders could be adjusted 
accordingly.
173
  The Arab Higher Committee was strong in its opposition to the report.  
They did not understand why the Palestinians should give up an area with four times as 
much land as Jews and were as concerned as the Zionist leaders were certain that the 
borders of this Jewish state would eventually expand to encroach on the Palestinian 
state.
174
  Rather than partition, the Arab Higher Committee maintained its demands for an 
Arab state in all of Palestine and an end to Jewish immigration.
175
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Fig 4. The Peel Partition plan (Source: PASSIA) 
78 
 
In the wake of the Peel Report, the revolt reignited and entered a much more 
violent stage which the British chose to crush with the anti-insurgency tactics described 
above.  After the revolt had been stamped out, the British issued a new document, the 
White Paper of 1939, which steered British policy in the mandate until its termination 
nearly a decade later.
176
 
The White Paper and World War II 
The White Paper represented a reversal in British support for the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine. It read: “His Majesty's Government believes that the framers 
of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended 
that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab 
population of the country.”177  It therefore rejected the recommendation of the Peel 
Report that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish and Palestinian state and instead 
favored the creation of a Jewish national home in a Palestinian state with immigration 
limited to 15,000 people per year over the ensuing five years.
178
  After that period, 
immigration would be dependent on Palestinian consent.  Land purchasing by Jews 
would be limited to certain areas and be controlled by the high commissioner of the 
mandate in order to limit landlessness amongst Arab peasants.
179
  The White Paper, 
however, was even less popular than the Peel Report amongst the Palestinian and Jewish 
communities of the mandate.  Jews believed it went against the promises of the Balfour 
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Declaration because of the limits on immigration and the reversal of support for a Jewish 
state.  Palestinians opposed it because it did not meet demands for immediate 
independence and an end to all Jewish immigration.
180
    
Despite this strong opposition, neither the Palestinians nor the Yishuv were in 
much of a position to do anything about the White Paper in the years following its 
issuance.  Britain’s harsh suppression of the revolt left the Palestinians leaderless and 
broken.  Most of the important Palestinian nationalists and intellectuals were either 
executed or deported by the British and the countryside was in ruins.
181
  The Yishuv, for 
their part, were in a tight position as well.  Despite their vocal opposition to the White 
Paper and the changes in British policy it articulated, the Yishuv found itself making a 
truce with British authorities in order to help the war effort against Nazi Germany.
182
   
The more militaristic Revisionist groups like the Irgun and its break off faction, the Stern 
Gang, continued their attacks against the British throughout the war, including the 
assassination of the British Lord Moyne.  However, the mainstream Jewish community 
tried to limit these attacks by deploying the Haganah alongside British forces against 
these groups.
183
   
This status quo and a drop in Jewish immigration meant that Palestine was 
relatively quiet throughout World War II.  The Fifth Aliyah, which spanned the decade 
preceding the outbreak of the war, brought two hundred thousand Jews to Palestine, more 
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than all the previous waves of immigration combined.  Immigration during the war 
however, was only fourteen thousand people per year, less than the quota set by the 
White Paper.
184
  Contributing to this calm and stability was an economic boom in 
wartime Palestine.  Submarine warfare in the Mediterranean Sea made shipping 
dangerous.  This took Palestine temporarily out of the global market, protecting local 
farmers from international competition.
185
  This, combined with the large number of 
Allied troops stationed in Palestine driving up demand for local goods, meant rising 
prices and allowed for a number of small farmers to climb out of debt.
186
  
As the war came to an end, so did the prevailing calm in Palestine.  The five years 
of limited immigration stipulated by the White Paper had come to an end which meant 
that the deadline for the independent Palestinian state it proposed was five years away.  
Palestinians wanted an end to all further Jewish immigration and a fulfillment of the 
promise of independence.
187
  The revisionist Irgun and Stern Gang stepped up their 
attacks against British civilian and military targets.
188
  David Ben-Gurion initially 
deployed his Haganah forces alongside the British against these groups but by the end of 
the war, he came to believe that armed resistance would be the only path to statehood.
189
  
Also, Ben-Gurion was concerned by the loss of Haganah members who favored direct 
action to the Irgun and Stern Gang.
190
  By the end of 1945, the British had over eighty 
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thousand troops stationed in Palestine to deal with opposition by both the Jewish and 
Palestinian communities of the mandate.
191
   
Holocaust refugees quickly became an issue as the war wound down as well.  
United States President Harry Truman urged the British Prime Minister to settle one 
hundred thousand refugees in Palestine, as recommended by the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees.  The British government rejected this proposal as it was 
conditional on approval by both the Jewish and Palestinian communities.  Jewish attacks 
against British forces intensified in the wake of this denial by the government, the most 
notable of which was the Irgun attack on the Kind David Hotel in Jerusalem, home of the 
British offices, which killed ninety-one people.
192
  This instability led to a realization by 
war-weary and massively indebted Britain that it could no longer maintain its overseas 
holding in Palestine.  It decided it would need to enlist the help of the international 
community in solving the Palestine issue.
193
  It therefore turned to the United Nations, the 
new iteration of the organization that initially gave them control over the Mandate for 
Palestine, to solve the mess it found itself in.  
The UN General Assembly created the UN Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) to study the issue and propose a solution.  The committee was made up of 
representatives of eleven countries: Sweden, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Australia, Canada, India, Iran, Guatemala, Uruguay and Peru.
194
  The report 
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the committee produced was unified in calling for an end to the mandate but was divided 
about what should replace it.  Eight members wrote the majority report which called for a 
partition into a Jewish and a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as an international zone.  
The minority group called for a single federal state made up of two entities and a united 
central authority to be prepared for three years by the United Nations.
195
  The British, for 
their part, did not wait for the committee’s recommendation to declare that it would be 
pulling out of Palestine in the middle of May, 1948.
196
   
The United Nations General Assembly narrowly voted to accept the partition, 
needing strong lobbying from the Zionists and United States to push General Assembly 
Resolution 181 over the two-thirds majority necessary.
197
  Even the branches of the 
United States government were divided when it came to the question of partition.  
Truman’s advisers argued that the United States had a moral obligation to the Jews 
considering the suffering of the Holocaust (although not enough of an obligation, it 
seems, to allow Jewish refugees into the United States).
198
  They also argued that a 
Jewish state would offer the U.S. a forward listening post in a hostile neighborhood as the 
rivalry with the Soviet Union was already beginning to heat up.  Finally, domestic 
politics played a role (as they would come to do so often in the story of Palestine).  
Truman was afraid of losing New York and Illinois, two states with large Jewish 
populations, in the coming election.  The United States State Department and intelligence 
community was wary of supporting partition, believing that it would put relations with 
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the neighboring Arab states into jeopardy and would lead to a bloodbath that would take 
one hundred thousand American troops to end.
199
  The United States did go along with 
partition, however, as did the Soviet Union, who would be the first country offer Israel de 
jure recognition (and eventually a significant arms shipment during the 1948 war).
200
  
The Palestinians and Arab rejected the resolution and the Yishuv accepted it, with an eye 
at changing its borders.   
Civil War, Nakba and Independence 
In the months from the passing of UN Resolution 181 in November up to the 
British withdrawal, a three way civil war broke out in mandate Palestine.  Still crippled, 
leaderless, and disarmed as a result of the British reaction to the revolt nearly a decade 
earlier, the Palestinian community was hardly ready for it. They lacked institutions and 
leadership to match those of the Jewish community in Palestine.  Bitter rivalries still 
plagued the potential Palestinian resistance as did a lack of material and monetary 
support from the relatively young Arab countries.  Also, the Palestinians had a serious 
lack of military training and experienced soldiers.
201
  The Yishuv however, was far better 
suited to pursue its nationalist goals.  In addition to training an army for decades in the 
form of the officially sanctioned Haganah and the paramilitary, underground Irgun and 
Lehi, the Yishuv had sent soldiers to fight alongside the British in World War II.  While 
these groups had not been folded into a single force by the time of the passing of the 
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partition resolution in 1947, they did coordinate operations.
202
  The weapons they carried 
were newer and more advanced than those of their Palestinian rivals.  The main challenge 
faced by the Jewish forces was maintaining contact with the scattered isolated settlements 
and Jerusalem surrounded by Palestinian areas.
203
   
The war that occurred between 1947 and 1949 has been the subject of many 
books by numerous Palestinian, Israeli and international academics.  To give a full 
account of the war here would go well beyond the scope of this study, but it is necessary 
to give it some attention because of its significance to the Palestinian and Israeli historical 
narratives.   There are practical consequences, most notably the establishment of the state 
of Israel and the creation of the Palestinian refugees, and ideological consequences, such 
as the Palestinian and Israeli sense of justness of goals and victimhood.  Here we will 
outline the major events of the war and their implications for the future of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, briefly touch on the post-war status quo and then move on to the study of 
discourse after 1967. 
 Broadly speaking, the war can be divided into two stages.  The first took place 
between the passing of the UN partition plan in fall 1947 and the end of the mandate in 
spring 1948 and was characterized by a three way conflict between the Palestinians, the 
Yishuv and the British Mandate forces.  The second stage began at midnight on May 14
th
, 
1948 with the final withdrawal of the British from historical Palestine.  After this final 
withdrawal, Arab states sent troops into historical Palestine beginning the first Arab-
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Israeli war.  At the conclusion of the war in 1949, Israel had grown beyond the partition 
plan borders for the Jewish state to take 78% of historical Palestine and the rest, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip would be split between Jordanian and Egyptian control, 
respectively. 
In the immediate wake of the passing of the partition resolution, sporadic attacks 
by Palestinian irregulars took place against Jewish settlements and convoys.
204
  There 
exists debate, however, if these attacks signified the start of war or merely isolated 
incidents.  According to the Israeli narrative, the war began with these Arab attacks.  
Palestinian academic Saleh Abdel Jawad citing UN and Yishuv sources, argues, 
convincingly, that the attacks that occurred between the passing of the partition resolution 
on November 30
th
 and the middle of December did not signify that the Palestinian 
population at large was gearing up for war.
205
  He relates Ben Gurion’s view that the 
Palestinian peasants, the majority of the Palestinian population at that time, would stay 
out of hostilities unless they were faced with direct force.
206
  He also relates a UN report 
that even at the highest levels of the Palestinian national movement there was a 
preference to avoid “serious outbreaks,” and states that “it is possible that the excitement 
would have subsided and little loss of life been caused” if Yishuv provocation had not 
occurred.
207
  However, on December 11
th
 and 13
th
, Jewish terrorist attacks on Palestinian 
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cities and towns resulting in dozens of deaths signaled a point of no return.
208
  War had 
broken out in historical Palestine.  These terror attacks, usually bombings or car 
bombings in highly congregated Palestinian areas, began to occur throughout the major 
cities such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem and would soon spill out into the 
countryside.  These were not only carried out by the paramilitary Irgun and Lehi but also 
the mandate sanctioned Haganah, or Jewish defense force.
209
  The Palestinians adopted 
these tactics and answered in turn leading to waves of retaliatory acts.
210
  The first wave 
of Palestinian refugees occurred during this time period as 15,000 fled the violence and 
terror attacks in the cities despite calls from the Palestinian leadership to stay.
211
 
As the date of British withdrawal approached, the Zionist leadership was stuck 
with a dilemma.  At the time of the passing of the partition plan, the Palestinians 
outnumbered the Jewish settlers in historical Palestine nearly two to one.  Within the area 
that was supposed to become the Jewish state, the Yishuv only held a small majority 
(498,000 to 407,000) and a minority of the total land.
212
  The plan also put a number of 
Jewish settlements and the city of Jerusalem outside of this area.  The Yishuv leadership 
felt that it could not rely on the United Nations to enforce partition and knew that future 
recognition would rely on the ability to bring this area under Jewish control.  It resolved 
therefore in April of 1948 to go on the offensive and bring the areas of the proposed 
Jewish state under Haganah control and to expand the area of control to include those 
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Jewish settlements located outside of the partition plan’s borders.213  According to a 
Yishuv directive termed Plan Dalet, the Palestinians that lived in those areas were to be 
expelled.   
As with nearly every aspect of this conflict, there is significant controversy and 
debate surrounding Plan Dalet.  The conventional Israeli narrative argues that the 
Palestinians who fled during the course of the war were not refugees at all and therefore 
have no right to return to their homeland.  According to this narrative, the Palestinians 
either left of their own accord or after Arab encouragement.
214
  Furthermore, this willing 
dispersal of the Palestinians demonstrated that there existed no national tie to the land of 
historical Palestine amongst the Palestinians.  This is important going forward because it 
is used as justification of the Israeli refusal to take any blame for the creation of the 
Palestinian refugees and the refusal to allow their return.   
A group of Israeli scholars dubbed the New Historians, however, used Israeli state 
archives to dispute this claim.  Even within this group there is debate.  Perhaps the two 
most famous New Historians are Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé.  Morris argues that the 
Yishuv forces acted according to Plan Dalet from April 1948 and purposefully expelled 
the Palestinians who lived within the area meant to become the Jewish state but that the 
Yishuv never officially adopted the plan.  Pappé argues that Plan Dalet was officially 
adopted and therefore the expulsion of Palestinians was a premeditated ethnic 
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cleansing.
215
  Either way, it is widely accepted that the Jewish and later Israeli armies 
forcibly expelled a vast majority of the Palestinian refugees.   
This forcible expulsion began before the establishment of the state of Israel in 
May of 1948 and occurred in Palestinian cities and towns alike.  One of the most 
infamous episodes was the massacre at Deir Yassin.  The village of Deir Yassin had a 
non-aggression pact with the Haganah but in April of 1948 the Irgun and Lehi attacked 
the village.
216
  After valiant eight hour battle between the severely outnumbered villagers 
and the Jewish forces,
217
 the two paramilitary groups took the village and killed 115 men 
women and children.
218
  This event became a powerful propaganda weapon for the 
Yishuv throughout the war.  Threats of a repeat of Deir Yassin were played via 
loudspeaker and radio in Palestinian cities and villages caused thousands of Palestinians 
to flee their homes out of fear.
219
  These threats were often followed through by the 
Jewish forces as dozens of massacres (Abdel Jawad documents nearly 70 throughout the 
war) occurred as the Yishuv’s forces expanded their control over more and more of the 
Palestinian countryside.
220
   
The urban Palestinians were not exempt from this expulsion either.  After the 
Arab military command and British mandate troops left Haifa on April 21
st
 and 22
nd
 of 
1948, threats of another Deir Yassin and the shelling of the old city market led to the 
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expulsion of 50,000 Palestinians over the course of three days.
221
  All told, 300,000 
Palestinians, of the 750,000 documented total, would become refugees before the 
establishment of the state of Israel in May of 1948.
222
   
On May 14
th
, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the birth of the state of Israel in 
the borders articulated by UN Resolution 181.  With this, the next stage of the battle for 
Palestine began and the battle shifted for the first time from a Zionist-Palestinian conflict 
to an Arab-Israeli one.  Plans for a joint Arab invasion of Palestine had been formulated 
by the Arab League.  This invading force included troops from Jordan, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Egypt and a minor Saudi contingency.
223
  Despite the clear population 
advantage these countries had over the Yishuv, they never were in a position to challenge 
the Zionists’ goals.  The army the Arab states fielded never came close to matching that 
of the Yishuv in terms of manpower.
224
  With the exception of the British trained Arab 
Legion from Jordan, the Arab soldiers could also not match the Yishuv soldiers when it 
came to training and equipment.
225
  On top of that, the Arab states were either newly 
established or still under imperial pressure and therefore unable or unwilling to commit 
full military mobilization to the liberation of Palestine due to domestic concerns.
226
  
Perhaps the most significant handicaps on the Arab were effort was the internal rivalries 
and suspicious amongst the Arab states.  There was no coordination of military 
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movement as each country was unwilling to put their troops under a rival’s control.227   
The primary rivalry was between Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on one side and the 
Hashemite kings in Jordan and Iraq on the other.  The other Arab leaders suspected, and 
rightly so, Jordan’s King Abdullah of coveting the areas granted to the Palestinians in the 
partition resolution.
228
  Abdullah had been meeting regularly with Zionist leaders since 
the creation of his territory in 1921 and as a result, he and Zionist officials had already 
negotiated the borders of their states.  The king therefore deployed his troops in order to 
occupy the area allocated to him in the agreements.  The only fighting that took place 
between Jordanian and Israeli troops was over Jerusalem, where no agreement had been 
reached, and when Israeli troops entered areas meant to go to the Arab state.
229
 
With the best trained and best funded Arab army negotiated out of the war, it did 
not take much time for the newly minted Israeli Defense Forces to beat back the Arab 
invasion.  After about a month, the UN was able to bring about a truce accepted by both 
sides.  In order to bypass an embargo on weapons shipping enforced by the United States 
and Britain, the Israelis turned east to the Soviets via Czechoslovakia to rearm themselves 
throughout the thirty-five day truce.
230
  When the Egyptians and Syrians chose not to 
extend the truce, the Israelis earned decisive victories, gaining control of the Galilee and 
the Negev Desert in the south ousting Jordanian and Egyptian forces and greatly 
                                                 
227
 Ibid., 130.   
228
 Smith, 2
nd
 edition, 145.   
229
 Ibid., 145.   
230
 Ibid., 145.   
91 
 
increasing the territory under Israeli control beyond that which was allocated to in the UN 
partition plan.
231
 
After the end of hostilities, the United Nations sponsored peace talks between the 
parties aimed at reaching a permanent resolution.  No such resolution could be reached 
because of the issue of Jerusalem and the three quarters of a million Palestinians refugees 
created by the war.  The Arab states demanded the repatriation of the refugees.  The 
Israelis, who did not recognize Palestinians as a proper nation and saw them as just 
Arabs, argued that they could be resettled in another of the Arab countries.
232
  After the 
failure of the peace talks, the UN mediator lowered expectations and looked for armistice 
agreements with peace settlements to be agreed upon sometime in the future.  These 
armistice agreements between Israel and the neighboring Arab states set informal borders 
of the state of Israel.  These borders left Israel with 78% of the land of Palestine (the UN 
partition resolution granted them a little over 50%).  The rest, the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, came under the control of Jordan and Egypt respectively (fig. 5).
233
  This 
would be status quo for nineteen years until the War of 1967. 
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Fig. 5. Original Partition Plan and Post-War Armistice Lines (Source: PASSIA) 
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For the Palestinians, the Israeli War of Independence was the Nakba or disaster.  
The Israeli expulsion continued as it expanded its control beyond the land allocated in the 
partition plan.  Three quarters of a million Palestinians were forced out by Israelis 
deliberate policy of expulsion and fear mongering.
234
  As we noted above, 300,000 of 
these were forcibly removed before the Arab states entered the war.  Of the eleven 
Palestinian cities taken by Israel in the course of the war, all but one were either partially 
or fully cleansed of their Palestinian inhabitants.
235
  470,000 refugees settled into camps 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  The remaining were forced out of Palestine 
altogether into Lebanon, Jordan and Syria.
236
  Of the 133,000 Palestinians that remained 
inside of Israel, 25% became internally displaced persons, meaning that they were forced 
from their homes but did not leave the territory that would become Israel.
237
  All 
Palestinians that remained in Israel were kept under military law until 1966.
238
  The land 
and property left behind by refugees and “present absentees” (those who were internally 
displaced but did not leave the state) was quickly seized by the state of Israel.  All in all, 
over five hundred Palestinian villages were cleared of their inhabitants and destroyed in 
1947-8.
239
  
The most important thing to take away from the events of 1947-9 for our 
purposes, other than perhaps the armistice lines that defined Israel’s borders until 1967, is 
the creation of the Palestinian refugees.  First of all, these refugees would become the 
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base of support for the Palestinian national groups we will study in the upcoming 
chapters.  But more significantly, the issue of Palestinian refugees becomes one of main 
factors keeping the Palestinian and Israeli future visions irreconcilable.  Because the 
Israeli narrative refuses to accept blame for the creation of the Palestinian refugees and 
refuses to acknowledge their claim to the land that is now Israel, the state of Israel will 
not accept the return of the Palestinians to their homes.  On a practical level, the return of 
the Palestinian refugees would lessen the Jewish majority of the state of Israel, a red line 
Israel will not cross.  For the Palestinians, the return from exile is the most cherished 
right the national movement pursues.  When I was in the West Bank this most recent 
summers, posters commemorating the Nakba read “No Peace Without Return.”  A peace 
that does not fulfill this right is a red line the Palestinians will not cross.   
Post 1948 and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
 With the end of the war, the conflict took on a distinctly different style.  Whereas 
during the mandate the conflict was between the Palestinians and the Jewish settlers, after 
the establishment of Israel the interstate Arab-Israeli conflict would emerge.  As we noted 
above, historical Palestine was split between three separate sovereignties.  Israel grew 
beyond its partition plan designated borders to take 78% of the land.  Jordan annexed the 
West Bank and the Egypt took administrative control of the Gaza Strip.  This would 
remain the status quo for the ensuing nineteen years.  Because our study focuses on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which went through a lull during this period, and not the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, it is not necessary to go into much detail on the events of these two 
95 
 
decades.  However, it is important to set the stage for the fundamental change that would 
occur with the June 1967 War.  During this period, the banner of the Palestinian cause 
would be carried not by the Palestinians themselves but rather alongside the banner of 
Arab nationalism.  The most notable of these banner carriers was Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
 Nasser was a major in the Egyptian military during the 1948 war with the state of 
Israel.  His unit was surrounded by Zionist troops and Nasser himself was seriously 
wounded.
240
  At the time, Egypt was a monarchy under British occupation.  Nasser and 
his fellow officers were affected deeply by ineffectiveness and corruption of their 
government throughout the war and the hold over the region from European imperialism 
as represented by British occupation and Zionist colonization.
241
  In 1952, the Free 
Officers, organized by Nasser, overthrew the king and took power in Egypt.  By 1954, 
Nasser had taken executive control over the country which he would hold until his 
death.
242
  While the issue of the Palestinians was not initially a priority for Nasser when 
he took office, this changed with the uncovering of an Israeli plot to destroy British and 
American instillations in Cairo and a devastating raid of the Gaza Strip.
243
  From that 
point forward, Nasser’s political program, on a discursive level, became one of Arab 
unity and Palestinian restoration.   
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 A couple years after these pivotal events, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, 
which was majority owned by the British government, sparking outrage from the British, 
French and Israelis.
244
  These three countries conspired to invade Egypt and overthrow 
Nasser.  International outrage and American pressure caused these three countries to pull 
back which raised Nasser’s profile and influence within Egypt and the Arab states.  In 
1958, Nasser made his only practical attempt at Arab political unity, creating the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria and entered into negotiations with Iraq for its inclusion 
into the new state.
245
  Despite the massive positive public reception of this news 
throughout the Arab Middle East, negotiations with Iraq broke down and subsequently 
Syria would leave the UAR in 1961.
246
  Six years later Egypt, Jordan and Syria would 
enter in the third Arab-Israeli war.  After six days in June, the status quo of the region 
would be permanently shattered, historical Palestine would once again be united under a 
single sovereignty and Arab nationalism would falter and in its place would rise the 
Palestinian nationalist organizations.
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Chapter 3: A New Conflict, A New Discourse; 1967-1968 
In 1967, everything changed.  What had been divided between three separate 
sovereignties for nineteen years was in one fell swoop reunited through war and 
subsequent occupation.  On June 5
th
, 1967 Israel launched an attack on the grounded air 
forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
1
  Possessing total air superiority combined with the 
kind of miscommunication and lack of coordination that characterized the Arabs’ war 
effort in 1948, Israel only needed six days to double its territory by taking the Gaza Strip, 
the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (fig. 6).  For the first time in 
two decades historical Palestine was once again a united territory, now under de facto 
Israeli sovereignty.  It is with this fundamental change in the conflict that we begin our 
study of official political discourse.   
For Israel and its citizens, the 1967 war was a moment of triumph.  For one thing, 
the territorial gains in the Sinai and the Golan gave Israel serious leverage over their Arab 
neighbors.  More importantly, however, Israel won the prize that had eluded them in the 
1948 war: the eastern part of Jerusalem and the holy sites therein.  For two decades, 
Israeli Jews had been unable to visit the Western Wall, their holiest site in Jerusalem.  
Jerusalem was and still is the national symbol of the state of Israel.  Unifying it under the 
Israeli flag was an extremely emotional nationalistic event. 
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Fig. 6: Israeli Territorial Gains of June 1967 (Source: PASSIA) 
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And while the Israeli Knesset (parliament) did not put the annexation of 
Jerusalem into law for another thirteen years, Israeli designs for the city were never in 
doubt.  When Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan reached the wall soon after its 
capture he stated: “We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned 
never to be parted from it again.” 2  Now that the city was in their hands, the Israelis had 
no interest in letting it go. 
For the Arabs, the story in the wake of the war was completely different.  In Arab 
parlance the 1967 War is referred to as the Naksa, meaning setback.  However, this is 
little more than a euphemism for the total defeat of the Arabs at the hands of Israel.  For 
all intents and purposes, these six days were the beginning of the end of Arab 
Nationalism as a political force.  The great Palestinian academic Edward Said had this to 
say of the 1967 war: “In a matter of six days, everything that Abdel Nasser and his 
followers had created came apart. To be an Arab meant a sense of defeat, profound 
shock, and bewildering uncertainty.”3  Such was the humiliating nature of the defeat, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt and the most influential Arab Nationalist, 
offered his resignation (an offer which the people of Egypt took to the streets to reject).
4
  
Nasser’s death a couple of years later was accompanied by the death of the first practical 
attempt at Arab political unity, the United Arab Republic, soon after.  Nasser would be 
replaced by Anwar Sadat who played little more than lip service to Arab Nationalism and 
instead focused on Egypt and its economy.  He did orchestrate the last military act of the 
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Arab-Israel conflict in conjunction with Syria: the 1973 War which was aimed at retaking 
the Sinai and the Golan Heights from Israel.  The Arab effort in this war’s early stages 
was relatively effective, which surprised both the Israelis and the Arab world.
5
  As the 
Israeli forces regrouped and drove towards Cairo and Damascus, a ceasefire was reached.  
Five years later, Egypt, the largest and most influential Arab state, signed a peace treaty 
with Israel (an act which resulted in its expulsion from the Arab League for a decade).
6
  
This agreement was perhaps the final nail in the coffin for political pan-Arab 
Nationalism, the end of a process of decline that had started with defeat in 1967.  While a 
feeling of Arab unity and solidarity still remains to this day, it is little more than 
sentimental, with no practical or political impetus. 
For Palestinians, 1967 was, in a number of ways, a replay of 1948.  Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees were once again created.  A number of these people were refugees 
of the 1948 war who once again had to leave their homes.
7
  The war also brought Israeli 
occupation and military government to the Palestinians of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip 
and East Jerusalem.  For those Palestinians who were refugees from the land that became 
the state of Israel, this de facto unification of historical Palestine was a surreal 
experience.  After nineteen years of separation from their former homes, refugees who 
now lived in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were all of a sudden able to return home.  
This return, however, was only temporary as the houses from which they fled were either 
demolished or repossessed and given to Jewish immigrants. The gut-wrenching 
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experience of seeing one’s home but being unable to stay was poignantly and powerfully 
portrayed by the great Palestinian short story writer Ghassan Kanafani in his novella 
Returning to Haifa.  He tells the story of a Palestinian couple forced to flee from Haifa as 
Jewish forces cleansed the city in April 1948.  In the melee, they left their five month old 
son asleep in their house. At first the couple was reluctant to visit Haifa in the wake of 
the 1967 War, fearing the grief and failure they would feel as they approached their old 
home.  They could not, however, keep themselves away:  
He turned toward his wife, but she wasn’t listening. She was turned away from him, 
absorbed in gazing at the road — now to the right, where the farmland stretched away as 
far as one could see, and now to the left, where to sea, which had remained so distant for 
more than twenty years, was raging near at hand. Suddenly she said: 
 “I never imagined that I would see Haifa again.” 
 He said: 
 “You’re not seeing it. They’re showing it to you.” 
With that, Safiyya’s nerves failed her for the first time and she shouted: 
   “What’s all this ‘philosophy’ you’ve been spouting all day long? The gates and 
the sights and everything else. What happened to you?” 
“What happened to me?”  
He said it to himself, trembling.  But he took control of his nerves and continued to speak 
to her quietly. 
“They opened the border as soon as they completed the occupation, suddenly and 
immediately. That has never happened in any war in history. You know the terrible thing 
that happened in April 1948, so now, why this? Just for our sakes alone? No! This is part 
of the war. They’re saying to us, ‘Help yourselves, look and see how much better we are 
than you, how much more developed. You should accept being our servants. You should 
admire us.” But you’ve seen it yourself. Nothing’s changed. It was in our power to have 
done much better than they did.”8 
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Here Kanafani deftly sums up the feelings of Palestine’s Arabs in the wake of 
both wars: the grief of expulsion, the bitterness of exile, the subservience of occupation, 
and the frustration at the inability to reclaim their homes. Instead, they return to see Haifa 
put on by the Israelis as an exhibition to show the superiority of the Jewish state.  
Beyond the changes to everyday life the war brought, 1967 inspired the 
realization that the Arab states could do nothing to return Palestine to the Arabs.  Nasser 
and his Arab Nationalism had failed to deliver on its promises and with their land now 
occupied by Israel and their armies roundly defeated, the Arab states could do nothing.  A 
paradigm shift was occurring in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The conflict that had for nearly 
two decades been dominated by Nasser and the Arabs had begun to change.  In the wake 
of the war, Palestinian groups, disillusioned with the Arabs and their failings, sprouted up 
with the goal of putting the fight for historical Palestine in the hands of the Palestinians.  
The conflict returned to the style it had taken during the mandate, a conflict between 
Palestinians and Israelis.  It is here, with this paradigm shift, that we will begin our study 
of the discourse of the conflict because it is here that the two nationalisms which claimed 
the same piece of land reignited their direct conflict.   
Official Israeli Discourse in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1967 
 From its birth in 1948 until 1977, Israel was ruled by the Labor party that grew 
out of the Labor Zionists of the second and third aliyot.  As such, this stream of Israeli 
political thought controlled the production of public discourse in the wake of the 1967 
War.  The international community and the United Nations took about five months to 
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finalize an official response to the events of the 1967 War, but Israeli Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol’s Labor government wasted little time in penning guiding principles for the 
state of Israel in light of this new arrangement.   
The assumption in the Israeli camp was that the territorial gains of the war 
rendered the armistice lines of 1949 invalid.  Israel had no intention of giving up any of 
the land captured in the war except in exchange for full peace treaties with its neighbors.
 9
  
Furthermore, they fully intended to expand the borders of the state beyond those of the 
preceding nineteen years, an action they perceived to be essential for the security of the 
state.
10
 
 One of the first and perhaps most famous future vision document presented to the 
Eshkol was what came to be known as the Allon Plan.  Drafted by labor minister Yigal 
Allon in July, the plan called for Israel to annex the Jordan River Valley to block any 
potential Arab invasion from Jordan, and a corridor of land running west to Jerusalem. 
The remaining land of the West Bank and its inhabitants would be returned to Jordan (fig, 
7).
11
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Fig. 7 Map of the Allon Plan (Source: PASSIA) 
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Note that the plan gave no consideration to the desires of the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank.  It was a purely unilateral act aimed at countering the issue 
of millions of new non-Jewish people under Israeli control.  In this Israeli future vision 
document, the Palestinians were only found as Arabs to be handed off to another Arab 
state and therefore essentially non-existent in Israel’s imagination.  The plan was never 
endorsed by the cabinet but it remained significant as the conflict would move forward.
 12
  
It was the first example of what would become known as the “Jordan Option” when 
negations with the Palestinians began decades later.  The idea was to solve the problem 
by scuttling Palestinian national aspirations and giving Jordan what was left of the West 
Bank’s territory and population after Israel took its share.  
 The failure of the Allon Plan was likely down to the government of Israel’s 
overall reluctance to give up that much of the land of the West Bank.  What came to be 
favored over the Allon Plan was a policy of settlement and de facto annexation of the 
West Bank.  At the time of the 1967 War, Menachem Begin (who we met previously as 
the leader of the revisionist Irgun paramilitary group and will meet again as the first 
Likud prime minister of Israel) was a minister without portfolio in the Eshkol 
government.  He, along with other prominent Israeli leaders like Labor Minister of 
Defense Moshe Dayan, favored a policy of settlement building in the West Bank.
13
  The 
goal of these settlements, which Israeli citizens had begun to construct almost 
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immediately after the conclusion of the war, was to create so called “facts on the 
ground.”  The idea was to mirror the Zionist policy in the mandate period of proving 
Jewish, now Israeli, control over a piece of territory by building permanent structures on 
it.
14
   
Just as Allon justified the annexation of the Jordan Valley in terms of Israel’s 
security, supporters of the settlement program used claims of security to justify 
expansion.
15
  The settlement population, and therefore direct Israeli control over territory, 
has steadily expanded over the course of the ensuing four and half decades of occupation 
to over well over half a million by 2012 (but we shall look more at the ramifications of 
this as we move forward in history).  The important thing to note here in 1967 was that a 
policy of moving Israeli citizens to the West Bank to prove sovereignty was beginning to 
emerge in the immediate wake of the war.  The framework for this policy of expansion 
was put into place mere weeks after the conclusion of the war.  The Israeli Knesset 
determined that whatever land is under Israeli jurisdiction, law and administration is 
sovereign Israeli territory.  It then gave the Israeli government the ability to extend Israeli 
jurisdiction, law and administration into the newly occupied territory, essentially 
expanding Israeli sovereignty in to this new territory.
16
  This decision at once opened up 
the newly occupied territories for Israeli settlement and required Israeli settlement to 
prove Israeli sovereignty over the land. It seems that Israel wasted little time in setting 
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out to expand its control into the occupied territories with little intent of returning them to 
either the Arab countries or its Palestinian residents.   
About a month after Allon came to the cabinet with his proposition, Prime 
Minister Eshkol himself outlined the “Principles Guiding Israel’s Policy in the Aftermath 
of the June 1967 War.”17  Right off the bat, Eshkol affirms the fact that Israel has no 
intention of returning to the pre-1967 borders: 
The Government of Israel will endeavor to achieve peace with the neighboring Arab 
countries.  We shall never permit a return to a situation of constant threat to Israel’s 
security, of blockade and aggression.
18
   
The implication here is that the armistice lines that defined Israel’s borders did 
not provide the state of Israel with a level of security it felt sufficient (meaning, 
obviously, land inhabited in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Palestinians would be 
taken by the state of Israel in order to reach this sufficient sense of security).  Just as 
Israel had no intention of giving up any part of Jerusalem, it had no intention of drawing 
back to borders it felt were unsafe.  As we see from day one, Israel’s policy in the 
occupied territories prioritized its sense of security over consideration for the wishes of 
the newly occupied people and showed clear intent to bring this new territory into the 
fold of the state of Israel.   
In the same document, the prime minister addresses the issue of the Palestinian 
refugees and the Palestinians in the newly acquired territories. 
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“Israel will cooperate fully in the solution of the refugees problem... within the 
framework of an international and regional plan. 
The government endeavors to maintain fair and equitable relations with the population in 
the new areas, while maintaining order and security.”19 
What stands out immediately is that Eshkol does not refer to the refugees or the 
inhabitants of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as Palestinians.  In fact, the 
term “Palestinian” does not enter mainstream Israeli political discourse until the late 
1980s as we shall see later.  It is clear that when Eshkol refers to the refugees here, his 
commitment to “cooperate” in finding a solution to the refugee problem neither states or 
implies any feeling of Israeli culpability for the existence of Palestinian refugees.  
Regarding the population in the territories (again not identified as Palestinian), the 
government of Israel will try to keep fair and equitable, but only when order and security 
allow.  Here not only does Israel’s sense of security supersede any self-determination for 
Palestinians, it also supersedes fair and equitable treatment.   
A quick note about the use of the word “security” in Israeli political discourse:  In 
almost all instances where Israeli producers of discourse discuss the expansion of Israeli 
territory, this expansion is justified in terms of the security of the state.  The question of 
the security of the state has been engrained in the Israeli psyche since its inception.  It is 
engendered in the Jewish citizens throughout their education almost to a level of 
institutionalized paranoia.
20
  For example, Jewish Israeli high school students take class 
trips to Auschwitz as a reminder of the threats the Jewish people face.  This is a process 
of education that culminates in mandatory service in the Israeli Defense Forces for all 
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Jewish Israeli teenagers (an organization whose name reflects the centrality of the 
security mentality in Israel).  The question, however, is how does the acquisition of 
territory inhabited by people hostile to the state of Israel or the settlement of Israeli 
citizens into this hostile territory contribute to the security of the state of Israel?  So does 
the answer “security” fully explain Israel’s desire to expand its borders beyond those of 
the 1949 armistice line?  Or does Israel simply want to expand its territory for the sake of 
expansion and uses security as an excuse?  Since we cannot read the minds of the Israeli 
producers of discourse, we can only judge their intention on what they say and what their 
actions suggests.  But it seems that from day one of the occupation of the territories, 
Israel had no intention or ceding all of its new holdings, whether for reasons of security 
or aspiration for expansion.  
Palestinian Armed Revolution 
As discussed above, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war meant that for the first time 
in nineteen years, the Palestinians would try to take control their own destiny and they 
would do this through armed revolution.  To understand the major players in the 
Palestinian armed revolution that took the reins in the fight for historical Palestine in the 
wake of the 1967 War, we must first return to 1959.  It was in that year that a young 
Yassir Arafat, along with a tight inner circle, founded Fatah.
21
  Arafat, ever the savvy 
nationalist leader, claimed to be born in Jerusalem and to be related to Hajj Amin al-
Husayni, the most famous Palestinian nationalist leader of the mandate period.  While 
these claims are dubious, what is known for sure is that he attended King Fuad University 
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in Cairo and graduated in 1951 with a degree in engineering.
22
  As early as 1951, Arafat 
recognized what it would take Palestinians another fifteen years to see: the Palestinians 
could expect nothing from the Arab states; they needed to take matters into their own 
hands if they were to free their homeland.
23
  To Arafat, the alternative strategy was 
unfolding around him.  The 1950s was the age of anti-colonial revolution and national 
liberation.  None of these revolutions were more significant to Arafat and his party than 
the Algerian revolution which began in 1954.
24
  The Algerian Revolution was a 
shockingly bloody affair with brutal French counterinsurgency answered in turn with 
Algerian attacks on both civilians and soldiers alike.  Despite this, the strategy of armed 
struggle as practiced by the Algerian revolutionaries and articulated by Franz Fanon was 
adopted by Arafat and Fatah.  This strategy would also be embraced by the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), the other two Palestinian groups we will study in this time period.  
Fatah did not muddy their message with Marxist, Maoist or Arabist aspirations.
25
  They 
focused strictly on the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle which presented a 
straightforward and appealing mission to Palestinians inside and outside of historical 
Palestine.   
Fatah penned its constitution in 1964.  The document proclaimed that the 
liberation of Palestine would come through popular revolution in the style articulated by 
Fanon and practiced in Algeria.  This document made it clear, repeatedly, that the 
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Palestinians would not take a back seat to the Arabs in the fight for Palestine.  While the 
first article of the constitution affirms that the Palestinians are members of the Arab 
Nation, the second proclaims their independence from it: “The Palestinian people have an 
independent identity. They are the sole authority that decides their own destiny, and they 
have complete sovereignty on all their lands.”26  Because the Palestinians have the right 
to complete sovereignty on their lands, “the Palestinian Revolution plays a leading role in 
liberating Palestine.”27 This is sort of “stay off our turf” message to the Arab states is 
reiterated in the methods section of the constitution: “Fatah does not interfere with local 
Arab affairs and hence, does not tolerate such interference or obstructing its struggle by 
any party.”28  They were happy, however, to accept support from the Arab Nation as it 
was the Arab’s “national obligation” to give it.29  Fatah would need to wait until 1967 to 
take this leading role in the fight for Palestine.   
The constitution also articulated the goals Fatah hoped to achieve through 
Palestinian led popular revolution.  Fatah was unequivocal in its criticism of the enemy of 
its struggle: “The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, 
organization and method... The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a 
colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international 
imperialism.”30  Clearly, the founders of Fatah saw Zionism, and the state it created, as 
part of a wider global imperialism and colonialism that was plaguing Africa and Asia at 
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this time.  The goal of the revolution, therefore, was the, “complete liberation of 
Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural 
existence.”31  This racial, colonial entity would then be replaced with the establishment of 
“an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all Palestinian lands, and 
Jerusalem is its capital city, and protecting the citizens' legal and equal rights without any 
racial or religious discrimination.”32   
It is important to note here that the framers of the Fatah constitution never in the 
entire document use the terms Jewish, Judaism, or Jews.  To them (in terms of political 
discourse anyway), Israel was not a Jewish state but a settler, colonial, Zionist one.  Since 
the tactics of Zionism were colonial and imperialistic and the state it created separated the 
Palestinians from historical Palestine, it needed to be replaced.  The Fatah future vision is 
a Palestinian state in all of historical Palestine, not without Jews but without Zionism.  
This is not to say, however, that Fatah were perfectly happy to live alongside all of the 
Israelis that had immigrated over the past half century.  The document refers to Palestine 
as part of the Arab world and considers Israeli existence in Palestine “a Zionist 
invasion.”33  It is perhaps stretching the imagination, therefore, to believe that should 
Fatah’s popular revolution have been more successful, the state they created would have 
been welcoming to all of the hundreds of thousands of Israelis who inhabited the lands of 
historical Palestine.  The important thing to realize, however, is that Fatah’s opposition to 
these people living in historical Palestine was not a result of their religious affiliation but 
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because they were in Palestine as a result of colonial settlement.  Obviously this view of 
Zionism is completely at odds with the self-view of the Zionist movement which sees 
Israel as the culmination of Jewish history.  To an Israeli, who sees Zionism as an 
expression of Jewish self-determination and not a settler-colonial movement, talk of 
eradicating “Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence” seems to follow 
a long history of anti-Semitic rhetoric.  My point is that to view this document or 
subsequent documents we will study as anti-Semitic is a misinterpretation.  Palestinian 
opposition to Zionism was anti-colonial, according the Palestinian understanding of the 
situation in which they found themselves, not anti-Semitic.  This is just one of the failures 
to see eye to eye that we will encounter as we move ahead in history.   
One last note on Fatah’s original constitution of 1964: it is interesting to trace the 
evolution of the sentiment expressed in article 22 and echoed in other Palestinian political 
documents of this period. The article states that Fatah will oppose: “any political solution 
offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as 
any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any international mandate 
on its people.”34  It is interesting because as of 2013, the Palestinian Authority, under the 
control of Fatah, has been actively negotiating for two decades for an alternative political 
solution to the conflict instead of demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine.   
As Arafat and Fatah were advocating Palestinian resistance independent of Arab 
aspirations, Nasser was attempting to bring the issue of Palestine under Arab control.  
Nasser was concerned by guerilla raids into Israel by Palestinian groups which were 
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aggravating the already tense relationships between Israel and its neighbors.
35
  In an 
effort to avert a potential crisis caused by these raids, Nasser called together the leaders 
of the Arab states to create a body that would control the actions of Palestinian guerilla 
groups.  Thus the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created and a Palestinian 
diplomat by the name of Ahmad al-Shuqayri was installed as its leader.
36
  While 
nominally representing the national goals of the Palestinian people, the PLO, as imagined 
by Nasser, was a group subservient to the Arab League.
37
  The idea was for the Arab 
states to play the leading role in the fight for Palestine while ensuring the Palestinian 
nationalist groups would do nothing to jeopardize Arab aims.  As we have discussed 
above, this all fell apart with the Arab defeat in 1967.  Soon after, Yassir Arafat’s Fatah 
would come to dominate the PLO and he would become chairman for the following three 
and a half decades.
38
 
Resolution 242: Israeli and Palestinian Reactions 
While the Israelis were drawing maps and seeking to establish facts on the ground 
and the Palestinians were claiming their place at the forefront of the battle for historical 
Palestine in the months following the war, the international community and the UN were 
writing their official response to the events of June 1967.  This response finally came in 
November of 1967 in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 242.  The resolution 
took so long to draft because it was written meticulously to contain a level of ambiguity 
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that would ensure acceptance not only by Israel and the Arab states but also by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  The main goal of the resolution was to lay the 
foundation of the so-called “land for peace formula.”  The idea was that the Israelis 
would return the land they conquered in 1967 in exchange for recognition and peace 
treaties from the Arab states.
39
  The Israelis officially accepted Resolution 242 
immediately (as did Egypt and Jordan) but the PLO did not.  In order to understand why, 
we must first look at the text of the document. 
After a brief preamble expressing the concern of the UN over the situation in the 
Middle East and emphasizing the inadmissibility of acquiring territory through war, UN 
Resolution 242 reads like this: 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the 
area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every 
State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.
40
  
There are two important things to note about this document in the context of 
Israeli and Palestinian future visions.  First was that the resolution discusses exclusively 
the rights to sovereignty of states, thereby precluding the Palestinians from being a party 
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to the debate.  The second is that Palestinians are not even mentioned in the text.  They 
are referred to abstractly as a “refugee problem” that deserves a just resolution.  To the 
PLO, this was a huge step back from previous UN resolutions, most notably Resolution 
194, which called for the return of refugees to their homes.  This combination of ignoring 
Palestinian national aspirations and backtracking on the right of refugees to return led to 
the rejection of the resolution as the basis for negotiation by the PLO (until 1988, 
anyways).
41
   We shall look at the wording of this rejection below but let us first look at 
Israel’s acceptance of the resolution.    
Israeli Reaction 
Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol signed on to the resolution on behalf of Israel a 
short time after its passage at the UN.  However, the ambiguity of the resolution allowed 
for differing interpretations between Israel and the Arab states.  Foreign Minister Abba 
Eban elaborated Israel’s interpretation of the document to the UN General Assembly in 
October of 1968.  Because the resolution focused on the sovereignty of states and made 
no specific mention of the Palestinians, the response of the foreign minister primarily 
discussed the prospects of peace with Israel’s neighbors and not with its newly occupied 
population.  But just as Resolution 242 made peripheral mention of the Palestinians, the 
response of Foreign Minister Eban had a thing or two to say about the future of the 
Palestinians as seen from official Israeli eyes.   
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Eban early on in his speech reiterated the sentiment found so often in Israeli 
political discourse over the last 45 years:  Israel would not return to the status quo that 
existed in 1967.  Eban picked up on the phrase “secure and recognized borders” from 
Resolution 242 to justify this refusal.  To Eban, this was proof of international support for 
changing the current borders, the so called 1967 borders, to ones that satisfy Israel’s 
sense of security.  He cites an unnamed United States resolution draft author as pointing 
out that the term “safe and secure borders” meant the creation of borders “different from 
the old armistice demarcation lines.”42  His American drafter went on to state that “secure 
and recognized boundaries... had never existed in the Middle East. They must, therefore 
be fixed by the parties in the course of the peacemaking process.”43  In the mind of the 
Israelis, this was the international support they needed to permanently change the borders 
from the lines that existed before the war.
44
  This understanding of Resolution 242 would 
come to have serious consequences for Palestinians despite their official absence from the 
document. 
Reading further into Eban’s speech to the UN, we find that he actually does use 
the word Palestinian twice (although only when quoting the Egyptians).
45
  Following the 
pattern of Resolution 242, when Eban does talk about Palestinians in any length, he refers 
to them as refugees.  Point six of the nine-point peace plan Eban delivered as part of this 
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particular speech to the UN was about refugees.  Two crucial points arise from Eban’s 
proposal to solve the refugee problem.  The first is that Israel refused (and to this day 
refuses) to take any responsibility for the creation of the refugees.  Because Eban does 
not see Israel as culpable, he does not believe that Israel should be exclusively 
responsible for solving the problem, as is evident in his proposal to solve the refugee 
question.   
The second point Eban makes is that the refugee question should be removed 
from the overall peace process.  His statement on refugees begins: “The problem of 
displaced populations was caused by war and can be solved by peace.”46  This does not 
mean that the problem of refugees will be solved with peace negotiations, however.  The 
Israeli plan as articulated by Eban was to call “a conference of Middle Eastern 
States...together with the Governments contributing to refugee relief and the specialized 
agencies of the United Nations in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the 
refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees into 
productive life. This conference can be called in advance of peace negotiations.”47  The 
Israelis, who since the end of the 1948 war favored resettlement of displaced Palestinians 
into neighboring Arab countries rather than allowing return to the territory that became 
Israel,
48
 aimed to depoliticize the Palestinian refugee before any direct peace negotiation 
began. With the refugee (which to the Israeli producers of discourse was coterminous 
with Palestinian) off the political table when negotiations took place, the Israeli 
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government would not have to worry about demands for repatriation of refugees from the 
Arab states.   
Eban re-emphasizes these two points (Israeli innocence in the creation of refugees 
and the separation between the peace process and the future of the refugees) about a year 
later.  Towards the end of 1968, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring approached the states 
involved in the 1967 War on behalf of the UN to check on each state’s willingness to 
fulfill the provisions of Resolution 242.  Abba Eban once again was the speaker on behalf 
of the Israeli government, this time answering the questions of Ambassador Jarring.  
Amongst his answers was a reiteration of the Israeli demand never to return to pre-1967 
borders, insisting that “secure and recognized boundaries have never yet existed between 
Israel and the Arab states... they should now be established as part of the peace making 
process.”49  Regarding refugees, Eban seemed to have hardened his language regarding 
the two points articulated above.  His renunciation of Israeli guilt was more explicit: “The 
refugee problem was caused by the wars launched against Israel by Arab States, and has 
been perpetuated through the refusal of Arab States to establish peaceful relations with 
Israel.”50  He is also more explicit about the Arab states’ position towards the refugees in 
the context of the peace process: “In view of the special humanitarian nature of this issue 
we do not make agreement on plans for a solution of the refugee problem contingent on 
agreement on any other aspect of the Middle Eastern problem.  For the same reason it 
should not be invoked by the Arab States to obstruct agreements on other problems.”51  
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Here Eban’s effort to depoliticize the Palestinian refugee is quite explicit, citing it as a 
humanitarian concern rather than a political factor.  The last sentence expresses Israeli 
frustration at Arab use of the refugee issue as a political issue to be dealt with in a 
political forum.  
So what can we take out of the Israeli reaction to Resolution 242?  The first point 
is that Israel refused to return to the de facto borders that existed from 1948 up to 1967.  
As we move forward and the PLO comes to claim the land of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip for a Palestinian state, this talk of secure borders begins to have serious 
consequences on Palestinian national aspirations.  Secondly, the Israelis only saw the 
Palestinians in the context of Resolution 242 as a refugee problem rather than as an 
independent nation or a political force.  In taking on this problem, the Israeli position, 
based in its refusal to take responsibility for its creation, was to depoliticize and resettle 
the refugees in the Arab countries in which they found themselves.  That position on the 
refugees will hardly change over the ensuing decades but the realization that the 
Palestinians were an independent national political force would grow.   
Palestinian Reaction 
Resolution 242 was rejected by the PLO.  At the time, the organization was still 
under the command of Shuqayri, meaning it had not yet been taken over by the 
Palestinian factions.  The first issue that the PLO had with the resolution was the 
ambiguity that allowed it to be accepted by both Israel and the Arab States: 
121 
 
The resolution as a whole is in the nature of a political declaration of general principles 
and is more like an expression of international intentions than the resolution of an 
executive power.  Its treatment of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces is 
superficial, rather than being a decisive demand.  It leaves Israel many loopholes to 
justify her continued occupation of Arab territories, and may be interpreted as permitting 
her to withdraw from such territories as she chooses to withdraw from and to retain such 
areas as she wishes to retain.
52
 
Clearly, the PLO had the same interpretation of the resolution as the Israeli 
government regarding the treatment of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory: the 
resolution gave Israel room to maneuver when it came to keeping and conceding 
territory.  While this was a boon to Israel and its future aims, it was unacceptable to the 
PLO who had a diametrically opposed vision for the future of Palestine.  Point two of the 
PLO’s rejection focused on this: 
The resolution more than once refers to Israel’s right to exists and to establish permanent, 
recognized frontiers...this imposes on the Arab countries undertakings and a political and 
actual situation which are fundamentally and gravely inconsistent with the Arab character 
of Palestine, the essence of the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinian people to 
return to their homeland.
53
 
At the time of Resolution 242, the PLO aimed to create an Arab state in the 
entirety of historical Palestine (as we move on to 1968, we will see how the PLO came to 
define the character of this imagined Arab state).  How, then, could they accept an 
international resolution advocating for the permanence of a state in territory they 
claimed?  Additionally, “the resolution ignores the right of the refugees to return to their 
homes...thereby annulling the resolutions adopted by the United Nations over the past 
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twenty years.”54  And most importantly to the PLO, the resolution “ignores the existence 
of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination.”55   
Overall, Resolution 242 was a step backwards in the eyes of the PLO.  Not only 
did it solidify Israel’s permanence and ability to control larger swaths of territory, it went 
back on previous UN documents and resolutions calling for the return of Palestinian 
refugees and the rights of Palestinian self-determination.  Whereas the ambiguity of the 
document served Israel’s future vision of an expanded Israeli state with new borders 
despite the will of the newly occupied people, it hampered the desire of the PLO to return 
to historical Palestine and exercise Palestinian self-determination in land it claimed as its 
own.   It made the problem of the Palestinians one of resettling refugees rather than issue 
about land.   
But just as the failure of the 1967 proved to be the end of Arab involvement in the 
overall conflict, so too did Arab involvement in the PLO end.  By the end of the year, the 
Egyptian installed chairman Ahmad al- Shuqayri was forced to step down.  Over the next 
year of interim leadership, the PLO absorbed the Palestinian commando groups, most 
notably Fatah who came to dominate the organization.
56
  This new-look PLO quickly 
began creating discourse that reflected this new state of affairs.   
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Chapter 4: I Israeli Plans and PLO Rebirth; 1968-1970 
Fatah had begun its military agitations against Israel before it was officially 
absorbed into the PLO.  Early on in its history, Fatah began conducting random bombing 
operations in Israel, causing little damage and few casualties but inciting significant 
Israeli concern and reprisals.
1
  Although these activities exceeded any actions by the 
Shuqayri-led PLO, Fatah lacked widespread support for its revolutionary activities before 
the 1967 war.
2
  In July of 1967, Arafat himself entered the West Bank to direct Fatah’s 
actions but effective Israeli suppression and little Palestinian support prevented Fatah 
from having much impact.   
In the wake of the war, however, the new situation resulted in a shaky alliance 
between King Husayn of Jordan and Yassir Arafat.  King Husayn, who feared that Israel 
would annex the West Bank, which he had controlled for the previous nineteen years, 
allowed Arafat’s Fatah to use Jordan, where Palestinian support was higher, as a base of 
operations for attacks against Israeli targets in the West Bank and Israel proper.
3
  He 
hoped that these attacks would discourage Israel from maintaining control of the land.  
Once Israel was convinced that retention of the West Bank was a bad idea, Husayn would 
happily discard Fatah and retake control of the territory.
4
  Arafat and Fatah, however, 
used the opportunity to expand its operations against Israel while using Jordanian 
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sovereignty as a shield against the kind of suppression that occurred in the Israeli 
occupied West Bank.
 5
 
Husayn’s decision to allow Fatah to attack Israeli positions from Jordan came 
back to bite him.  On one hand, as time went on, it became harder and harder to limit 
Palestinian activities.  On the other, Israeli reprisals on Jordanian territory began in 
February of 1968.
6
  The most significant of these occurred in March of that year, and it 
seemed to validate the Fatah position Palestine that could only be freed with Palestinian 
hands.  Israel launched a huge reprisal attack against the Jordanian village of al-Karameh 
to destroy a Fatah camp located in the village.  The Israeli force was met with strong 
resistance by Palestinian guerillas and Jordanian artillery.  While Israel was able to 
destroy the camp, that the Palestinians were able to push back the mighty Israeli military, 
something the armies of the Arab states could not do, and inflict over one hundred 
casualties created a stir in the area.
7
  The serendipitous fact that the name of the village 
meant “dignity” only added to the propaganda value of the event.8  In the wake of the 
battle, thousands of new volunteers turned out to join Fatah or rival Palestinian militant 
factions and began taking control of Palestinian refugee camps across Jordan.
9
  This 
battle put the Palestinian militant organizations into the forefront of the conflict.
10
  With 
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their new numbers and popular support, these guerilla organizations were able to take 
control of the PLO. 
Fatah’s success on the battlefield of al-Karameh did not, however, mean they had 
a monopoly on Palestinian paramilitary resistance to Israel.  Their biggest rival, and our 
second main producer of Palestinian national political discourse, was the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  A Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organization, 
the PFLP condemned the conventional wars waged by the Arab states against Israel as 
“the war of the bourgeoisie.”11  The PFLP plan of action written in 1969, with its 
commitment to revolutionary war and its bitter indictment of the Arab bourgeoisie’s ties 
to global imperialism, reads like it was pulled directly from the pages of Franz Fanon’s 
The Wretched of the Earth.  Unlike Arafat’s Fatah, which aimed to steer well clear of the 
Arab state affairs, the PFLP sought to use a broad Arab revolutionary movement to 
radicalize the Arab governments in the fight for Palestine.
12
  This comes across rather 
clearly in the group’s founding document: 
The Palestinian struggle is a part of the whole Arab liberation movement and the world 
liberation movement.  The Arab bourgeoisie and world imperialism are trying to impose 
a peaceful solution on this Palestinian problem but this suggestion merely promotes the 
interests of imperialism and Zionism, doubt in the efficacy of people’s war as a means of 
liberation and the preservation of the relation of the Arab bourgeoisie with the imperialist 
world market.
13
 
And later: 
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The Arab bourgeoisie is quite prepared for a limited satisfaction of the needs of the 
national struggle as long as it respects the limits that the bourgeoisie sets.  A clear 
illustration of this is the material help that Saudi Arabia offers Fatah while Fatah declares 
that she will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab countries.
14
 
The PFLP never had any intention of staying out of the internal affairs of other 
Arab countries.  Their revolution was a class war as much as a national one and it 
included the revolutionary movement of all Arabs, not just Palestinians.  As such, the 
PFLP would not stand for the Arab bourgeoisie or any other state preventing this 
revolution.  And while the main field of the revolution is Palestine and “the decisive 
battle must be in Palestine,” the plan finishes by essentially calling for the overthrow of 
the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan:   
The problem of the revolution in Palestine is dialectally connected with the problem of 
the revolution in Jordan.  A chain of plots between the Jordanian monarchy, imperialism 
and Zionism have proved this connection.  The struggle in East Jordan must take the 
correct path, that of class struggle.  The Palestinian struggle must not be used as a means 
of propping up the Jordanian monarchy... This is the only way in which Amman can 
become an Arab Hanoi: a base for the revolutionaries fighting inside Palestine. 
15
   
The reference to Amman as an Arab Hanoi, along with the general anti-
imperialist revolution flavor of the document very much speaks to the age in which it was 
written.  The fifties and sixties were the time of decolonization and national revolution.  
The PFLP, like Fatah, saw the Palestinians as revolutionaries fighting the colonizing 
Zionist forces.  To look for the state of Israel in these documents is counterproductive.  It 
is not there.  There is no belief by these Palestinian paramilitary fighters that the state of 
Israel is in any way permanent.  It is colonial entity established by the Zionist movement 
that needed to be replaced with an Arab Palestinian state.  As we saw with the PLO 
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rejection of Resolution 242 and here with the PFLP’s treatment of the king of Jordan, any 
document or entity that stands in the way of the decolonization of Palestine must be 
opposed or dealt with.   
It is probably productive here to return to an issue raised in the discussion of the 
Fatah founding document.  Just like Fatah, the PFLP never mentions Jews or Judaism in 
its charter.  PFLP opposition to Zionism was not based on the Jewish character of the 
movement but rather its colonialist character.  This colonialist character is what was 
preventing Palestinian refugees from returning to their homeland and preventing 
Palestinian self-determination and needed to be replaced for the PFLP vision to be 
realized.  This vision begins to take shape as the Palestinian factions, led by Fatah and the 
PLFP come to control the PLO in 1968. 
The New Palestinian National Covenant 
Following the resignation of Ahmad al-Shuqayri from the PLO, the organization 
underwent a facelift.  On the strength of the propaganda victory that was the Battle of 
Karameh, the Palestinian militant factions swept into control of the PLO.  Fatah took 33 
of the 57 seats allotted to the paramilitary groups (out of 105 total seats) which made up 
the PLO’s ruling body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC).16  Eventually, in 1969, 
Arafat would be elected head of the executive committee.  This did not mean, however, 
that Arafat’s Fatah was able to steer the direction of the PLO.  A fierce rivalry evolved 
between Arafat and the founder of the PFLP, George Habash, who remained committed 
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to radicalizing the neighboring Arab regimes and overthrowing those who would not 
commit to the liberation of Palestine.  There was nothing that Arafat could do to sway 
Habash from this course despite Arafat’s larger base of popular support.  Each of the 
numerous groups on the council had the support of an Arab country and each had its own 
strategy and goals.  The council therefore became not an executive, determining the 
course of the revolution, but an umbrella organization within which all of the factions 
were represented.
17
  The PNC had no ability to deploy or coordinate the operations of the 
various militias that were nominally under their authority.  While this perhaps is a 
haphazard and unorganized way to run a revolution, it meant that the PLO had no single 
home base that Israel could attack in order to stamp out Palestinian resistance.
18
  
However, this new PLO was able to unite enough in 1968 to revise the original 1964 
Palestinian National Covenant.   
The covenant set out the goals of the PLO and the methods by which they were to 
be achieved.  Compared to the original 1964 charter penned under the Egyptian and 
therefore Arab nationalist influenced Shuqayri, the revisions deemphasized pan-Arab 
goals and focused on armed struggle as the means to liberate Palestine.  It acknowledged 
that the goals of Arab nationalism and Palestinian liberation were complementary goals 
but made it clear that the Palestinian people would take the reins of achieving the latter.   
The covenant first set out, however, to define exactly what “Palestine” is and who 
the Palestinians are.  This self-definition is invaluable for our purposes as it establishes a 
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baseline PLO future vision, the evolution of which we can trace over the ensuing forty-
five years.  As we look at this document, it is important to understand that it was penned 
in the age of decolonization and anti-colonial national revolution.  The document reflects 
the Palestinian attitude that its struggle was against a colonial usurper, not a race or a 
religion.   
The covenant opens with the assertion that the Palestinians have a legal right to 
their homeland of Palestine and the right to exercise self-determination within it.  It 
defines this homeland as the “Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the 
British mandate.”19  The Palestinians, those who have the right to self-determination in 
Palestine, are “the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, 
whether they were expelled from there or remained.  Whoever is born to a Palestinian 
Arab father after this date, within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian.”20  Additionally, 
“Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist 
invasion will be considered Palestinians.  [For the dating of the Zionist invasion, 
considered to have begun in 1917] [sic].”21   
The first thing to notice is that this definition makes explicit a distinction between 
Jews and Zionist settlers that had been implicitly expressed in both the Fatah and PFLP 
founding documents.  It states clearly that the PLO’s struggle is against Zionism and not 
Jews.  To the PLO, Judaism is a faith, not a nationality:  
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Judaism, its character as a religion of revelation, is not a nationality with an independent 
existence.  Likewise, the Jews are not one people with an independent personality.  They 
are rather citizens of the states to which they belong.
22
  
It is because of this understanding of Judaism that the PLO indicates that there are 
Jewish members of the Palestinian nation.  This statement is not merely an inclusive 
message to Palestinian Jews, however.  By arguing that the Jews are members of a faith 
rather than a national group, the PLO aimed to delegitimize claims to the land of 
historical Palestine made by Zionism as a national movement (just as the Zionists aimed, 
and still aim today, to delegitimize Palestinian national claims to the land by arguing that 
Palestinians are merely a part of the Arab nation and have no specific tie to Palestine). 
The enemy of the PLO was Zionism.  To the PLO in 1968, Zionism was, “a political 
movement organically related to world Imperialism and hostile to all movements of 
liberation and progress in the world.  It is a racist and fanatical movement in its 
formation: aggressive, expansionist, and colonialist in its aims; and fascist and Nazi in its 
means.”23  Here we see the grounds of PLO opposition to Zionism.  As we have 
discussed before, Zionism represented colonialism, expropriation, and expulsion to the 
Palestinians.  The state that was created by the Zionist movement, Israel, was standing in 
the way of Palestinian self-determination and return to historical Palestine.  Israel was, to 
the 1968 PLO, a temporary colony that needed to be replaced.  It was “the instrument of 
aggression” that was preventing the establishment of a “peace based on justice.”24 It was 
on this basis that the PLO pledged itself to, “restore Palestine and liberate it through 
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armed struggle.”25  The PLO commitment to armed struggle was meant to be absolute 
and unchanging.  The covenant described armed struggle as “the only way to liberate 
Palestine” and indicated that it is “a strategy and not a tactic”26 to be discarded when a 
political solution is available.  Armed struggle was, “a defensive act necessitated by 
requirements of self-defense,”27  aimed at combating the imperialist and colonialist 
Zionist movement.  Liberation meant the liberation of all of historical Palestine.  The 
covenant declared the 1947 partition of Palestine, the basis for the foundation of Israel, 
“null and void,” because it ran, “contrary to the wish of the people of Palestine and its 
natural right to its homeland.”28 
So here we see the Palestinian baseline vision from which we will track change.  
In 1968 according to the foundational document of the PLO, the Palestinians desired to 
exercise self-determination and sovereignty in all of historical Palestine.  Palestinians 
were those born in Palestine before 1947 and their descendants, including Jews who 
resided in Palestine before the beginning of Zionist immigration and their descendants.  
The means to achieve this self-determination was a campaign of armed struggle against 
the state of Israel.  This strategy of armed struggle would not be discarded in favor of an 
expedient political solution that did not liberate all of Palestine.  This was meant to be 
absolute and unchanging.   
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The PLO issued a set of resolutions in the wake of the drafting of the national 
covenant.  Included in these resolutions was a grim prediction of what would become of 
Palestine and the Palestinians should armed struggle be jettisoned in favor of a political 
solution.  The particular political solution that had been floated was the idea of the 
creation of a Palestinian political entity within the territory occupied in the 1967 War.  
We saw in the founding Fatah document that such as solution would be unacceptable and 
it is reiterated in these resolutions: 
The Zionist movement along with imperialism and its tool, Israel, is seeking to 
consolidate Zionist aggression against Palestine and the military victories won by Israel 
in 1948 and 1967 by establishing a Palestinian entity in the territories occupied during the 
June, 1967 aggression.  This entity would owe its existence to the legitimization and 
perpetuation of the state of Israel, which is absolutely incompatible with the Palestinian 
Arab people’s right to the whole of Palestine, their homeland. Such a spurious entity 
would in fact be an Israeli colony and would lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian 
cause once and for all to the benefit of Israel.  The creation of such an entity would, 
moreover, constitute and interim stage during which Zionism could evacuate the territory 
of Palestine occupied during the June 5 war of its Arab inhabitants, as a preliminary step 
to incorporation it in the Israeli entity. In addition, this would lead to the creation of a 
subservient Palestinian Arab administration in the territories occupied during the June 5 
war on which Israel could rely in combating the Palestinian revolution... the National 
Assembly herby declares its categorical rejection of the idea of establishing a spurious 
Palestinian entity in the territory of Palestine occupied since June 5... The assembly 
hereby declares, moreover, that any individual or party, Palestinian Arab or non-
Palestinian, who advocates or supports the creation of such a subservient entity, is the 
enemy of the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation.
29
 
We shall see as time goes on and the conflict progresses how spot-on this 
prediction becomes.  But for now it is enough to know that  the original Palestinian future 
vision left no room for a solution of this kind. The last important thing the new covenant 
and the subsequent PNA resolutions did was reaffirm the rejection of UN Resolution 242 
by the 1967 PLO.  It reiterated more or less the same conclusions regarding the resolution 
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as standing in the way of Palestinian self-determination in Palestine and reducing the 
issue of one of refugees rather than land.   
Israel’s Demands and US Pressure. 
We now move into 1969.  The PLO was still operating with Jordan as a base and 
exercising de-facto sovereignty over large parts of Amman, a state of affairs leading to 
frequent Israeli reprisal attacks into Jordan.  The organization was dominated by Fatah 
but the PFLP was causing significant havoc agitating for an overthrow of King Husayn in 
Jordan, a state of affairs which the King would not tolerate for long.  Israel had expanded 
the municipal borders of Jerusalem to include the Old City and parts of East Jerusalem.  
Most importantly, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank and it was unclear what it intended to do with this territory.  
We have raised the question previously if Israel ever intended to relinquish 
control of the territories it conquered in the 1967 War.  Judging by the speeches given by 
Israeli military leaders when their forces reached Jerusalem, the Israelis would never let 
the Holy City out of their control.  However, their acceptance of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 indicated that they would agree to cede control of “territories occupied in 
the recent conflict.”  Israel made it clear that it would be at the very least incorporate 
enough occupied territory to create so-called “secure borders.”   Beyond that Israel’s 
stance on the future of the occupied territories was unclear.  In May of 1969, Abba Eban 
gave a speech on this very issue to the Knesset: 
134 
 
Three demands which Israel will not waive are a permanent presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, 
a unified Jerusalem despite concessions to Jordan over the Holy Places and a Golan 
Heights forever out of Syrian hands.
30
 
It seems, then, that in 1969, Israel’s territorial aims went beyond simply 
establishing secure borders.  Or, if, the goal was safe and secure borders, then it is clear 
that those imagined borders expanded beyond the territory of historical Palestine and into 
the occupied territory of Syria and Egypt.  We have discussed the issue of Jerusalem 
previously.  From day that East Jerusalem came under the control of Israel, the Jewish 
state had no intention of giving it up.  The other two specific demands are new to the 
discourse.  They both fundamentally undermine the formula put forth in Resolution 242 
aimed at creating a permanent peace in the region.  Sharm el-Sheikh, internationally 
recognized as Egyptian territory, sits at the base of the Sinai Peninsula at the opening of 
the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel’s access point to the Red Sea.   The Golan Heights, recognized 
as Syrian territory, is a plateau that overlooks the Galilee and runs straight downhill to 
Damascus.  An argument can be made that Israel’s security is stronger by maintaining 
control over these two regions.  However, the idea behind Resolution 242 was that in 
exchange for peace treaties, Israel would return territories to the respective Arab states.  
To demand a permanent presence in both of these areas runs directly contrary to this 
formula.  Therefore, even though maintaining a permanent presence may in the short 
term have security benefits for the state of Israel, this presence would simply prolong the 
state of conflict by preventing the drafting of peace treaties.  Israel seems to making the 
choice to expand its territory rather than follow the international formula for a lasting 
peace.  Negotiations are a two way street, however, and the Arab League’s committal at 
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Khartoum in 1967 to no recognition, negotiation, or peace with Israel also prolonged the 
state of conflict (despite this declaration, Egypt’s president Anwar al-Sadat was willing to 
enter into negotiations to regain lost territory as early as 1971 and as we, covered 
previously, Jordan’s Husayn was willing to turf out the PLO if it meant he could 
negotiate the West Bank back into his hands).
31
  But since our concern is mainly with 
Israeli discourse regarding the Palestinians, this issue is less of a concern for us.  Suffice 
it to say that Israel’s territorial ambitions extended beyond historical Palestine, 
independent of the stipulations of Resolution 242. 
It seems that the United States government was concerned over this issue of 
conquered land.  U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers put forward the U.S. 
understanding of Resolution 242 in an address in December of 1969.  While American 
political discourse on the conflict is not within the scope of this study (that would be a 
book in itself), the Israeli reaction to this proposal illuminates certain aspects of the 
Israeli future vision. 
 Rogers in his plan is trying to toe the line between Israeli and Arab demands.  He 
states that “to call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without 
achieving agreements on peace would be partisan towards the Arab [states].  To call on 
the Arab [states] to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan towards 
Israel.”32  He goes on to state that the United States supports the provisions of the 
resolution requiring Israel withdraw from occupied territories.  Rogers was, however, 
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sympathetic to Israel’s desire to change its boundaries from the 1949 armistice lines.  He 
acknowledges that these were, “armistice lines, not final political borders.”33  However, 
he breaks with the Israeli vision when describing the shift in armistice lines.  While the 
Israelis are adamant that they will not return to the pre-war armistice lines, Rogers is 
more flexible.  He states that the resolution “neither endorses nor precludes these 
armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries.”34  That is, the United States is not 
opposed to using the armistice lines as the basis for final borders.  He continues: “any 
changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be 
confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.  We do not support 
expansionism.”35  Here is a phrase that we will shortly see drew the ire of the Israelis.  On 
the one hand, it contradicts the drastic changes to Israel’s envisioned in the Allon Plan 
and Eban’s speech to the Knesset.  On the other, it terms significant changes in Israel’s 
borders “expansionism,” rather than justifiable by security concerns, as argued by Israel.   
Rogers covered two more issues beyond the borders and withdrawal that are of 
interest to us here: refugees and Jerusalem.  Regarding refugees, Rogers acknowledges 
that “there can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those 
Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless.”36  However, he puts 
forward no plan to bring about the settlement of this issue.  He simply warns that should 
it continue then the problem will become increasingly serious as more generations of 
young Palestinians grow up as refugees.  Note that Rogers is far more willing to use the 
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word “Palestinian” in the official discourse than Israeli officials.  However, in line with 
Israeli officials and Resolution 242, Rogers gives no consideration to Palestinian desires 
for self-determination.   
The U.S. vision for Jerusalem has significant breaks with that of Israel.  Rogers 
first makes it clear that the U.S. would not “accept unilateral actions by any part to decide 
the final status of the city.”  This statement is likely aimed at the Israelis as by this point 
they had already expanded the municipal boundaries of the city to include Arab East 
Jerusalem and the beginnings of Israeli settlements were appearing in this newly 
controlled area.  Rogers shared the Israeli desire for a unified Jerusalem.  He states: “we 
believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be 
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods.  There should be open access to the 
unified city for all persons of all faiths and nationalities.”37 
The crucial difference is that while the Israelis see a united Jerusalem under 
Israeli control, Rogers describes a Jerusalem where “administration of the unified city 
should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic and 
Christian communities.  And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, 
economic, and religious life of the city.”38  A Jerusalem with Jordan influencing not only 
religious but civil and economic aspects of the city is vastly different from the Israeli 
vision of a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control.   
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The Israeli government took issue with Rogers’ framing of the situation in the 
wake of the 1967 War.  The response of the government first of all emphasized Israel’s 
belief that the war and the lasting tension were due to exclusively to Arab aggression.  
They believed the state of conflict was a result of the Arab governments’ lack of intention 
to make peace with Israel rather than its occupation of Arab land.  They were quite 
offended at Rogers’ implication that Israel actions were expansionist in their goals: 
The Six Day war, or the situation created in its wake, cannot be spoken of in terms of 
expansion or conquest.  Israel cried out against aggression which threatened its very 
existence, and used its natural right of self-defense.
39
 
Despite this aggression, the Israeli government states that it is willing to negotiate 
lasting peace treaties with the neighboring Arab governments, so long as those 
negotiations are “without prior conditions by any party.”40  This is an Israeli demand we 
have encountered before.  That time the concern of the Israelis was that the Arabs would 
use the refugee situation in negotiations.  Here the context implies that amongst those 
prior conditions from which Israel wants to be freed are the 1949 armistices lines that had 
defined Israel’s borders.  Instead, as we have repeatedly seen, the Israelis believe 
negotiations will establish new, permanent borders.  Those borders are to be discussed 
only by the involved parties, however.  The government of Israel took serious issue with 
U.S. and other countries meddling in the peace process: 
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The position of Israel is: The negotiations for peace must be free from prior conditions 
and external influence and pressures.  The prospects for peace will be seriously marred if 
states outside the region continue to raise territorial proposals.
41
 
That is to say, Rogers’ suggestion that the negotiations could be based on the 
1949 armistices lines, the so-called 1967 borders, was in the eyes of the Israelis damaging 
to peace as it imposed prior conditions on the negotiations from which Israel wished to be 
free.  Clearly, as we have seen several times in the two and half years since the 
conclusion of the war, Israel intended to see drastic changes from the armistice lines that 
had define its borders for the first nineteen years of its existence, rather than the 
insubstantial ones suggested by Rogers.  The government here does not make its vision 
for these lasting borders clear.  But this combined with other documents and statements 
make it clear that they refused to return to any situation similar the one that predated the 
war.   
The Israeli government had equal disdain for the United States putting in its two 
cents over the future of Jerusalem.  In the eyes of the Israeli government, allowing 
Jordanian say over non-religious aspects of the city was out of the question.  To the 
Israelis, only a Jerusalem united under Israeli control would be an open and unified city: 
Jerusalem was divided following the conquest of part of the city by the Jordanian Army 
in 1948.  Only now, after the unification of the city under Israeli administration, does 
there exist freedom of access for members of all faiths to their holy places in the city.
42
 
Clearly Israel does not believe that anything but its control of the city would 
ensure the freedom of movement and worship to all faiths.  Israel, however, does not 
want to control Jerusalem simply because it thinks it is going to be the best steward for 
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the Muslims and Christians who want to worship there.  When the Israelis took the 
eastern half of the city in 1967, they saw control of the city as their national right because 
of Jewish ties to the city.  They had no intention of letting it slip away not because of 
concerns over the accessibility of holy sites to all but because of nationalist claims.  It is 
because of these national claims that Israel moved to influence the final status of the city 
by extending its municipal boundaries to include both halves of the city and began the 
settlement of the Eastern half.   
The PLO’s 1969 
A few significant events occurred in the Palestinian camp in 1969 as well.  One 
was the writing of the PFLP’s program of action which we have already covered.  In the 
same year, Fatah released a slight adjustment to its 1964 constitution clarifying its 
position and future vision.  These were known as the Seven Points.  For the most part 
these points reiterated issues that were covered in the original Fatah constitution and the 
PLO covenant.  They once again reaffirmed the Palestinian rejection of Resolution 242 
and any solution that does not free all of historical Palestine from Zionism.  They tied the 
Palestinian struggle to those anti-colonial and national liberation struggles sweeping the 
globe at the time and affirmed Palestine’s Arab character.   
However, two of the seven points were crucial clarifiers of the Palestinian vision.  
Point two states: 
Al Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, is not struggling against the Jews 
as an ethnic and religious community.  It is struggling against Israel as the expression of 
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colonization based on a theocratic, racist and expansionist system and of Zionism and 
colonialism.
43
 
This statement is indeed a slight softening of the same sentiment regarding Jewish 
people found in the 1968 PLO national covenant.  While that statement argued that the 
Jews were not one people, merely the citizens of the states in which they lived, this point 
acknowledges the ethnic solidarity of the Jewish people.  This understanding by Fatah 
moves closer the Zionist understanding of the Jews as an ethnic and national community, 
although Fatah did not acknowledge the Jewish national claims to the land of historic 
Palestine.  Point five provided a similar clarification and softening of the Palestinian 
vision: 
Al Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, solemnly proclaims that the final 
objective of its struggle it the restoration of the independent, democratic State of 
Palestine, of whose citizens will enjoy equal rights irrespective of their religion.
44
 
Here we see a more concrete vision from Fatah.  Previous statements had argued 
that Palestinians had a right to self-determination in historical Palestine.  Those 
statements had defined who qualifies a Palestinian and therefore who has a right to 
qualifies to exercise self-determination in Palestine.  This point gives a picture of the 
shape this self-determination would take, should Fatah get its way.  Fatah presents, as an 
alternative to the state of Israel who privilege rights along the lines of religion, political 
solution where all citizens exercise the same rights.  But does “all” include those Jews 
who came to Palestine as Zionist settlers? We have seen before that the term 
“Palestinians” does not include those Jews who settled in Palestine after 1917.  Would 
                                                 
43
 The Central Committee of Fatah, “The Seven Points” (January, 1969) in The Israel-Arab Reader: A 
Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict eds. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, 372 (New York: 
Penguin, 1984). 
44
 Ibid., 373. 
142 
 
this new state absorb Jews who were not Palestinian or not of Arab descent? And if it did, 
how would this democratic state be Arab in character, a feature of Palestine repeatedly 
affirmed by the PLO and Fatah?   These questions were put to Fatah leader and PLO 
chairman Yassir Arafat in a newspaper interview a few months after the release of the 
Seven Points.   
The interviewer asks Arafat: “Al Fatah has offered an alternative to the Jews in 
Palestine – that is the creation of a progressive, democratic State for all.  How do you 
reconcile this with the slogan “Long live Palestine Arab and Free?” 45 Arafat’s answer to 
this question focused on what he believes is the failure of the Zionist movement and the 
possible alternative solutions.  Arafat believes that the state of Israel has failed in its 
mission to answer Herzl’s Jewish Question.  He argues that the state does not have the 
capacity to absorb all of the world’s Jews.  He states that there are two solutions to this 
issue.  The Zionist movement can either “carry on an expansionist policy which will 
enable it to absorb all the Jews of the world or... admit the failure of its experience and 
try to find a solution for those Jews who have been uprooted from their countries of 
origin to be settled on the land of Palestine.”46   
Fatah, Arafat states, offered one solution to this question: “the creation of a 
democratic Palestinian State for all those who wish to live in peace on the land of 
peace.”47  Here it is clear that this imagined Palestinian democratic state would include 
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those Jews who settled in Palestine, not just Palestinians and Jews of Arab descent.  The 
state would remain Arab in character because the global population of Palestinian Arabs, 
combined with the Jewish Arab population settled in Palestine, would ensure that the 
common Arab language and culture would be maintained in Palestine.  A state that was 
not Arab in character, Arafat warned, would be a foreign entity like the crusader states 
before.  These foreign entities did not last.  
Another significant event occurred in 1969 within the Palestinian national 
movement beyond this vital clarification of Fatah’s future vision.  The PFLP experienced 
a split.  Nayif Hawatmah led many of the younger members out of the PFLP and formed 
a new group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP, the 
group would come to be known as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine or 
DFLP).
48
  Hawatmah agreed with the PFLP strategy of building a broad support of Arab 
revolutionaries.  However, Hawatmah saw himself as more true to the Marxist-Leninist 
principles upon which both groups were based.
49
  The DFLP would become the third 
largest faction in the PLO and an important producer of political discourse over the 
course of the conflict.  It would be a DFLP leader who would lead the push to accept a 
Palestinian state in less than all of Palestine some five years after the groups founding.  
But we shall get to that shortly.   
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Chapter 5: The National Authority; 1970-1976 
1970 would become one of the major turning points in the history of the 
Palestinian national movement.  The events of 1970 remain so politically charged in 
Jordan that they are spoken about in hushed voices to this day.  King Husayn of Jordan 
grew increasingly frustrated in the late 1960s with the actions of the PLO in Jordan.  The 
patterns of PLO attacks in the West Bank from Jordan and corresponding Israeli reprisals 
on Jordanian territory resulted in heavy civilian casualties and significant damage to 
Jordanian infrastructure.  The PLO demanded tolerance and a level of autonomy that 
King Husayn found dangerous to his sovereignty.  On top of that, Husayn still desired to 
retake control over the West Bank and was willing to make peace with Israel to get it.
1
  
He was only prepared to offer the Palestinians in the West Bank minimal control under 
Jordanian sovereignty once he got the territory back.  This was unacceptable to the 
Palestinians who were completely opposed to peace between any Arab state and Israel.    
George Habash and Nayif Hawatmah, the heads of the PFLP and DFLP 
respectively, decided that now was the time to overthrow Husayn’s Hashemite 
monarchy.
2
  In an effort to embarrass the King and show the level of their power in the 
country, the PFLP and DFLP conducted hostage takings and plane hijackings in Jordan.
3
  
Arafat’s Fatah, acting according to their charter, tried to stay out of the affairs of the Arab 
states.  However, left with the choice between their fellow Palestinian guerillas and the 
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Jordanian monarchy, Fatah was forced to through its support behind its countrymen.
4
  
The Jordanian reaction to this assault on its sovereignty was severe.  In what became 
known as Black September, civil war erupted in Jordan.  Jordanian troops assaulted the 
PLO, shelling Palestinian refugee camps leading to the deaths of three thousand 
Palestinian civilians and fighters.
5
  PLO estimates for the number of killed run into the 
tens of thousands.
6
  By the summer of 1971, the Palestinian factions were forced to pull 
out of Jordan all together and move the PLO base in Beirut, Lebanon where it remained 
until it was once again forced out in 1982.
7
   
The Palestinian National Council released a statement in the midst of this ordeal, 
days before they were forced to move to Lebanon.  The main concern of this document 
was the assault on Palestinian fighters and civilians in the refugee camps in Jordan.  The 
council was convened in order to address this issue.  It decided it needed to change its 
makeup to promote national unity, an issue which had plagued the Palestinians since the 
Mandate and throughout the 1948 war.  It tried to bring all of the Palestinian 
revolutionaries under the control of a single Executive Committee (again mirroring past 
experiences): 
The Executive Committee was elected as a supreme command of the Palestine 
revolution.  Representation... has been widened to insure more collective action and bar 
individual action and also to insure the participation of all forces in facing the dangerous 
conditions threatening the Palestine revolution and people.
8
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Clearly the Black September assault on the Palestinians in Jordan prompted 
somewhat of an existential crisis within the PLO.  It determined that it needed to change 
its model from an umbrella organization to one of more direct control over individual 
actions.  The goal was to affirm the PLO’s place as the national representative of the 
Palestinian people in the face of Jordanian and wider Arab challenges by expanding its 
control.  It condemned these Arab states for limiting the actions of the revolution and 
demanded they conform to previous agreements between the PLO and the Arab states.  
The final point it hammered home was one that we have seen in every Palestinian 
document we have studied so far: absolute opposition to Resolution 242 leading to any 
settlement between Israel and the Arab states.  To the PLO, as we have seen repeatedly, 
the only just solution is one that allows Palestinian self-determination in all of historical 
Palestine.  A solution between the Israel and the Arab states would make this solution 
impossible as it would a final acceptance of Israel’s permanence, a fact the PLO refused 
to acknowledge at this point (it would change its stance later with its own acceptance of 
Resolution 242 at a later date). 
This reconstruction of the PLO seems to have been only partially successful.  The 
PLO was unable to remain in Jordan, forced to flee to Lebanon only a few days after this 
resolution was issued.  Also, the PLO remained more of an umbrella organization than a 
unified front as this executive committee was never truly been able to control the actions 
of the individual groups under its control.  On the other hand, the PLO was able to thrive 
in Lebanon (until Israeli intervention in 1982) and would have its place as the sole 
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representative of the Palestinian people recognized by not only the Arab states but also 
the United Nations in 1974.   
The Settlements 
Before we analyze the significant paradigm shift in the Palestinian ideology that 
occurred in 1974, it productive to first review the state of the Palestinian and Israeli 
future visions after five years of Israeli occupation.  The Palestinian vision is relatively 
clear.  The aim was to defeat Zionism though a protracted armed revolt and replace the 
state of Israel with a secular democratic Arab state in the whole of the territory that was 
the Palestine Mandate.  The preferred means by which to do this were different amongst 
the various Palestinian factions.  That state would be open not only to Palestinians within 
the territory and the refugee of 1948 and 1967 but also the Jews who immigrated to 
Palestine since 1917, i.e. Israeli citizens.  There was also an absolute rejection on the part 
of the PLO of any political solution between the Arab states based on Resolution 242 and 
a refusal to establish a Palestinian state on anything but the whole of historical Palestine.   
The Israeli vision was ambiguous to say the least.  It is clear that they indented to 
maintain exclusive civil and military control of a united Jerusalem (Jordan would be 
permitted to share religious considerations).  It was also clear that Israel intended to 
expand its borders to include significant swaths of occupied territory.  It failed to make 
clear what territory it intended to absorb but it had designs as far afield as the Golan 
Heights and Sharm al-Sheikh.  In fact, when the Labor Prime Minister at the time, Golda 
Meir, put forward a rough plan including the retention of the Golan, Sharm al-Sheikh, 
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parts of the West Bank and the return to Egypt of a demilitarized Sinai Peninsula, she 
was attacked by right wing politician and future prime minister Menachem Begin for 
lenience.
9
  Additionally, the Israeli Knesset had given the state the power to expand 
Israeli sovereignty to whatever territory the state had under its control.  It began the 
process of asserting that sovereignty over Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
through the building of settlements.   
By 1972, more than 10,000 Israeli citizens lived in the occupied territories of the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem in settlements constructed in 
the wake of the 1967 War.
10
  These were advocated for by different Israeli groups for 
different reasons.  Moshe Dayan, Labor party politician and minister of defense, and 
Begin, who would become the first non-Labor prime minister of Israel in 1977, desired 
permanent control of all of the territory of historical Palestine and settlements were the 
way to instill this control.  Others, such as Yigal Allon, whose plan was discussed 
previously, believed that the settlements should be installed in specific regions for 
security purposes.  By the beginning of 1973, forty-four settlements had been constructed 
in the occupied territories with another fifty planned to be completed by the end of the 
year.
11
  Most of these planned settlements were meant to start out as military camps in the 
West Bank and Sinai but over time shift to be civilian residences.  Here we see, as 
Charles D. Smith writes, that “the Allon Plan, envisioning only defensive perimeters on 
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the West Bank, was being manipulated to further create facts on the ground for retention 
of the area.”12  In fact, when King Husayn of Jordan proposed a United Arab Kingdom in 
the form of federation with parts of the West Bank, Allon saw this as a positive idea.  The 
Israeli cabinet as a whole, however, rejected it as it impinged on “the historic right of the 
Jewish people over the land of Israel.”13  Note that the notion of the land of Israel here 
extended to the occupied West Bank. 
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan wanted to take the settlement process a step 
further in order to entrench Israeli control over the territory.  He advocated for the selling 
of land to Jewish Israeli individuals and opening up the territory to private investment.  
Up to this point, land had been taken by the military government of the occupied 
territories, labeling it abandoned, and turned it over to the Israeli government for the 
purpose of settlement.  He also desired to expand Israeli control of the Sinai with the 
construction of a large city to be called Yamit and by annexing the part of the Sinai that 
included the Egyptian oil fields. Initially, this proposal faced significant opposition from 
Meir and her cabinet but the public calls to absorb the occupied territories were so strong 
that it would have been politically devastating for her party to go against them in what 
was an election year.
14
  This policy was enshrined as the labor platform for the 1973 
election in the form of the Galili Plan, issued in August of 1973.  It is probably these 
permanent designs on the occupied territories, and the de facto rejection of Resolution 
242 they represented, that made Anwar Sadat, who became president of Egypt after the 
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death of Nasser in 1970, launch his October attack on Israel.  We will look in depth at the 
ramifications of the Galili plan for the Palestinians shortly but first we should return to 
January of 1973 to see how the PLO encountered the policy of Israeli settlement in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem.   
First let us note that the Palestinians also rejected King Husayn of Jordan’s 
federation plan as, in the view of the PLO, it impinged on their right of self-determination 
and proved, if the events of Black September were not proof enough, Jordan was an 
accomplice of the state of Israel.
15
  At this point (January of 1973), the Palestine 
Liberation Organization was still committed to the establishment of a “democratic 
Palestinian society”16 in the whole of historical Palestine through armed struggle.  It 
remained opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state in part of the land of 
Palestine and the threat to the struggle it represented.  However, this political program 
issued in January of 1973 by the Palestine National Council referred to a new growing 
threat to the Palestinian revolution: settlements.  The PLO saw the settlement project for 
what it was; an attempt to exercise and assert Israeli sovereignty over the occupied 
territory, in an effort to undercut Palestinian ties to the land.  It resolved, therefore: 
To struggle against the settlement mentality and the projects it harbours either for the 
liquidation of our people’s cause as far as the liberation of our homeland is concerned or 
for the distortion of this cause by proposals for entities and for the establishment of a 
Palestinian State – in part of the territory of Palestine.17 
And: 
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To oppose the policy of evacuating the Arab population of the occupied territory, and to 
resist with violence the building of settlements and the Judaization of parts of the 
occupied homeland.
18
 
We see here that between the political resolutions released in 1971 and this 
program in 1973, the expansion of settlements and the threat it posed to the Palestinian 
national movement came on to the PLO’s radar.  The pressure of this Judaization in the 
occupied territories seemed to be effective enough to rouse Palestinian concern.  The 
PLO, which for the most part operated from bases outside of historical Palestine, feared 
that this process would dilute the Palestinian identity and its tie to the land within the 
occupied territories.  As such, it warned against the joining of Israeli labor organizations 
and working on Israeli settlements, desiring instead to promote Palestinian economic and 
cultural institutions.
19
  It also resolved to shield Palestinian peasants from the pressure of 
occupation to “check the trend to emigrate.”20  Clearly the PLO saw the settlements as a 
serious threat not only to their designs on the whole of historical Palestine but also the 
ties of the Palestinians within the territory to the land on which they lived and worked.   
The Israelis accompanied their attempts to undercut Palestinian ties to the land on 
the ground with speeches aimed at denying that any true Palestinian tie to historical 
Palestine existed.  It has been outline above and demonstrated thoroughly elsewhere
21
 
that a Palestinian identity and a corresponding Palestinian nationalist movement claiming 
ties to the land of historical Palestine existed well before the 1948 War that resulted in the 
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creation of the state of Israel and perhaps even before the Zionist movement was 
articulated in the late 19
th
 century.  Yet in April 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
gave a speech to the Labor Party in which she at once denied the contemporary existence 
of the Palestinian people and rejected any responsibility of Israel regarding the creation 
of the Palestinian refugees.  The first section of this speech is unequivocal on this: 
We Israelis make no pretensions of determining whether there is or is not a ‘Palestinian 
entity.’  This decision is the privilege of the Arabs themselves.  As a result of the war 
imposed upon us in 1948, some of the Arabs of Palestine left and wandered to other 
places.  Nonetheless, I reject the contention that ‘two and a half million Palestinian Arabs 
are wandering about the world without a homeland.’22 
Here she acknowledges that the war the resulted in Israel’s existence did lead to 
the departure of some people (for which Israel has no blame to take).  However her 
characterization of these peoples as “Arabs of Palestine” rather than Palestinians or 
Palestinian Arabs indicates her belief that these people had no national character or 
identity that distinguished them from the Arabs in the surrounding states.  She reaffirms 
this view a sentence later: 
The Palestinian Arabs live amongst their brethren with whom they share a common 
religion culture and language.  The Arabs themselves declare that they are a single Arab 
nation.
23
 
As such, those Arabs who became refugees have a homeland in the form of any of 
the Arab countries in which they choose to live. This is contrasted, in Meir’s view, with 
the Jews who only have a single homeland, Israel, “in which the Jewish people can be 
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sovereign and in which every Jew can live with his fellow-Jews in independence.”24  The 
refugee problem, therefore, is easily solvable.  The only thing holding it back is a refusal 
by the Arab states to integrate the Palestinian refugees into their countries.  They do this, 
Meir says, “for use against us.”25  That is to say, the Arabs are keeping the Palestinians 
from integrating so as to gain political power in the realm of negotiations.   
Not only does Meir believe that the Palestinians had no national tie to Palestine 
and that they have a multitude of homelands in anyone of “eighteen independent states,” 
she believes that they are perfectly able to, and currently do, practice the self-
determination they seek.  She points to Jordan, where the state granted refugees and 
residents of the West Bank citizenship in the wake of the 1948 War: 
The Palestinian Arabs have in Jordan every opportunity for nation selfexpression [sic]... 
Some 600,000 or more citizens of Palestinian origin are now living on the East Bank of 
the Jordan.  For many years now, never less than half of the members of the Jordanian 
parliament have been of Palestinian origin, as are the majority of the members of the 
present Jordanian cabinet.
26
 
 This, then, is the model situation in the eyes of Israel.  The refugee population 
should be integrated into their country of residence and they then can practice self-
determination in the political institutions of that country.  Since they are living among 
fellow Arabs, they are in their national homeland.  The Israeli foreign minister Abba 
Eban in a speech later in the year takes this a step further and essentially declares that 
Jordan is Palestine: 
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The situation is that, since 1948, the Palestinians have had their Arab State in which they 
have been a majority.  There is, therefore, no sense in the attempt to portray them as 
having been denied independent Arab expression of their identity all these years.
27
 
Should the state of Jordan then choose to call itself Palestine and the Palestinians 
express themselves in that way, that is of no concern to Israel.  In this way, Golda Meir 
and her foreign minister Abba Eban, present Palestinian self-determination in the territory 
of historical Palestine as a moot point.  There is no need for an independent Palestinian 
political entity as Palestinian political aspirations can be exercised in any Arab country in 
the region.  As such, Meir opposes the establishment of any Palestinian state in historical 
Palestine: 
Between the Mediterranean Sea and the eastern desert, there is room for two States only: 
A Jewish State and an Arab State – Israel and Jordan.  We oppose the establishment of an 
additional Arab State in the region between Israel and Jordan.
28
 
 The final shape of those two states would be decided by a peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan.   
There are obviously numerous problems with this framing of the situation.  First 
of all, as we alluded to before, a Palestinian identity which claimed ties historical 
Palestine, distinct from the identities of its Arab neighbors, was well developed over a 
decade before the establishment of the state of Israel.  To claim in 1973 that there was no 
Palestinian people living in exile from the land they called their home was factually 
incorrect.   Secondly, if Black September proved one thing, it was that this Palestinian 
national movement was unable, and unwilling, to practice self-determination in Jordan.  
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Throughout the PLO documents that refer to the situation in Jordan, the talk was of 
replacing the monarchy with a government supported by the Jordanian national 
movement.  The Palestinian national movement supported this because it wanted a 
friendly base from which to pursue its own goals, not because it wanted to set up a 
Palestinian government in Amman.  Finally, while the Palestinian national movement 
supported the freedom of refugees to work and their country of residence, Palestinians in 
refugee camps maintained a distinct Palestinian identity and a feeling that they are living 
in exile.  This is apparent today as any child in any refugee camp can tell you from which 
village in Palestine their grandparents or great-grandparents fled.  The refugee condition 
was not maintained by the Arab governments as political tool but through a Palestinian 
desire to return to the land they called home (although the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees in these Arab countries has often been extremely poor).  Despite these flaws, 
much of this mentality remains pervasive in current Israeli political discourse.   
The Galili Plan 
Now that we understand the goals of the settlement project and the Palestinian 
reaction to it as well as the prevailing Israeli mentality towards the national aspirations of 
the Palestinians, we can move on to the Galili Plan.  As we touched on before, this 
document became the Israeli Labor Party Platform for the 1973 election.  It was written 
to accommodate public calls to absorb the occupied territories in to Israel.  And it was the 
platform on which the Labor Party won reelection.   
156 
 
This document was, more than anything else, a plan for the economic, civil and 
political incorporation of the occupied territories under Israeli control.  Crucially, this 
plan would not, “be conditional on any change in the political status of these areas or the 
civil status of the inhabitants and the refugees.”29  That is to say, this was a unilateral plan 
of action that would move forward despite the fact that the final political status of the 
territories was yet to be determined.    
The Galili Plan aimed to promote economic and civil integration of the territories 
in a number of ways, the main ones being the construction of settlements and industrial 
areas.  It promised that “new settlements will be established and the network of 
settlement will be reinforced. Efforts will be made to increase their population by 
developing trade, industry and tourism.”30  The plan also promised that “more intensive 
action to unify lands for the requirements of existing and planned settlements (purchase, 
state lands, absentees’ lands, exchanges of lands, arrangement with inhabitants) will be 
expanded” and that “the Israel Lands Authority will be recommended to expand 
purchases of land and real estate in occupied areas for the purposes of settlement, 
development and land exchange.”31  Beyond promising to expand settlements and land 
purchasing, the plan promoted economic and civil integration by “encouraging Israeli 
business in the territories” with “facilities and incentives... to encourage Israelis to 
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establish industrial projects in the occupied areas.”32  It also promised to expand the 
borders of Jerusalem and to investigate building “a deep sea port in Southern Gaza.”33   
The most notable aspect of this plans and provisions is their feeling of 
permanence.  By the plan’s own admission, it cared little for the eventual final status of 
the territories.  While that question was still being discussed, this plan provided the 
means for permanent private and government acquisition of land accompanied with a 
transfer of Israeli population to the occupied territories.  As we have noted before, this 
settlement project was a means of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the occupied 
territory, mirroring the same strategy of the original Zionist settlers in Palestine.  This 
was coupled with economic investment in the territory, further integrating the occupied 
territory into Israeli infrastructure.  And while the deep sea port in Gaza was never built, 
the proposal to build such a large and permanent piece of trade infrastructure in Gaza 
betrays the Israeli mentality regarding the future of the occupied territory.  These 
different initiatives show an Israeli intent to change the permanent status of the occupied 
territory by exerting Israeli sovereignty over the land through economic and civil 
integration and by doing ensure the permanent retention of the land by the state.   
The other important aspect of the plan regarding the Palestinians was the civil and 
political integration for which it called.  It called for municipal representation for the 
“inhabitants” of the territories and promised aid in “the field of developing democratic 
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forms in social and municipal life.”34  It also promised “work for the inhabitants of the 
occupied territories in Israel and in Jewish economic areas in the occupied territories” 
with “working conditions and wages similar to those in Israel.”35  The plan called for 
improvements in “the essential services (health, electrical, etc.)” in the territories and to 
help rehabilitate the refugees through the improvement of these services and, 
interestingly, “improving the refugees’ housing situation,” by “establishing places of 
residence for the refugees near the camps.”36   
The suggestion of including the Palestinian “inhabitants” of the territories in 
municipal representation is an attempt to undercut Palestinian nationalist goals by 
offering some level of political expression under Israeli sovereignty.  This had been an 
ongoing plan of the Israelis that previously the PLO denounced, calling it an attempt to 
“impose coexistence between the people and the occupation, to legitimize the occupation, 
and consequently to perpetuate the occupation of the part of Palestine occupied in 
1967.”37  It was an attempt to normalize the occupation and a way to ward off political 
issues that might jeopardize Israeli control of the territories in the future.  Similarly, the 
treatment of the refugees as a humanitarian issue, as one that can be treated with an 
improvement of essential services and permanent housing, was an attempt to undercut the 
refugee situation as a political issue.  If the Israeli government could successfully 
integrate the refugees into the general society of the occupied territory, they would, in 
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theory, lose the desire to return to their homes in what is now Israel.  It was an attempt to 
turn the temporary status of refugee into a permanent status of West Bank or Gaza Strip 
resident.   
Overall, what we can glean from the Galili Plan is an intention on behalf of the 
state of Israeli to exert Israeli sovereignty and control over the occupied territory through 
permanent infrastructure before the final status of the territory was decided.  By doing so, 
Israel would make it harder and harder to determine what parts of the land were Arab and 
what parts were Israeli.  In 1973, Ariel Sharon, future Likud prime minister, stated that 
Israel would “make a pastrami sandwich of [the Palestinian territories]. We’ll insert a 
strip of Jewish settlement in between the Palestinians and another strip of Jewish 
settlement right across the West Bank so that in 25 years’ time neither the U.N. nor the 
U.S., nobody will be able to tear it apart.”38  The Galili plan of that same year was an 
effort to simultaneously prove Israeli control through economic investment and 
settlement and to undercut Arab and Palestinian claims by integration of the territory on 
economic, civil and political levels. We see, therefore, not only Israeli intent, but concrete 
action, aimed at absorbing a large part of the occupied territory permanently into Israel.  
What is especially interesting about the plan is that it never once references the security 
of the state of Israel, which is the usual justification for territorial expansion in 
international documents.  Here it is simply a given that Israel intends to expand and 
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integrate the occupied territory for the sake of expansion, based on the understanding that 
this is land to which Israel has the rightful claim. 
The National Authority 
In his speech to the Knesset regarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
community, Abba Eban referred to a perhaps ironic reality regarding the situation in 
1973: 
The interesting thing is the unanimity – of opposition to the idea of setting up a third 
State with the borders of historic Eretz-Israel.  Israel, Jordan, the inhabitants of Judea and 
Samaria, all the Powers, the Palestinian organizations – all of them agree that there is no 
place for three States in that area.
39
 
 The area which he refers to as “Eretz-Israel” is the original Palestine Mandate 
which included historical Palestine and what is now Jordan as a single piece of territory.  
He is correct in this observation. When this speech was delivered the official PLO 
platform was to oppose the creation of a Palestinian state in between Israel and Jordan.  
However, it is common knowledge that in 2013 the stated goal of both the Israeli and 
Palestinian political leaders is the establishment of a third state; a Palestinian state.  What 
happened?  It was the Palestinians who first began to change their stance on the issue, 
amid much controversy amongst the Palestinian factions, and open up to the idea of the 
establishing of an independent Palestinian political entity in the occupied territories.  The 
push for this change came from the DFLP and their leader Nayif Hawatmah. 
   We have seen in pretty much every PLO and Palestinian faction document that 
we have looked at so far a virulent denunciation of the establishment a Palestinian state in 
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any territory other than the whole of historical Palestine.  I want to return to a quote from 
the PNA resolutions in 1968 that I included above to illuminate the strength of this 
opposition: 
The Zionist movement along with imperialism and its tool, Israel, is seeking to 
consolidate Zionist aggression against Palestine and the military victories won by Israel 
in 1948 and 1967 by establishing a Palestinian entity in the territories occupied during the 
June, 1967 aggression.  This entity would owe its existence to the legitimization and 
perpetuation of the state of Israel, which is absolutely incompatible with the Palestinian 
Arab people’s right to the whole of Palestine, their homeland. Such a spurious entity 
would in fact be an Israeli colony and would lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian 
cause once and for all to the benefit of Israel.  The creation of such an entity would, 
moreover, constitute and interim stage during which Zionism could evacuate the territory 
of Palestine occupied during the June 5 war of its Arab inhabitants, as a preliminary step 
to incorporation it in the Israeli entity. In addition, this would lead to the creation of a 
subservient Palestinian Arab administration in the territories occupied during the June 5 
war on which Israel could rely in combating the Palestinian revolution... the National 
Assembly herby declares its categorical rejection of the idea of establishing a spurious 
Palestinian entity in the territory of Palestine occupied since June 5... The assembly 
hereby declares, moreover, that any individual or party, Palestinian Arab or non-
Palestinian, who advocates or supports the creation of such a subservient entity, is the 
enemy of the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation.
40
 
 Not only is this an emphatic rejection of this idea, it provides a pretty grim picture 
of what the future would hold for the Palestinians should they agree to the creation of a 
Palestinian state in between Israel and Jordan.  However, the events of Black September 
1970 in Jordan were a shock to the system of the Palestinian revolution.  This shock was 
interpreted in different ways by the different factions but the DFLP saw two significant 
consequences that put their goals in danger.  The first was concern that the PLO 
expulsion from Jordan meant that the there was no longer a secure base from which to 
operate.  The second was the feeling defeat of the PLO in Jordan opened the door for a 
permanent settlement between the Arab states and Israel, as the prevailing feeling 
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amongst the Palestinian factions was that Palestinian paramilitary activities were 
preventing a permanent peace agreement.
41
  It was with the idea of overcoming these two 
concerns that DFLP came to formulate the so called “Transitional Plan.” 
 Essentially the Transitional Plan was an attempt to ensure the survival of the 
Palestinian revolution despite unfriendly Arab states or peace agreements by creating a 
permanent base of operations within historic Palestine.  The DFLP saw this plan as a 
practical answer to the reality of the power relation between the Palestinian factions and 
the states of Jordan and Israel.  It called for the expression of Palestinian self-
determination in the parts of historical Palestine occupied in 1967, namely the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip by founding of a Palestinian state thereon.  The DFLP saw this occupied 
territory as the central link of the Palestinian struggle and to establish a Palestinian state 
within this territory would protect against a peace agreement that would split the territory 
between Israel and Jordan.
42
  A peace agreement would simultaneously ensure Israel’s 
permanence in the eyes of the Arab states, thus defeating the PLO’s struggle for control 
of the whole of historical Palestine, and prevent Palestinian self-determination in any part 
of their homeland.  As we have noted before, advocating for a Palestinian state was a 
controversial position, paramount to treason in the eyes of the PLO.  The DFLP, even 
writing in 2010, took great pains to argue that this plan was not a denunciation of armed 
struggle.
43
  The name “Transitional Plan” itself addresses these concerns by indicating 
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that a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not necessarily the final goal 
but an intermediary step from which a popular revolution could be launched from within 
historical Palestine.   
  Nayif Hawatmah took this plan to the PLO in 1974.
44
  He succeeded in 
convincing the PNC to include the core of the Transitional Plan in the “10 Point 
Program” issued during that session.  The PNC, however, substituted the ambiguous term 
“national authority” for “state” to describe the political entity that would be established 
“on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated.”45  The PLO made it clear that it was 
not accepting this in exchange for conceding its aims to found a Palestinian state in the 
whole of historical Palestine but rather a step in that process: 
Any liberation step that is achieved constitutes a step for continuing [the efforts] to 
achieve the PLO strategy for the establishment of the Palestinian democratic State that is 
stipulated in the resolutions of the previous national conferences.
46
 
 This plan as it was adapted by the PLO from the original DFLP idea was therefore 
ambiguous at best.  The leaders of the PLO choose to not define too specifically the form 
that this national authority would take.  Arafat himself appeared to be open to a 
settlement of the conflict involving a state in the occupied territories but shied away from 
articulating this out of fear of losing control of the PLO.
47
  In fact, the PFLP did split 
away from the PLO because of its adoption of the Ten Point Program, blaming the plan’s 
acceptance on the “surrenderist leadership” of the PLO who sought to legalize their 
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“pursuit of the course of deviation and surrender,” rather than following the principles of 
the PLO.
48
  There also started to appear a split amongst the rank and file of the 
Palestinian revolution between those who lived in the West Bank and favored a solution 
that maintained what little was left of Palestine and those refugees who came from what 
was now Israel and favored the complete liberation of the territory.
49
  For the sake of 
PLO unity, Arafat and the PLO leadership maintained this uncertainty regarding a 
political solution for a number of years.  However, the significance of the 1974 cannot be 
overstated.  It planted the seeds for a paradigm shift.  While this plan was only spoken of 
as an intermediary step to a future Palestinian state in the whole of historical Palestine, it 
laid the groundwork for the shift towards the later renunciation of this goal.  It also 
opened the door for negotiation with the PLO for a peaceful settlement, their acceptance 
of Resolution 242 as the basis for a permanent solution to the conflict and the final goal 
of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.   While most of these events 
would not occur for at least a decade, their origins are in the Transitional Plan that the 
DFLP brought to the PLO in 1974.   
International Legitimization of the PLO 
 The other significant developments of 1974 for the PLO came in the form of 
international recognition.  For the first time, the Arab states recognized the PLO’s right to 
self-determination over the occupied territories on the basis of the Ten Point Program.  At 
the Rabat Conference in October, the Arab League resolved to “affirm the right of the 
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Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people in any Palestinian territory liberated.”50  This was significant because the Arab 
League was recognizing Palestinian sovereignty to the West Bank rather than Jordanian 
sovereignty, under which it had been between 1948 and 1967.  This also meant that 
Husayn could no longer negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, much to the chagrin of 
those American diplomats who preferred to neutralize the Palestinian national movement 
under the Jordanian state.
51
  Husayn accepted this decision but he would not officially 
renounce a claim to the West Bank until 1988.
52
  This recognition by the Arab states was 
“categorically rejected” by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who promised that “the 
aims of the Palestinian National Charter will not be achieved.”53  This rejection was 
reflected in Israeli policy that treated the Palestinians as if they were under Jordanian 
control all the way up to the early 1990s.
54
  To this day the so-called Jordanian option 
persists in Israeli political circles which advocates giving the heavily populated parts of 
the West Bank to Jordan rather than allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
 The other significant legitimization the PLO gained in 1974 was recognition by 
the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.  On top 
of that, the PLO was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly.  Yassir Arafat 
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addressed the UN on the occasion of this recognition.  For the most part, his speech was a 
reiteration to an international audience of the guiding principles of the PLO.  He 
emphasized that the PLO made a distinction between Zionism as a colonizing force and 
Judaism as a religion.  He denounced the expansionist policies of Zionism and its 
mistreatment of Palestinians.  He affirmed the PLO’s commitment to armed struggle and 
tied the Palestinian revolution to the numerous contemporary anti-colonial revolutions in 
Asia and Africa.  He insisted that the Jews currently living in Israel had every right to be 
a part of the secular democratic Palestinian state envisioned by the PLO.   In the spirit of 
the Ten Point Program, he implored the world to support Palestinian efforts at self-
determination in Palestine as is their right according the foundational documents of the 
UN and to aid in returning the Palestinians from their imposed exile. While Yassir 
Arafat’s speech did not contain anything particularly new regarding the Palestinian future 
vision, it did include one of his most famous lines: 
Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun.  Do not let the olive 
branch fall from my hand.  Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive 
branch fall from my hand.
55
 
The peace he was offering was in the form of a secular democratic state in the 
entirety of historical Palestine; a state which would include Jews inspired by Zionism 
who settled in Palestine.  
As the decade moved forward, attempts at a permanent settlement based on 
Resolution 242 between Israel and the Arab states began to be pushed for more strongly 
by the Americans.  No one, not even the factions within the PLO, could agree on the role 
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the PLO should play in these negotiations.  The Jimmy Carter administration believed in 
the establishment of some sort Palestinian “homeland” alongside Israel as part of the 
overall settlement of the conflict.
56
  This, as we have touched on before, was an idea 
about which the PLO was only lukewarm.  Menachem Begin, who would be the first 
Likud prime minister of Israel, was set on annexing the West Bank and compared the 
PLO to the Nazis, stating that even if the PLO accepted Resolution 242, he would never 
negotiate with them, nor would he concede the territory of the West Bank to foreign 
control.
57
  Before we talk too much about the peace efforts and Palestinian and Israeli 
views regarding them, we must analyze the ideological base of Begin’s newly in power 
party and the change that represented to Israeli politics.  
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Chapter 6: Likud and the Dreaded Permanent Peace; 1977-1986 
For the first three decades of Israel’s existence, it was ruled by the Labor party.  
Before the state of Israel was officially established, the labor party’s ideological fathers, 
the Labor Zionists of the second and third ailyot, dominated the politics of the Yishuv in 
Mandate Palestine.  But they were not without rivals. We have met the Revisionist 
Zionists before.  These were the settlers of the fourth aliyah who came from the ghettoes 
and the Pale of Eastern Europe, rather than the enlightened liberal Western European 
breeding ground of the Labor Zionists.  They were not utopian or socialist but 
conservative, middle class Jews who caught the brunt of anti-Semitism in Poland and 
Russia.  Their right-wing militaristic spokesperson was Vladimir Jabotinski who 
advocated military action against the Palestinians and British alike to ensure the creation 
of the Jewish state.  His followers established a number of paramilitary groups, the most 
notable of which was the Irgun, most famous for the bombing of the King David Hotel, 
led by Menachem Begin.  Menachem Begin sat in first Knesset as party of his Herut 
party, the ideological offspring of the Revisionist Zionist Irgun and the ideological father 
of the Likud Party.
1
  He was the main opposition leader from 1948 until 1977 when he 
finally took the office of Prime Minister as the head of the Likud.
2
   
His rise to power was closely tied with the situation of the Israeli Jews of Arab 
origin.  For the most part, the powerful ruling Labor Party elites were of European 
decent, known as Ashkenazi.  The Arab and Eastern Jews, known as Mizrahi Jews, were 
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looked down upon and discriminated against by the Ashkenazi, having lived in camps for 
the early years of the state’s existence and experienced little social mobility, stuck for the 
most part doing menial, unskilled labor.
3
  Begin, an Ashkenazi but fellow Labor outsider, 
was able to capitalize on these feelings of alienation amongst the Mizrahim and gain their 
support.  Additionally, the unification of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel into a 
single sovereignty and single economic zone meant an influx of Palestinian workers to 
take the low-wage, unskilled jobs once performed by the Mizrahim, thus pushing them up 
the social ladder.  The Mizrahim feared that should Israel return the territory to the Arab 
states, they would pushed back down by the Ashkenazim into the lowest social strata of 
Israel.  It was this fear in part, along with the outsider identification, which led 75% of 
Mizrahim voters to throw their support behind Begin in the 1977 elections.
4
   
Whereas the Labor Party platform from 1974, the Galili Plan, was ambiguous 
when it came to the future of the occupied territory, Begin’s Likud Party platform was 
direct.  The Galili Plan advocated settlement of the territory irrespective of the future 
political status of the land through which they aimed to strengthen Israeli control over the 
land.  Begin believed in settlements as well but to him, Israel’s permanent right to the 
land was self-evident. 
The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and indisputable and is 
linked with the right to security and peace; therefore, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] 
will not be handed to any foreign administration; between the Sea and the Jordan there 
will only be Israeli sovereignty.
5
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 This is the first point of Begin’s platform.  Here we see a significant discursive 
break with the Labor Party.  While there were, without doubt, Labor politicians who 
advocated for complete retention of the territories and their policies indicate the aim their 
integration, the public discourse produced by the Israeli left wing focused on retention of 
territory and settlement for the sake of secure borders.  Even if the policies regarding the 
territories was largely the same between the two parties, to say no to the international 
community, who advocated for the return of “territory occupied” during the 1967 war 
according to Resolution 242, was a bold and new stance.    
This position clearly left no room for the Palestinians to establish any sort of 
independent state, or national authority as the PLO preferred to call it, in the West Bank.  
But just in case this was not clear from the first point of the platform, Likud stated 
explicitly its opposition to any such entity being formed: 
A plan which relinquishes parts of western Eretz Israel undermines our right to the 
country, unavoidably leads to the establishment of a “Palestinian State,” jeopardizes the 
security of the Jewish population, endangers the existence of the State of Israel, and 
frustrates the prospect of peace.
6
   
Here we again see that to Begin and Likud, Israel’s claim to the West Bank is 
inherent.   To Begin, the West Bank is not a separate territory but an integral part of the 
state of Israel, never to be relinquished and certainly never to be home to a Palestinian 
state.   
It is important to note here that this is the same party that currently leads the 
coalition government of Israel which supposedly supports the establishment of a 
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Palestinian state as part of a peace agreement.  Obviously positions change and stances 
soften, but if we are going to hold the PLO responsible for positions articulated decades 
ago but no longer held, we have a responsibility to do the same for the Likud party.  Just 
as the PLO aimed to negate Jewish self-determination based as expressed through 
Zionism, the Likud party promised to prevent any expression of Palestinian self-
determination in historical Palestine.   
 The other significant takeaway from the Likud 1977 party platform was the 
framing of the settlement project.  As we have discussed before, Labor supported 
settlement as a means to promote security and strengthen Israeli ties to the occupied 
territory.  To Begin, these ties were self-evident, just as legitimate ties to Palestine were 
self-evident to the settlers before the establishment of Israel.  Begin saw the settlement 
project as a revival of the Zionist ethos that provided Israel’s foundation: 
Settlement, both urban and rural, in all parts of the Land of Israel is the focal point of the 
Zionist effort to redeem the country, to maintain vital security areas and serves as a 
reservoir of strength and inspiration for the renewal of the pioneering spirit.
7
 
 Like Labor, Likud speaks to settlement for the sake of security.  But he equates 
the original Zionist mission to settlement of the occupied territory and calls for a renewal 
of that spirit.  He goes on to call the younger generation of Israelis to the task of 
“inhabiting and cultivating the wasteland,”8 language that harkens back to the old Zionist 
slogan of “making the deserts bloom.”  Whereas Labor is vague about the future of the 
occupied territory, Begin is clear.  In calling back to the rhetoric of the original Zionists, 
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he is asserting that Israel’s right to the occupied territory is as indisputable as its right to 
Jerusalem or Tel-Aviv.  This is a right he promised to never concede.   
 But what about the millions of Palestinians who live within the territories Begin 
claims as Israel’s own?  He promises they will never see an independent state in the 
occupied territory, but permanent military rule over a significant population hardly fitting 
with the secular, western, democratic values on which the state of Israel claims to be 
based.  In December of 1977, Begin, now prime minister, put forward an “autonomy 
plan” for the occupied territories to reconcile these issues.  He stated that with the 
establishment of a permanent peace, military rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will 
be replaced with “an administrative autonomy of, by and for the Arab residents.”9  This 
administration would be run by a council elected by the Palestinians regardless of their 
citizenship status.  It would control the civil aspects of Palestinian life including 
education, transport, housing, industry, commerce, health, labor, law and would operate a 
local police force.  Israel would have final military say as “security and public order in 
the areas of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will be entrusted to the Israeli authorities.”10 
Palestinians living in these territories would be able to choose between Israeli or 
Jordanian citizenship.  Citizens living in Israel would be permitted to purchase land in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and residents of the Palestinian areas who accepted Israeli 
citizenship would be allowed to purchase land in Israel.  Regarding refugees, a committee 
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would be established to determine regulations to determine the volume of refugees 
permitted to immigrate to Israel.
11
  
 Begin asserted Israel’s demand of sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip but recognized that “there are at least two other demands for the sovereignty over 
these areas,” those being Palestinian and Jordanian. 12  He stated, therefore, that for the 
sake of peace the question of sovereignty is left open.  However, he does not intend that 
sovereignty actual fall to anyone but the state of Israel.  He argues that should these 
contradictory demands remain, there was no chance of an agreement being reached.  The 
only way, to Begin, is “administrative autonomy for the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael; and for 
the Jews of Eretz Yisrael – genuine security.”13  This can only be achieved under Israel 
sovereignty.  And although he recognizes that a Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip exists, he refuses to deal in anyway with the spokes-
organization of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO.  He promises never to cede any control 
of any territory to the PLO even if peace agreements are reached, calling it “history’s 
meanest murder organization, except for the armed Nazi organizations.”14  As such, 
whoever chooses to enter into this agreement with Israel must accept the fact that “the 
IDF will be deployed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.”15  So while Begin seems open to 
discussing sovereignty over the occupied territory, the territory would be under Israeli 
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military control.  If the Jordanians and Palestinians refuse to accept this then no 
agreement will be reached. 
 Begin’s plan here is in many ways a foil to the PLO’s plan for Palestine.  The 
PLO sought a secular democratic Palestinian state on the whole of historical Palestine to 
replace the Zionist Israel which it saw as racist, expansionist and colonialist.  This state 
would allow for the return of refugees to their homes and would be open to Jews who 
renounced Zionism.  Begin is putting forward a plan for a single state in the whole of 
historical Palestine as well.  This state would be a Zionist Jewish state.  The Arab areas 
would be autonomous but ultimately under Israeli sovereignty and military control.  
While his plan allowed for the return at least a few refugees and Israeli citizenship, it is 
hardly the expression of Palestinian self-determination the PLO desired.  Rather it was a 
way to incorporate the Palestinians as subjects of the Israeli state to negate Palestinian 
nationalist goals.  This is the situation that so many PLO documents warned against. It 
was a solution that would create a subservient Palestinian political entity as a means to 
allow permanent Israeli control over the entirety of historical Palestine, with no prospect 
of Palestinian independence or self-determination.  These two visions were completely 
irreconcilable.  However, they were, in a sense, mirrors of one another.  The main goal of 
each was the negation of nationhood of the other.  And each nation refused to allow their 
ties to historical Palestine to be negated.   
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The Dreaded Permanent Peace 
 To understand the next significant shift in the history of Palestinian and Israeli 
discourse, it is necessary to first take a quick review of the events in Egypt since 1967.  
As we have mentioned before, the great Egyptian Arab national leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser died in 1970 and Anwar al-Sadat took his place as president.   Sadat chose to 
move away from Nasser’s Arab nationalist goals and sought to accommodate U.S. 
diplomatic pushes regarding Israel and in return receive American economic aid.
16
  Sadat 
was willing to enter into conditional negotiations with Israel as early as 1971 despite 
Arab League resolutions vowing never to negotiate with Israel.  Israel’s insistence on 
negotiations without preconditions and their permanent designs on the occupied Sinai 
Peninsula, Egyptian territory, frustrated Sadat.
17
  The issuing of the Galili Plan in August 
of 1973, a document that seemed to reject Resolution 242 as the means for establishing 
peace agreements between Egypt and Israel, angered Sadat.  Sadat desired to return the 
Sinai to Egyptian control and was willing to go against the demands of the PLO and the 
Arab League to do so. 
 In October of 1973 Sadat launched an attack against the Israeli positions in the 
Sinai coordinated with a Syrian attack in the Golan Heights.
18
  The attack and its early 
success came as a shock to everyone involved.  Sadat’s forces were able to break through 
the Israeli blockade on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and maintained this position in 
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Israeli controlled territory when the inevitable ceasefire came around.
19
  Israel was able to 
recover quickly and to reach the outskirts of both Damascus and Cairo, giving it a tactical 
and military victory but the surprising success of the attacks meant significant political 
and strategic gains for Egypt.  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able to negotiate 
two partial withdrawals between Israelis and the Egyptians in 1974 and 1975.
20
   
Attempts by the Carter Administration in 1976 and early 1977 to bring Israel, Jordan, 
Syria, Egypt and the PLO (pending their acceptance of Resolution 242) into a single 
conference were not successful.  Sadat was convinced by these failures that the best way 
to regain the Sinai was direct negotiations with Israel.
21
  In November of 1977 Sadat 
announced to the Egyptian National Assembly, with Yassir Arafat in attendance, that he 
would visit Jerusalem.  Two weeks later he completed this trip and spoke to the 
Knesset.
22
  This was the first step in a bumpy road to the Camp David Accords in 1978 
and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979.   
 The steps to an Egypt Israel peace were not as simple as Egypt declaring its 
recognition and peace with Israel and in exchange receiving control of the Sinai.  Sadat 
demanded Israel recognize the right of Palestinians to some level of self-determination, 
likely as a defense against the Arab states accusing him of abandoning the Palestinians 
and their cause.
23
  However, Menachem Begin was by this time prime minister of Israel.  
As we have already seen, Begin would never let an independent Palestinian entity be 
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established.  Begin sought from any agreement with the Egyptians the ability to 
selectively apply Resolution 242; an agreement that would allow it to return some 
territory as stipulated in the resolution while maintaining control over the West Bank.
24
  
His plan for autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was therefore vague.  Sadat, 
however, seemed willing to accept vague promises as long as he would regain the Sinai 
for Egypt and did not push Begin for specifics.  In September of 1978, representatives of 
Egypt and Israel came to Camp David to hammer out two agreements: one on the future 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a second as a framework for the drafting of an 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty which would eventually be signed in 1979.
25
  That final treaty 
made no mention about the rights of Palestinians to self-rule or the future of the West 
Bank, which was a huge win for Begin.  Israel was able to selectively apply the return of 
territory provision of Resolution 242, ceding the Sinai but maintaining control of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.   
 This came as a significant blow to the PLO.  Permanent peace that recognized 
Israel on the basis of Resolution 242 was in many ways the worst nightmare of the 
Palestinian national liberation movement.  That document reduced the Palestinian issue to 
one of refugees and did not acknowledge the national rights of the Palestinians and so the 
creation of an agreement based on Resolution 242 was perhaps a fatal challenge to the 
PLO’s vision of a single Palestinian state on the whole of historical Palestine.  The first 
point of its March 1977 political declarations reaffirmed its rejection of Resolution 242 
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for these reasons.  These declarations did soften the stance, however, the participation of 
the PLO in international peacemaking efforts.  While previously there was an absolute 
refusal to engage in these efforts, these 1977 declarations, issued before Sadat’s trip to 
Israel, stated that the PLO wished to participate in any conferences concerned with the 
issue of Palestine on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 3236.  This resolution 
issued in 1974 recognized the right to self-determination of the Palestinians, addressing 
in what their eyes was the central defect of Resolution 242.  Going along with this focus 
on the Palestinian right to self-determination, the March 1977 declarations also affirmed 
“the determination of the PLO to abort any settlement achieved at the expense of the firm 
national rights of our people.”26  Within two years, however, the Egyptians agreed to a 
peace settlement that did just that.  And while the Palestinian National Council declared 
that “any settlement or agreement affecting the rights of our Palestinian people made in 
the absence of this people will be null and void,”27 there was really little the PLO could 
realistically do to nullify the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.   
 The PLO did, however, attempt to isolate Egypt.  A number of Palestinian 
factions came together in the wake of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem to call for the creation of a 
“steadfastness and confrontation front” made up of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Syria 
and the PLO to oppose Sadat’s actions and boycott his regime.28  Egypt was actually 
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suspended from the Arab League after the peace treaty was signed.  It only regained 
membership a decade later.
29
   
It is hard to overemphasize the significance of Egypt in particular making peace 
with Israel.  Egypt was the largest Arab country and for decades the heart of Arab 
national spirit.  It was not a coincidence that the headquarters of the Arab League were 
located in its capital.  It had lead the way in two wars against the state of Israel and 
Nasser held the cause of the Palestinians at the heart of his political programs (on a 
discursive level anyways).  Therefore, for Egypt, of all the Arab countries, to make a 
permanent peace with Israel was quite a shock.  It reflected, however, Sadat’s priority on 
domestic rather than international or pan-Arab issues.  He wanted to regain the Sinai and 
gain U.S. aid to boost the Egyptian economy.  This choice may have cost him his life.  
The man who assassinated him in 1981 cited the peace agreement as his primary 
motivation.
30
  
Civil and political society of the West Bank rejected the Camp David Accords as 
did the Palestine National Council because of the “grave threats to the cause of Palestine 
and Arab national liberation”  they represented.31  To the PLO, Camp David, and the 
subsequent peace treaty, condoned the actions of Israeli expansion and dispossession in 
historical Palestine and nullified the “inalienable right of the Palestinian Arab people to 
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their homeland.”32  By remaining vague regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, the agreement seemed to give Begin free reign to operate and expand as he pleased 
in the occupied territory.  Camp David and the peace treaty granted him recognition by 
the largest Arab country and the tacit approval by the international community of his 
selective reading of Resolution 242.  This was a freedom he grasped with both hands at 
the start of 1980s.   
Jerusalem Law and Land Grab 
With Egyptian recognition and an election approaching in 1981, Begin turned to 
consolidating and strengthening Israel’s hold over the occupied territories.  As we have 
discussed before, the Labor Party had put forward in its time in office plans for the 
integration of the occupied territory and Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.  In the wake 
of the 1967 War, the municipal boundaries of West Jerusalem were expanded to include 
the holy sites of the eastern part of the city.  They were steadily expanded to include more 
and more of East Jerusalem as numerous settlements were established housing tens of 
thousands of Israeli settlers.  Official Israeli discourse since the moment that the Western 
Wall came under Israeli control emphasized the centrality of the city to Israel and 
Zionism and promised that the city would never be divided or ceded to foreign control.   
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In 1980, Begin’s government put these promises and slogans into Israeli law with 
the passing of “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel.”33 The law declared that 
“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.”34  It also declared that 
Jerusalem was the seat of “the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and 
the Supreme Court,” and that “Jerusalem shall be given special priority in the activities of 
the authorities of the State so as to further its development in economic and other 
matters.”35  Just as with Begin’s explicit position on the retention of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, here we see the Likud prime minister putting into writing what the Labor 
party implied with their actions.  The Labor party never had any intention of giving up 
any part of Jerusalem and the settlement of the occupied half of the city was sponsored by 
successive Labor prime ministers.  Begin, however, chose to leave nothing to doubt and 
annexed Jerusalem officially.
36
   
 In the last year of his first stint in office, Begin also set about solidifying Israeli 
control over the West Bank.  He did this primarily through massive land grabs.  At the 
time, Israeli settlement was conducted under the auspices of the Israeli Agricultural 
Ministry.  The ministry would be given private Palestinian land that had been seized by 
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the military administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for “training purposes.”37  
The Agricultural Ministry would then build settlements on this seized land.  Ariel Sharon, 
then the head of the ministry, wanted to drastically expand the settlement project by 
accessing public and state land held by the Israeli government for settlement.  He found, 
however, that most of the land seemed to be held by Palestinian individuals and that the 
state actually controlled little land in the occupied territories.
38
  In 1980, Begin’s 
government changed this by seizing huge tracts of land, totaling nearly 40% of the entire 
West Bank, and declaring it “state land” to be handed over to settlers after three weeks.39  
If the rightful owners wished to dispute this seizure, they were required to come forward 
and prove their ownership before the three weeks had expired.  Begin knew this was at 
best an unlikely action for the Palestinians and in this way huge new areas of the West 
Bank were opened to Israeli settlement.
40
  Begin won reelection in 1981, but barely.  He 
made Sharon his minister of defense that year.
41
 
 These actions were almost diametrically opposed to the spirit of the plan for the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip as articulated in the Camp David Accords.  Begin needed, 
however, to put forward the semblance of cooperation with the accords.  The Knesset 
released a set of fundamental policy guidelines about a month after Begin’s reelection.  
Within these points, the government promised to “diligently observe the Camp David 
Agreements” and to work on “the implementation of the agreement on full autonomy of 
                                                 
37
 Smith, 2
nd
 edition, 259. 
38
 Ibid., 259. 
39
 Ibid., 260. 
40
 Ibid., 260. 
41
 Ibid., 260.   
183 
 
the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.”42  Autonomy did not mean 
independence, however, as the document makes very clear: 
The autonomy agreed upon at Camp David means neither sovereignty nor self-
determination.  The autonomy agreements set down at Camp David are guarantees that 
under no condition will a Palestinian State emerge in the territory of Western Eretz 
Yisrael.
43
 
 This point is very telling in two ways.  First it betrays the Israeli reading that the 
Camp David Accords recognized Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The 
second is that its description of the West Bank as “Western Eretz Yisrael” rather than 
“east of the state of Israel” demonstrated the Israeli view that the West Bank is an integral 
part of the land of Israel and therefore not occupied territory.    
Once this autonomous authority is established in the occupied territory, then 
“Israel will present its claim and act to realize its right of sovereignty over Judea, 
Samaria, and the Gaza district.”44  Here there is no mincing of words.  The Knesset of 
Israel in 1981 believed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were parts of the state of Israel 
over which it had the right of sovereignty and settlement.  It would not allow the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in this land because that would infringe on Israel’s 
natural right to the territory.  The best it would offer was some form of autonomy under 
Israeli sovereignty.  If this was not enough of an attack on Resolution 242, the 
government also promised that “Israel will not descend from the Golan Heights, nor will 
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it remove any settlements established there,” and that “Jerusalem is the eternal capital of 
Israel, indivisible, entirely under Israeli sovereignty.”45 
 Begin’s first five years provides a blunt clarification of Israel’s policy in the 
occupied territory.  While he did not change the course of action set out by the Labor 
Party, he certainly said aloud what was previously understood implicitly.  Under Begin, 
promises were made for permanent retention of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
hundreds of thousands of acres of Palestinian land was seized by the government for 
settlement, and the Golan Heights and Jerusalem were annexed.  And while security was 
a voiced concern of Begin and his government, that was not the primary reason behind 
these actions.  These were undertaken due to the belief that all of this land was rightfully 
Israel’s, and this was a right it would not concede despite the stipulations of Resolution 
242 or the Camp David Accords.
46
   
A Difficult Few Years 
 What had been a successful half decade for Begin and the Israelis of recognition, 
expansion and annexation was period of adversity for the PLO.  Not only did they have to 
deal with Sadat’s recognition and peace with Israel, they once again found themselves 
embroiled in civil war.  Just as with Black September in Jordan, this civil war in Lebanon 
would lead to the expulsion of the PLO; exiled to Tunis, where would stay from 1982 
until the mid-nineties.    
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 To fully spell out the Lebanese political system that has led to more than one civil 
war in the country’s history is a project in and of itself.  Suffice it to say that the conflict 
we are interested in began in 1975 and grew out of antagonism between Palestinian 
militants and Lebanese Maronite Christians.
47
  While not strictly a Muslim-Christian 
conflict as there were radical Christian groups allied with the PLO, the civil war certainly 
played on deep seated religious animosity fostered in Lebanon by the divisive political 
system.  This political system, known as the “confessional system” accorded membership 
in the countries parliament proportionally according to religious and ethnic identity.  The 
formula, however, was based on a horribly outdated census that gave disproportionate 
power to the Maronite confession and did not represent the growing Muslim population, 
augmented by hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees.  The PLO was able to 
operate a sort of state within a state due to its control over the Palestinian refugee camps 
in Beirut and the southern border areas.
48
  Their operations in Israel from those bases 
prompted heavy handed Israeli retaliation.  Israel provided assistance to private Maronite 
militias in their battle against the PLO and Begin compared them to Jews fighting Nazi 
persecution during the Holocaust.
49
  Eventually, as PLO actions increased in the wake of 
Camp David, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. The goal of now defense minister Ariel 
Sharon was elimination of the PLO’s base of operations in Lebanon, if not the complete 
elimination of the entire Palestinian leadership.  In this he failed, as the PLO militants 
and leaders were able to make a negotiated withdrawal to Tunis.   
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Other than the withdrawal, the most notable event of the Israeli invasion was the 
massacre at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.  Sharon arranged for a Maronite militia 
to wipe out a supposed two thousand strong PLO force in the camps.  There was no such 
force.  Rather, the Maronite militia massacred some 800 (some say as many as 3,500) 
Palestinian refugees.  The militia was aided by the Israelis launching flairs throughout the 
night to give them enough light to carry out their slaughter.
50
  An Israeli commission 
found Sharon personally responsible for negligence leading to the massacre and was 
recommended to be removed as defense minister.  Begin refused to fire him.
51
  Ariel 
Sharon would later be elected prime minister of Israel.   
 The Civil War in Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis 
put the organization on life-support.  The diplomatic moves made by Arafat in the wake 
of this crisis show just how damaging these events were to the so-called sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people.  Arafat faced significant opposition within the 
PLO and exercised less and less influence over the various factions of the organization.
52
  
He therefore turned outside, making diplomatic overtures to the United States and Jordan.  
The United States stood with Israel’s position that there would never be a Palestinian 
state in the occupied territory and required that the PLO accept Resolution 242 before 
even being considered for participation in a peace conference.  However, the Reagan 
Administration stood by parts of Resolution 242 that required Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territory and envisioned a Palestinian autonomous region in the West Bank and 
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Gaza Strip in a federation with Jordan.
53
  Arafat and the PLO rejected this arrangement, 
as they had for nearly two decades, and stood by their rejection of Camp David and 
Resolution 242 because of their neglect of Palestinian national rights.   However, in a 
move that illuminates the struggles of the PLO in the mid-1980s, Arafat agreed to a 
different version of a federation plan with Jordan known as the Amman Accord.  That 
plan called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
with East Jerusalem as its capital “within the context of the formation of the proposed 
confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine.”54  The highest authority in this 
federation, however, would be the king of Jordan.
55
  This was hardly the image of self-
determination laid out in the 1968 PLO charter.   
 Neither the PLO nor King Husayn was particularly happy about this agreement.  
King Husayn ideally wanted the West Bank without the PLO but needed their approval to 
get the support of the Arab world.  The PLO did not want self-determination under 
anyone else’s control but they believed that this plan would open the United States’ mind 
to the inclusion of the PLO in the peace process.
 56
  The U.S. refused to consider this until 
the PLO accepted Resolution 242 (for their part, the Israelis refused to negotiate with the 
PLO even if this acceptance occurred) and the PLO refused to accept the resolution 
without an invitation to negotiations.
57
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 On the Israeli side, another tight Knesset election in 1984 led to a Labor-Likud 
coalition whereby Labor leader Shimon Peres would be prime minister until 1986 at 
which point Begin’s successor, Yitzhak Shamir (another former Revisionist paramilitary 
leader from the time of the Mandate), would take over the office.
58
   Peres hoped to enter 
into direct negotiations with Jordan.  His party’s more flexible attitude towards retention 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is apparent in the 1984 Knesset policy guidelines issued 
while Peres held the office of prime minister.  Regarding the future of the occupied 
territories, the guidelines stipulate that “Israel will oppose the establishment of an 
additional Palestinian state in Gaza District and in the area between Israel and Jordan.”59  
Here Peres’s government describes the West Bank as territory in between Israel and 
Jordan, as opposed to Begin’s framing of the West Bank as part of the land of Israel.  
Likud politicians Shamir and Ariel Sharon, now minister of commerce, wanted Israel to 
annex the West Bank and attempted to undermine Peres’ efforts by expanding settlement 
activity.  The Labor and Likud leaders were able to agree on one thing, however: a 
refusal to negotiate with the PLO even if it accepted Resolution 242 and the Camp David 
Accords.
60
 
 What evolved was a stalemate between the PLO and Jordan on one side and Israel 
and the United States, each party unwilling to acquiesce to the demands of the other.  
Surprisingly, it was Margret Thatcher who stepped in to attempt to break up the deadlock 
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by inviting members of the PLO’s national council to London.61  This was a serious break 
with both Israel and the United States’ refusal to speak with the PLO. But it was not just 
the western powers that feared Anglo-PLO dialogue.  The left wing PFLP and DFLP, 
who were opposed to the notion of a federation under Jordanian control, feared that this 
meeting would lead to a Palestinian recognition of Israel.  In order to undermine this, 
paramilitary attacks against Israeli targets were conducted by PLO members.  The 
Israelis, who were all too happy to do their part to undermine Arafat’s participation in 
any peace process, carried out a bombing of the PLO’s headquarters in Tunis which was 
likely aimed at killing Arafat.  The attack killed fifty Palestinians and hundreds of 
Tunisians.
62
  In the months that followed, PLO commandos carried out another attack, 
this time against a cruise ship, and Israel made another failed attempt on Arafat’s life.63  
Arafat would finally tell his envoys not to sign any recognition of Israel in London and 
the British cancelled the meeting. 
64
  
With this, Arafat’s attempts of the 1980s to enter into the peace process failed.   
He found himself with little influence over the factions, unable to prevent them from 
carrying out armed activities.  The PLO itself was divided, exiled to Tunis, and isolated 
from the homeland and the Diaspora.  The armed struggle, described in the 1968 national 
covenant as “the only way to liberate Palestine” that would not be abandoned in favor of 
a political settlement had been discredited by Israel and its supporters as terrorism in all 
occasions and was largely abandoned.  It seemed as if the PLO was going to peter out as 
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the decade wound to a close.  But it was the Palestinians of the occupied territories, who 
felt abandoned by the PLO because of its alliance with Husayn of Jordan, that would jolt 
the PLO, and the Palestinian liberation movement back to life.  But with that new life 
came a new Palestinian rival, Hamas, who would use Islamism as a means to national 
liberation, challenging the PLO’s secular monopoly of the Palestinian revolution.   
191 
 
Chapter 7: The First Intifada; 1987-1993 
It is hard to imagine that anyone, whether it was Arafat and the PLO in Tunis, 
Shamir and Sharon discussing annexation or Peres talking to the UN about a peace with 
Jordan, saw the events of 1987 coming.  What did come in 1987, in the twentieth year of 
occupation, was a full out popular uprising, what would come to be known as the First 
Intifada (literally shaking off), by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
Such was the significance of the Intifada that it raised the PLO from its death bed (even 
though it occurred largely independently of Arafat and his National Council) and it 
finally forced the word “Palestinian” and the people it described in to the Israeli 
discourse.  After the Intifada, no longer was it possible for Israeli leaders to realistically 
expect that a Jordan Option was viable (although many have stuck by it to this day).  It 
forced the Israelis to do what was previously unthinkable, negotiate with the PLO, as this 
was preferable to the continuation of the uprising.  And with the end of the First Intifada 
we begin to see the monopolization of both Palestinian and Israeli discourse of the so-
called “two state solution” as the only way to finally bring peace to historical Palestine; a 
paradigm that has been almost unshakable for the last two and a half decades.  
 The uprising began in 1987 when an Israeli tank transport in Gaza crashed into a 
group of Palestinian cars killing four.
1
  With the subsequent funerals of the victims came 
the expression of frustration at twenty years of occupation that spread like wildfire from 
Gaza to the West Bank.  The strength of the Palestinian reaction to this single event 
reveals just how much frustration had been amassed over twenty years of occupation.  By 
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1985, policy of settlement by both the Likud and Labor parties had put over 150,000 
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories.
2
  This settlement, combined with twenty years 
of economic, civil and political integration, meant that all aspects of Palestinian life were 
affected by occupation.  From impacts on travel, land expropriation, limits on land use, 
limits on agriculture to discriminatory labor policies, the occupation touched on the lives 
of all Palestinians regardless of socioeconomic standing, geographic location or religion.
3
  
Crucially, there was no sign of the occupation ending, and things were only getting 
worse.  Facing the weight of occupation and feeling forsaken by the PLO, their supposed 
representative, the Palestinians of the territories took matters into their own hands.  The 
Intifada was a full-scale popular uprising, in the vein of the 1936 Great Revolt, which 
was characterized by community organization and non-violence and was answered by the 
Israelis with brutal repression.  And the effects and implications of this five year uprising 
on the course of the conflict cannot be overstated.   
The Discourse of the Intifada 
The First Intifada progressed largely independently of the PLO, instead being 
organized on the local level.  The most important local organizing committee was 
founded in January of 1988, just a couple weeks after the outbreak of the revolt under the 
name “Unified National Leadership of the Uprising” (UNLU).4  The UNLU issued 
communiques aimed at guiding the path of the uprising including such strategies as 
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general strikes and boycotts which were distributed as leaflets throughout the occupied 
territory.
5
  It issued its first communique on January 8
th
 of 1988.  This document speaks 
to the relationship between this local leadership and the far off PLO.  
The meat of the first communique was the call for a weeklong strike by all of 
Palestinian civil society whether it was laborers, businessmen, taxi drivers or 
pharmacists.
6
  However, the interesting part of the communique was the statement by the 
UNLU that they “stress our abidance by the call of the PLO, the Palestinian people’s 
legitimate and sole representative, and the need to pursue the bountiful offerings and the 
heroic uprising.”7  Here the UNLU puts itself nominally under the authority of the PLO, 
despite the fact that they were essentially the highest direct leadership of the Intifada.  
The reasons for this are primarily political.  On one hand, the UNLU and the PLO had, to 
a certain extent, divergent interests.  The UNLU was directing and representing the 
population of the occupied territories, while the PLO represented the Palestinian people 
as a whole, including those outside of the West Bank and Gaza.  However, the UNLU 
wanted the support of the PLO because of its legitimacy as the representative of the 
Palestinian people to gain its own legitimacy as the leadership of the uprising in the face 
of local rivals.
8
  The PLO, as we discussed above, was at its lowest point when the 
uprising broke out.  They needed a relationship with the local leadership so they would 
not be marginalized as the Intifada succeeded in ways the PLO had not over the past two 
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decades.
9
  This does not mean the UNLU and the PLO had a perfect relationship.  We 
shall see later that the PLO came to the negotiating table at Oslo primarily out of a fear of 
this marginalization. 
The PLO itself put out a document regarding the uprising not long after.  This 
document came to be known as the Fourteen Points.  It was initially released by non-PLO 
officials but eventually, with approval from the organization in Tunis, came to be the 
official PLO policy guiding the uprising.  This is a particularly important document that 
reflected the fundamental shift in the Palestinian future vision.  The document stated that 
“the uprising has come to further affirm our people’s unbreakable commitment to its 
national aspirations.  These aspirations include our people’s firm national right to self-
determination and of the establishment of an independent state on our national soil under 
the leadership of the PLO, our sole legitimate representative.”10  Should that aspiration 
not be met, “real peace cannot be achieved” and “the continuation of Israeli occupation 
will lead to further violence and bloodshed, and the further deepening of hatred.”11  Peace 
should be made under the auspices of “an international conference of all concerned 
parties including the PLO… as an equal partner.”12   
The talk of Palestinian self-determination on Palestinian soil is nothing new.  
Neither is the demand of an independent state.  We traced the evolution and eventual 
acceptance of this idea by the PLO in 1974 and in the Amman Accords of 1985, where 
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the PLO expressed the desire for an independent state in confederation with Jordan.  
However, in 1974, that state was not so called, rather it was termed a national authority.  
This national authority was not, officially, an end in itself either.  It would be established 
as a permanent base within historical Palestine to continue the struggle for the whole of 
Palestine.  By 1985 and the signing of the Amman Accord, Arafat and his loyalists in the 
PLO conceded the desire for the control of the entirety of historical Palestine, although 
not officially, in favor of a state in a federation with Jordan.  However, as we have 
discussed before, this was a move out of desperation for the PLO and the Palestinian state 
would have been essentially under the sovereignty of King Husayn of Jordan. 
This document updates those two positions and sets the foundation for positions 
held today.  First of all, it implicitly accepts a state of Palestine in less than the entirety of 
historical Palestine as the goal of the Palestinian national movement.  This acceptance 
indicates fundamental changes in the PLO vision from its original 1968 position in that it 
accepts a political settlement (the warnings against which were vocal and pronounced) 
and it implicitly recognizes the permanence of the state of Israel.  The permanence of 
Israel was a fact accepted by the Arab states in 1967 with Resolution 242 but the PLO 
stayed away from this realization until at least the early eighties when Arafat tried to get 
the PLO into the diplomatic arena in the face of Israeli and American opposition.  While 
the Fourteen Points did not constitute official PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 and 
recognition of the state of Israel (that would come later in the year), it indicated that the 
permanence of Israel was a truth officially accepted by the PLO.  This document meant 
that the goal of the popular revolution in Palestine was the creation of a state, 
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independent from both Israel and Jordan.  This was a significant and new discursive 
change. 
 The other important part of this document is the term “on equal footing” 
regarding peace negotiations.  This term puts forward a clear temporal process through 
which the Palestinians saw the coming of peace.  For the Palestinians, the first step was 
the ending of the occupation and the establishment of a state.  That state would then make 
peace with Israel in an international conference as an equal, state to state.  Until the 
occupation is ended and a state is created, resistance like the Intifada would continue.  At 
this time, Israel had no intention of creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  However, when Israel finally came to accept this idea, their notions 
regarding the steps by which a Palestinian state would be created and peace reached were 
fundamentally and irreconcilably different.  It is enough to note here, however, that the 
Palestinian goals for the coming decades had been articulated in January of 1988. 
The PLO faced a serious issue, however, in its bid to reach a political settlement 
through negotiations: Resolution 242.  The United States had made it repeatedly clear 
that it would not speak to the PLO if it did not accept Resolution 242 (the Israelis made it 
repeatedly clear that it would never talk to the PLO no matter what it accepted or denied, 
although that was soon to change).  The PLO, however, had rejected Resolution 242 and 
its implications for twenty years all because of a single issue: the document only referred 
to the resolution of the Palestinian people in terms of refugees, not national rights.  The 
PLO refused to recognize the Resolution, and in doing so, recognize the state of Israel 
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without reciprocal recognition from the Israelis.  However, by the late eighties, that 
rejection had softened, due to the political reality of the situation and the PLO’s new 
stated goals.  The PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif articulated the PLO’s now 
complex relationship with Resolution 242 to the Arab League in June of 1988.  He begins 
his speech, perhaps surprisingly, by appealing the world to see the shared vision of the 
PLO and the Israelis.   
Peel off the layers of fear and mistrust that successive Israeli leaders have piled on the 
substantive issues and you will find that the Palestinians and Israelis are in general 
agreement on ends and means.  Israel’s objectives are lasting peace and security.  Lasting 
peace and security are also the objective of the Palestinian people.  No one can 
understand the Jewish people’s century of suffering more than the Palestinians.  We 
know what it means to be stateless and the object of the fear and prejudice of the nations. 
Thanks to the various Israeli and other governments that have had the power to determine 
the course of our people’s lives, we know what it feels like when human beings are 
considered somehow less human than others and denied the basic rights that people along 
the globe take for granted.
13
  
The appeal to Israel’s desire to lasting peace and security are a direct reference, 
and in many ways an acceptance, of Resolution 242.  Abu Sharif, on behalf of the PLO, 
also accepted the Israeli’s demand for direct negotiations, stating that “the means by 
which the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and security is direct talks… the 
Palestinians agree.”14  And he states the PLO’s willingness to negotiate with whoever the 
Israelis choose to put forward, whether it was Peres and Labor or Shamir and Likud.  He 
also recognizes that the Israeli and U.S. fear regarding negotiations with the PLO, which 
“center on the PLO’s failure of unconditionally accepting Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338 [the resolution regarding the1973 War] and on the possibility that a 
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Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza would be a radical, totalitarian threat to its 
neighbor.”15  He counters that the PLO “does accept Resolutions 242 and 338.  What 
prevents it from saying so unconditionally is not what is in the resolution by what is not 
in them: neither resolution says anything about the national right of the Palestinian 
people… for that reason and that reason alone we have said that we accept Resolutions 
242 and 338 in the context of the other UN resolutions which do recognize the national 
right of the Palestinian people.”16   
Just as with the Fourteen Points, this speech represented a fundamental change to 
the Palestinian discourse, although it is again just the articulation of a de facto stance.  
Here the PLO spokesperson falls short of a full recognition of Israel and official 
unconditional acceptance of Resolution 242 but his speech clearly states a desire to create 
a Palestinian state along the lines of that very document, alongside the state of Israel.  He 
is arguing that what is holding back the prospects of peace is not Palestinian refusal to 
accept Resolution 242 but rather Israeli to end the occupation.  The fact that the PLO 
accepted Resolution 242 six months later but the occupation continues to this day perhaps 
proves his point.   
The culmination of the PLO’s 1988 peaceful appeals was the drafting of the 
Palestinian Declaration of Independence and Yassir Arafat’s second speech to the United 
Nations.  The Declaration of Independence announced the establishment of the state of 
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Palestine “on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem.”17  This “Palestinian 
territory” was the land of historical Palestine occupied by Israel in 1967, namely the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  Here we see a clearer articulation of the previous documents on the 
national self-determination of the Palestinians.  This document put forward the currently 
held Palestinian vision for the future: A state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with 
Jerusalem as its capital neighboring the state of Israel. 
In looking for legitimacy for this land beyond the simple fact of Palestinian 
residence and tie to the land, the drafters made a clever move.  They referred to UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181 which called for the partition of historical Palestine 
into two states, which was accepted by the Jewish community of Palestine, giving it the 
basis for the foundation of its state.  The drafters state that not only did the resolution 
give legitimacy to the state of Israel but also, as it was now accepted by the PLO, it gave 
“international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to 
sovereignty.”18  On that basis is this declaration of statehood justified.  Crucially, we see 
with this declaration of statehood the Palestinian belief that peace will only come once 
the state of Palestine could negotiate with Israel on equal terms once the occupation 
ended.   
As for Arafat’s December 1988 speech to the UN, a US refusal to grant Arafat a 
visa forced the meeting to be held not in New York but in Geneva, Switzerland.
19
  A 
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month before Arafat’s speech, the PLO, meeting in Algiers, formally and officially 
accepted Resolution 242 as the basis for a solution to the question of Palestine by calling 
for an international peace conference based on that resolution, only, however, with 
mutual recognition by Israel of Palestinian national rights.
20
  Arafat’s speech, therefore, 
was centered on the building of peace according to the formula put forward in that 
document.  
Arafat very helpfully describes the evolution in the PLO’s future vision since his 
first speech to the UN in 1974: 
The last thing I said from this platform was that war erupts from Palestine and that peace 
starts in Palestine. Our dream then was to set up the democratic state of Palestine, in 
which Muslims, Christians and Jews would live on an equal footing, in terms of rights 
and duties, in a single, unified society, similar to other peoples on this Earth and in our 
contemporary world.
21
 
However, when the Israelis saw this dream as “a scheme that aims to destroy and 
annihilate their entity,” Arafat stated that the PLO had a “duty… to learn a lesson from 
this difficult situation and … began searching for the realistic alternative formulas, which 
are applicable, to find a solution to the question based on the possible and not absolute 
justice which would guarantee our peoples’ rights to freedom, sovereignty and 
independence.”22  This is a simplified version of the events that forced this change of 
vision, but it is, at its core, the truth.  The PLO was forced to accept that it would never 
be able to replace the state of Israel with its dream of a democratic state for all.  That 
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realization, combined with its dire situation in the wake of the Lebanese Civil War 
pushed it towards the acceptance of a political settlement to salvage whatever was left of 
historical Palestine for the Palestinians.   
At the end of the day, the success of nationalist movements depends on the extent 
to which national claims are accepted by the international community.  This is why it was 
so important, for example, for the Zionist movement to get British recognition and 
support.  The Palestinian people, in the eyes of the international community, had no 
legitimate ties to the land of what was now Israel.  However, its claim to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip was accepted on a much wider scale.  Its claim certainly outweighed the 
claim of Israel who was required to withdraw from that territory according to Resolution 
242.  Thus, even though a Palestinian state is not “absolute justice,” it was the best 
“possible” solution for the PLO.  The change in the future vision of the PLO, then, was 
one from coexistence with the other in a single state to coexistence between two equal 
nation-states. 
These new diplomatic overtures to the United States and Israel were not without 
opposition amongst the Palestinians.  The brutal and indiscriminate repression of the 
Intifada by the Israeli government served as a unifying factor.  However, while this 
repression inspired resistance across class, social and religious lines, not all Palestinians 
had a unified future vision.   The PFLP feared the repercussions of recognizing the 
national rights of Israel without reciprocation.  The DFLP, who had initially put forward 
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the Palestinian state idea, had similar reservations.
23
  They feared that Arafat was giving 
much to Israel based on promises of negotiation that may never materialize.
24
  Despite 
this opposition, the PNC endorsed the PLO’s peace path in November of 1988.  But 
while these internal concerns failed to sway the PLO’s path or change its vision, a new 
national political force appeared in 1988 that operated, and to this day operates, outside 
of the PLO.  This group, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) put forward a future 
vision in 1988 that called back to the original PLO charter in many ways though in a 
fundamentally different framework.  
Hamas 
Let us be perfectly clear about Hamas before we go too far into an analysis of its 
charter.  Hamas, in terms of goals and means, is a nationalist organization just like Fatah, 
the PFLP and the DFLP.  However, while these groups are strictly secular, Hamas 
presents its nationalist goals in Islamist terms.  This is important to point out because it is 
a misconception that Hamas is waging a strictly religious war.  It is not.  Its goal is the 
liberation of Palestine, which is nationalist.  This is not to say that it is not inspired by 
religion or that their claim to Palestine is not partially based in religion; it calls itself the 
Islamic Resistance Movement for a reason.  But just as Fatah, the PFLP and the DFLP 
are cut from the same secular nationalist cloth as the Zionist labor and Likud party, 
Hamas is in the company of religious Zionist parties.  Religion is in the rhetoric but 
nationalism is the motivating factor.  
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The emergence of Hamas is another example of how the First Intifada traced the 
path of the Great Revolt of 1936.  In that uprising populist religious leaders like al-
Qassam (after whom Hamas would name their military wing) led followers in nationalist 
struggle.  Hamas itself grew out of the many Islamic charities that had begun to spring up 
in the occupied territories in the seventies.  These charities provided social services like 
education, aid to the poor and healthcare and aided in political organization of unions and 
professionals.  The Israeli government nurtured these charities believing that if they could 
raise the standard of living in the territories, the people would be pacified and turn away 
from the nationalist PLO.
25
  However, as Israel would come to find, these charities were 
not the pacifying force they expected.  During the first week of the Intifada, Hamas 
announced its foundation and in August of 1988 it released its founding document.
26
  It 
would come to play a significant discursive, political and military role in the ensuing two 
and a half decades of the conflict.  
Just as the Zionist movement laid claim to the land of historical Palestine because 
of its Jewish character and history, Hamas made the same claim but based instead on its 
Islamic character and history.  Hamas describes historic Palestine as an “Islamic Waqf.”  
A waqf is essentially the Islamic equivalent of a trust.  Usually it is a building or a piece 
of land donated and held by a charitable trust.  The proceeds or interest earned off of that 
asset is used by the trust to maintain a hospital, school, or mosque for example.  The key 
feature of waqf law in this context is that waqf assets are inalienably given to the trust.  
                                                 
25
 Gelvin, 223. 
26
 Ibid., 223. 
204 
 
By describing Palestine as a waqf, Hamas is stating that the land of historical Palestine is 
inalienably Muslim in character.  It is the mission of Hamas, therefore, to return it to 
Islamic control.  Hamas’ goals were maximalist, just like the PLO of 1968: Palestine, “or 
any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up.”27  
Also, as we noted before, Hamas was not on board with the PLO’s new political push.  It 
stated that “Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are 
in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part 
of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement is part of its religion… There is no solution for the Palestinian 
question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all 
a waste of time and vain endeavors”28  Again this harkens back to an earlier era of PLO 
discourse.  This is an Islamist reframing of the PLO commitment to armed struggle, 
calling it Jihad, as a tactic, not a strategy to be jettisoned in favor of a political settlement.  
Hamas shares the nationalist goals of the PLO, going so far as to describe it as part of its 
religion, but rather than framing in it in a secular way, puts it forward in an Islamic 
context.   
Regarding the PLO, the founding document, called the “Covenant of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement,” includes sections about “National Movements in the Palestine 
Arena” and “The Palestine Liberation Organization.”  It has high praise for these 
movements and assures them that Hamas “is there for their support and assistance... It is 
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there to bring together and not to divide, to preserve and not to squander, to unify and not 
to throw asunder.”29  It has particularly reverent words for the PLO stating that the 
organization is “is the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement. It 
contains the father and the brother, the next of kin and the friend. The Moslem does not 
estrange himself from his father, brother, next of kin or friend. Our homeland is one, our 
situation is one, our fate is one and the enemy is a joint enemy to all of us.”30  However, 
it explains that it cannot join the PLO precisely because of the PLO’s strictly secular 
orientation: 
Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions 
stem from ideologies. That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic 
Palestine with the secular idea.
31
 
It promises, however, that “the day The Palestinian Liberation Organization 
adopts Islam as its way of life, we will become its soldiers, and fuel for its fire that will 
burn the enemies.”32 
What we see with Hamas, then, is an organization which in goals in means 
reflects in many ways the original future vision of the PLO.  However, one fundamental 
difference between the two organizations prevents them from operating as in a unified 
way in the struggle for historical Palestine; religion, or rather, lack thereof.  It is 
interesting that the PLO’s talk of a political settlement at this time is not what holds 
Hamas back from unity but rather its secular disposition.  However, it seems that no 
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division is unbridgeable should the political situation require it to be bridged.  In the last 
couple of years, talks of incorporating Hamas into the PLO have picked up steam, but 
this has not yet come to fruition.   
It would be irresponsible of me at this point not to touch on the treatment of the 
Jewish people in the Hamas covenant.  We saw in the PLO charter and subsequent 
documents an overall inclusive message towards the Jews.  Jews who lived in Palestine 
until 1917 were considered Palestinians.  Those Israeli Jews who had since settled in 
Palestine would be equals in the secular democratic state the PLO sought to establish.  
Also, the documents produced by the PLO and its factions were always careful to 
distinguish between Zionism as a national movement and Jews as a religion and a people.  
The Hamas covenant does not make this distinction.  It refers to Israelis and Zionists 
simply as “Jews.”  It brings up the anti-Semitic hoax The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
and assigns Jews responsibility for both world wars.
33
  While it does state that according 
to Islam, Jews and Christians are protected peoples and that in an Islamic Palestine 
people of all religions would live in peace and quiet, the document is far from inclusive.  
These occurrences of anti-Semitism are indefensible.  It is important to recognize, 
however, that these attitudes appeared in a certain context.  The people of Palestine were 
first expelled from their land and then occupied by a state that proudly proclaims its 
Jewish identity.  That they would blur the line between nation and religion is 
understandable, although not defensible, as the line was initially blurred by the Jewish 
national movement itself.  
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Israeli Discourse during the Intifada 
What was to the Palestinians a heroic struggle for national rights and liberation 
was to the Israelis illegal and unacceptable behavior.  To defense minister, Labor Party 
member and future prime minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, the demonstrators were 
terrorists and needed to be treated as such.  In order to quell the uprising, Rabin ordered 
the IDF to “break the bones” of the protesters, and allowed for the use of live fire and 
beatings.
34
  Mass arrests were conducted and new prison camps were established to house 
the tens of thousands of arrested Palestinians, mirroring the anti-insurgency tactics of the 
British during the Great Revolt of the 1930s.
35
  Instead of dissuading Palestinians to join 
in, this violent and indiscriminant repression served to forge ties across class divisions.  
Out of desperation, the Israeli cabinet in April 1988, under Shamir, ordered the 
assassination of top Fatah official Khalil al-Wazir, purported to be the director of the 
Intifada and the voice advocating for non-violence rather than armed struggle.
36
  The 
assassination was not just an effort to bring the intifada to an end but also to undercut 
calls, supported by Labor head Shimon Peres, for an international peace conference.
37
  
The Likud ministers wanted to undercut these peace efforts, as they had done on previous 
occasions, because of their desire to annex the occupied territories.   
Both the Likud and Labor parities had reasons for quelling the uprising as quickly 
as possible.  And as 1988 was another Knesset election year, the party platforms for that 
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election reflect their attitude towards the Intifada.  For Labor, the goal remained a 
permanent peace with Jordan that saw the ceding of heavily populated Palestinian areas 
to the Jordan state and Israeli retention of most of the area of the West Bank.  However, 
the success of the uprising opened the door for a political solution that involved the PLO 
and the possibility of a Palestinian state.  By 1988, the process leading to this eventuality 
was already underway.  In reaction to the PLO’s Fourteen Points, King Husayn of Jordan 
openly renounced all claims to the West Bank and a short time later began actively 
supporting the PLO’s goals for a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.38  This U-
turn was hardly out of the goodness of his heart regarding the nationalist goals of the 
PLO.  Rather, it was out of concern for the level of support in Jordan for the Intifada by 
the Palestinian population of his kingdom.  The last thing he needed was the 60% of his 
population that was of Palestinian descent to begin an Intifada aimed at shaking off his 
rule.
39
  With this renunciation by the king of Jordan, the so called Jordan option for 
solving the conflict should have gone by the wayside but Peres and his Labor Party, with 
US support clung to the idea in their 1988 party platform.   
The Labor platform promised to “solve the Palestinian problem within a 
Jordanian-Palestinian political framework which would encompass the densely populated 
areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.”40  The rest of the land, such as the Jordan 
Valley, the area around Jerusalem and the northwest Dead Sea would be annexed by 
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Israel, with the eastern most border of the state being the Jordan River.
41
  The plan also 
promised once again that Israel under Labor would not allow the establishment of a 
Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel.
42
  And while the Labor Party did not mention 
the PLO by name, its offer to “hold talks with those Palestinian figures and elements that 
recognize by Israel’s existence, reject terrorism and accept UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338” was a clear rejection of talks that included the PLO.43  Again, 
this was a position that the U.S. supported as of 1988.  Despite the fact that the PLO 
would later in the year formally accept Resolution 242, their demand of Israeli 
recognition for Palestinian national rights was a precondition Peres and Labor Refused to 
accept.   
 Just like Labor, Likud had a vested interest in ending the Intifada as quickly as 
possible.  Unlike Labor, who clung to the at this point dead and buried Jordan option, 
Likud needed calm in order to maintain control over the territories Shamir and Sharon 
sought to annex.  Rather than grasp at the ghost of the Jordan option, Likud grasped at the 
ghost of the autonomy plan elaborated in the Camp David accords to try and bring some 
form of peace.  We have noted before that document produced by the Likud party do not 
mince words.  Its 1988 party platform was no exception.  For example: “The right of the 
Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and everlasting… Israel has a right and a 
claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District… Israel will enforce law 
and order in Judea, Samaria and Gaza… The Likud will renew the settlement policy in 
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all parts of the Land of Israel.”44  We have studied before this Likud position that the 
territories are an integral part of Israel and should be annexed and we see here that they 
persist up to at least 1988 despite the Intifada. 
Regarding the future of the Palestinians, the platform reaffirms the Likud position 
that the Camp David Accords guaranteed that no Palestinian state will be established in 
between Jordan and Israel.  Furthermore, the autonomy laid out in this agreement is 
neither a “state nor sovereignty nor self-determination.”45  To Likud, only Israel had the 
right to exercise these in the land of historic Palestine.  Rather, this autonomous 
Palestinian system would be wholly subservient to Israeli sovereignty and law.  Just like 
the Labor platform, the Likud platform makes no direct reference to the PLO but it does 
have a few choice words for the organization.  It states there “shall be no negotiations 
with organizations of assassins who seek to destroy the State of Israel” and immediately 
after this sentence, in case we have forgotten, it states that “Israel shall instate law and 
order in the Judea, Samaria and Gaza districts.”46  The fact that the PLO had implicitly 
recognized Israel and accepted Resolution 242 on numerous occasions, and were to do so 
openly shortly after this document is penned, seemed of no consequence to either Labor 
or Likud.  It seems that the parties’ strongest point of agreement was that Israel would not 
negotiate with the PLO and Israel would not allow the creation of a Palestinian state.   
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The 1988 election was another tight one, and it took a new force in Israeli politics, 
religious nationalist parties who we will encounter in more detail later, to give Shamir 
and Likud ability to form a new government.
47
  Shamir remained prime minister and 
Rabin remained defense minister.
48
   
In the wake of the elections the new government officially responded to the 
Palestinian declaration of independence stating that it exhibited no shift in Palestinian 
policy, no explicit or implicit recognition of Israel’s “right to exist,” or “unqualified 
acceptance of 242 and 338.” 49  This is at best misleading.  As we have already covered, 
the declaration of independence and accompanying political statements acknowledged 
Israel’s existence and accepted these resolutions in the framework of mutual recognition.  
It even included an implicit recognition of this so-called “right to exist” in pointing to 
Resolution 181 as not only the political legitimization of the Jewish state but the 
Palestinian one as well.  Israel, however, was not prepared to grant this same recognition 
to the Palestinians, especially to the PLO, as it contradicted the two points that both 
Likud and Labor agreed upon, no negotiations with the PLO and no national rights for the 
Palestinians.  These two points we again reaffirmed in the “Basic Policy Guidelines” of 
the new government a month later.
50
  However, with the coming of 1989, the United 
States would determine that the PLO had accepted Resolution 242 and renounced 
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violence (the other precondition to negotiation) and began to pressure Shamir to take 
steps towards negotiations with the organization.
51
   
The Birth of a Paradigm 
 While they had no way of knowing it at that point, the PLO in 1988 articulated 
the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli that would eventually monopolize the discourse in 
the Palestinian territories, the Arab States, the United Nations, the United States, the 
European Union and Israel for the ensuing two and a half decades and, as of 2013, the 
foreseeable future: the so-called “two state solution.”  While, as we will see, there has 
never been a consensus between the Palestinians and the Israelis over the forms these 
states would take, such was the strength of support for this solution in all circles that even 
those in Israel who sought to retain nearly all of the occupied territory found themselves 
being forced to pay at least lip service to the idea of a Palestinian state.  Thus, in 1988, 
we see a birth of a paradigm.  And without the Intifada, this would not have come to pass.  
 For the PLO, despite minor dissent that has started to strengthen in the second 
decade of the 21
st
 century, the future vision has remained unchanged since its original 
articulation in 1988.  The goal is the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, along with a just solution to the refugee 
question.  Until this state is created, Palestinian resistance to the occupation will continue.  
Throughout the peace process that would begin in the early nineties and last up to the 
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present day, these fundamental tenets would remain, despite small fluctuations in the 
final borders of the imagined Palestinian state.   
 For the Israelis, the clear future visions of 1988 (either, according to Labor, a 
peace with Jordan that includes ceding the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to 
their control or, according to Likud, total annexation of the territories with “autonomous 
rule” for the Palestinians therein) would become muddled as international support and 
pressure made these visions finally untenable.  Even with popular and professed political 
support for a two state solution, the Israeli vision for these states has never been made 
clear.  We will raise and likely be unable to answer the question if over the ensuing 25 
years Israel ever intended to allow the creation of a Palestinian state.  But we are getting a 
little ahead of ourselves here.  We are now entering 1989; a pivotal year for Palestinian 
aspirations at the height of the Intifada and the start of a diplomatic push that would 
finally include the PLO. 
U.S. Pressure and Diplomatic Push 
In December of 1988, just after denying Arafat a visa to speak at the UN in New 
York, the U.S. determined that the PLO satisfactorily met its demands for an opening of 
dialogue, namely acceptance of Resolution 242 and a renunciation of terrorism.
52
  This 
dialogue was opened through the American ambassador to Tunisia, still the site of the 
PLO’s headquarters.  Despite this dialogue, the U.S. stood by Israel’s demand that the 
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PLO be absent from any sort of official negotiations.
53
  However, in 1989, the U.S. began 
to push Shamir to talk to the PLO.
54
  Shamir, clinging to Likud’s “autonomy plan” pipe 
dream, called for elections in the occupied territories which would allow the Palestinian 
people to “conduct their daily affairs of life,” to put off negotiations.55  Israel in this 
arrangement would be “responsible for security, foreign affairs” and settlement.56  By 
conducting Palestinian elections under Israeli control, Shamir’s clear goal here was to 
gain Palestinian participation in this expression of Israeli sovereignty.  While this election 
process was described in the document as an “interim” arrangement, Shamir was clear 
that this “self-rule” would not lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state or a cession 
of the occupied territories to Jordan, stating “we shall not give the Arabs one inch of our 
land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years.”57  As a strategy to consolidate Israeli 
power in the occupied territories and get the U.S. of Shamir’s back about negotiations, 
the plan worked.  The American administration backed the plan, buying the idea that the 
interim status of the elections would lead to the end of Israeli rule over the territory and 
therefore gave Shamir a year to stage them.
58
  Not surprisingly, Palestinian leaders in the 
PLO and the territories rejected the idea and stood by their demand for a state.
59
  The 
yearlong deadline, therefore, gave Shamir a chance to further expand settlements and 
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entrench Israel’s control over the territory.60  Eventually both the United States and the 
Labor Party grew frustrated with Shamir’s attempts to undermine any attempt at peace.  
In March of 1990, President George H.W. Bush stated that he opposed Israeli settlement 
in the occupied territories.  Shamir did not back down, threatening to settle as many 
Soviet Jews in Jerusalem as possible and in reaction the Labor Party left the governing 
coalition.  The Labor leader Peres was unable to form a new coalition and eventually 
Shamir managed to form a government without the participation of Labor.
61
  With his 
newly consolidated power, Shamir formally rejected his own plan for autonomy in the 
occupied territories and expanded settlement.
62
 
On the Palestinian side, Arafat, seeking to gain further U.S. support, accepted the 
idea of elections in the territories without the participation of the PLO which weakened 
his position amongst the Palestinians.  He began, therefore, to move closer to Saddam 
Hussein, a step taken on the verge of the First Gulf Crisis which would harm the PLO’s 
standing in the Arab World and the internationally community.
63
  The United States 
suspended dialogue with the PLO in the summer of 1990.
64
  Within the Palestinian 
territories, there were rumors of the PFLP breaking PLO ranks to form an alternative 
front with Hamas.   
The actual events of the First Gulf War are not very important for this study.  
What are important are its consequences.  In his weak position, Arafat found himself 
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defending Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, hoping that Hussein’s threat of force would lead 
to American concessions regarding peace negotiations.
65
  This hurt the PLO’s standing in 
the international community.  Kuwait expelled thousands of Palestinian refugees from the 
country and pulled its financial backing of the PLO.
66
 However, as a result of the war, the 
United States decided to renew efforts to once and for all find peace in the Middle East.  
The Arab states called for an international conference sponsored by the USSR and US 
which would be held in Madrid.
67
  The Palestinians of the occupied territories were told 
that PLO representatives would not be allowed to attend.  Arafat acquiesced on the 
condition that Palestinians from both inside and outside of the territories were permitted 
to attend.
68
  Shamir agreed to participate as well, though losing some support at home.   
The Madrid Conference 
As the Intifada raged on in 1991 representatives of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordan gathered in Madrid to conduct peace talks based on UN Resolutions 242 and 
338.
69
  The Madrid conference marked the first time that Israel met directly with these 
Arab states.  The goal was to revive the land for peace formula that led to the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel more than decade earlier.
70
  Because of Israeli demands, the 
Palestinian delegation included no PLO representatives and was part of the Jordanian 
team.
71
  Not everyone in the Palestinian camp was happy with Arafat’s willingness to 
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acquiesce to these terms.  The PFLP and DFLP, who had previously opposed Arafat’s 
agreement to keep the PLO out of peace talks in 1988, joined with Hamas in issuing a 
statement critical of Arafat’s acceptance the terms of the Madrid conference.72  While I 
have failed to dig up this particular document, it is safe to say that the source of these 
groups’ opposition was a feeling that Arafat was giving up too much, especially 
recognition of Israel, with no assurance of a corresponding recognition of Palestinian 
national rights by Israel.   
Little practical progress was actually made during the talks, especially on the 
Palestinian-Israeli front.  Nor were there any adjustments to either people’s official future 
vision.  The head of the Palestinian delegation, who had no official ties to the PLO but 
acknowledged the organization as the representative of the Palestinian people, professed 
the Palestinian commitment to the two state solution based on Resolutions 242 and 338 as 
the path to peace.  Shamir, on the other hand, once again called for “interim self-
governing” amongst the Palestinian population of the territories but not as a means to any 
sort of future independence or statehood.
73
   
Because the Madrid Conference does not represent any change to the Palestinian 
or Israeli discourse, it is not necessary for this study to cover the events of the conference 
in much depth.  However, it behooves us to take a quick look at the opening statements of 
both the head of the Palestinian delegation, Haidar Abdul Shafi, and Israeli Prime 
Minister Shamir.  We mentioned briefly before that with the advent of the two state 
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solution paradigm, there appeared a fundamental disconnect between the Palestinians and 
Israelis on the order of steps by which a Palestinian state would be established and a 
peace agreement would be reached.  Despite the fact that at this point in 1991 both 
Shamir and the Labor opposition opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, Shamir’s 
discourse in the context of peace with Arab states betrays the understanding that the 
Israelis would bring to peace negotiations with the Palestinians a few years later.   
Abdul Shafi, the head of the Palestinian delegation, makes it clear that the aim of 
the Palestinians and goal of the Intifada is the creation of a Palestinian state on the whole 
of the territory occupied in 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital.  He argues that the 
main obstacle to this goal is Israel’s expansionist policies as represented in the 
construction of settlements.
74
  Instead, there needs to be a Palestinian state to negotiate 
with Israel on equal terms.  Abdul Shafi states that “bilateral negotiations on the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces, the dissolution of Israeli administration, and the transfer of 
authority to the Palestinian people cannot proceed under coercion or threat in the current 
asymmetry of power.”75  That is to say, as long as Israel has complete control over the 
territories and therefore the power to change the status of the territories through 
settlement and expansion, a Palestinian state cannot be established and peace cannot be 
reached.  While they would prefer that the Palestinian state be established “today rather 
than tomorrow,” Abdul Shafi states the Palestinians would accept the proposed interim 
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agreements so long as this stage is not “transformed into a permanent status.”76  The 
Palestinian idea was that with this interim autonomy and control over their own lives, 
they would be in a better position to negotiate than when complete subjugated by 
occupation.  This was obviously a concession as the clear Palestinian preference was, and 
still is, the establishment of a Palestinian state first and negotiations of peace on equal 
footing afterwards.  This is an adaption of the “land for peace” formula that was first laid 
out in Resolution 242: Israel would return the land occupied in 1967 and the Arab states, 
and the newly established Palestinian state, would sign peace treaties and normalize 
relations with the state of Israel.   
As we have covered before, Shamir had no intention of returning territory 
occupied in the 1967 War.  This is why he states in his introductory remarks at the 
Madrid Conference that “it will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively 
on territory.”77  To Shamir, the issue preventing peace was not the fact that Israel was 
occupying and settling land that once belonged to the Arab states (even though the return 
of this land in exchange for peace was the principle upon which the conference was 
called).  Instead, Shamir claims that “the root cause of the conflict is the Arab refusal to 
recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel.”78  Shamir was looking for acceptance and 
recognition from the Arab states and the signing of peace treaties without an Israeli 
commitment to the returning of territory.   What we will see with the peace negotiations 
with the PLO when they finally begin a couple years later is the application of this same 
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principle: demands of Palestinian recognition and acceptance of occupation and 
settlement in the form of a peace treaty with no Israeli commitment to the ceding of 
territory. What we see is the exact opposite vision to the Palestinians.  Rather than a state 
and then peace, the Israelis would demand peace, that is an acceptance of Israeli 
territorial demands, and then whatever is left will become the Palestinians “state.”  This is 
jumping ahead a couple years but it is important to identify the roots of this mentality in 
other contexts so we can recognize it later. 
Post Madrid 
As is probably clear, the differing mentalities between the Palestinians and Arab 
states on one side and Shamir’s Israel on the other meant that the Madrid conference did 
not really move the process towards peace.  The conference is therefore better 
remembered as being the first occasion of multilateral discussions between Israel and the 
Arab states rather than for any practical progress.  The United States eventually grew 
tired of Shamir’s settlement policy and refusal to negotiate according to the land for 
peace formula and withheld a promised $10 billion loan until settlement building 
ceased.
79
  Shamir expanded settlements as a response.  The U.S. then acted to undermine 
Shamir’s reelection bid in June of 1992 to ensure the instillation of a Labor coalition, 
with former defense minister Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister, which included left wing 
parties more open to ceding territory for peace.
80
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Rabin seemed more willing to negotiate than his predecessor.  He cut some 
financial incentives for settlers and stopped building what he termed “political 
settlements.”81  His government also passed a law that permitted Israeli contact with the 
PLO.  However, he was not willing to let everything go.  He maintained the construction 
of “security settlements” around Jerusalem and in the Golan.  As had been the Labor 
policy since the days of Yigal Allon, Rabin seemed to favor retaining large parts of the 
West Bank, particularly around Jerusalem, and opposed the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, still favoring the Jordanian option.
82
  However, a fundamental change would occur 
in 1993 with the secret Oslo negotiations and the start of the so called Peace Process.  
The Oslo Process would the entrance of the Palestinian people in to the official Israeli 
national political discourse and set the tone for the ensuing twenty years of the conflict. 
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Chapter 8: Oslo and the Peace Process; 1993-1999 
If we were to split the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict into distinct 
phases, we would find, as of 2013, four.  The first is the conflict in Mandate Palestine 
between Jewish settlers and the indigenous Palestinian population.  With the 
establishment of the state of Israel, we see the start of the second phase, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, where the Arab states took center stage in the struggle against Zionism.  With 
the crushing defeat of the Arabs in 1967, the third phase begins; the return to the 
Palestinian Israeli conflict.  Here the conflict is characterized by armed struggle by the 
Palestinian national groups while the Arab states, for the most part, recede to the 
periphery of the conflict.  With the signing of the Oslo Accords, we see the start the 
fourth and current phase of the conflict (but we will discuss later whether we have seen a 
new phase emerge in recent years).  Just as the 1967 War was the catalyst for the shift 
between the second and third phases, the First Intifada was the push towards the Oslo 
phase.  It was the First Intifada that drove the PLO to alter its future vision and it was the 
First Intifada that brought about mutual recognition and the so called Peace Process. 
The 1993 Oslo Accords was the result of secret negotiations hosted by the 
Norwegian foreign minister between an unofficial delegation of Israelis and PLO 
representatives. The result of the talks was an exchange of recognition between Yassir 
Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin (although not equal recognition) and the framework for peace 
upon which direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO would be conducted.
 1
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Why this sudden accord between these two groups who had been in direct conflict 
for two and a half decades at this point?  Well for Arafat and the PLO, this desire to 
conduct direct negotiations with Israel is no surprise.  Arafat had all but recognized Israel 
as far back as 1985 and was doing everything in his power to get a foot in the door at 
international negotiations.  And while the Intifada was a shot in the arm for the PLO who 
was at the time still smarting five years on from its expulsion from Lebanon, Arafat’s 
status in Palestine was once again weak as of 1992 when the Oslo negotiations began. 
First and foremost, his aloof position in Tunis created a disconnect between the on the 
ground leadership of the Intifada and the exiled PLO.  Secondly, the appearance of 
Hamas and the rejectionist fronts of the PLO meant that Arafat’s PLO was hardly the sole 
organization claiming to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.  This 
rivalry combined with Arafat’s agreement to negotiations without PLO participation 
severely weakened his support and prominence amongst the Palestinians.  Arafat’s 
support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf Crisis had a similar negative impact on his 
international standing both with the United States and the Arab states.  Losing support at 
home and abroad and with no say over the events of the Intifada, it is not surprising 
therefore, that Arafat looked for legitimacy outside of historical Palestine.  He found that 
in recognition of the PLO by Israel. 
Israel’s decision to recognize the PLO was slightly less predictable.  Why did 
Israel suddenly change from the position they held just a year before, no negotiation with 
the PLO? It was true that Shamir and his openly expansionist policies had left office, but 
Yitzhak Rabin was hardly a man of peace.  We first met Rabin above as defense minister 
224 
 
during the first years of the Intifada when he was describing the demonstrators of the 
First Intifada as terrorists and ordering beatings to brutally repress the uprising.  A short 
look at his past reveals that he organized the urbanicide of the Palestinian towns of Lydda 
and Ramle in the 1948 war.
2
  And as we have already covered, the Labor party platform 
promised no negotiations with the PLO and no Palestinian state.  It is probably safe to say 
that Rabin in midst of the Oslo negotiations still clung to the idea that the solution to the 
conflict would come in the form of the Jordanian option with Israel retaining much of the 
land of the West Bank.
3
  But still, why negotiate with the PLO?  First of all, Israel needed 
the Intifada to end and had a particular interest in relieving itself of Gaza, the source of 
much of the unrest.
4
  In order to do this, he needed Palestinian cooperation.  Secondly, 
Rabin and his government recognized that Arafat was in a severely weakened position 
and in dire need of a boost of prestige.  Rabin knew, therefore, that he could force 
concessions out of Arafat he would not otherwise give in return for providing him with 
recognition.
5
   Rather than undermining PLO peace attempts with violence as it had 
throughout the conflict, Israel chose to recognize the PLO and enter into direct 
negotiations.  For the first time, Israel could get more out of negotiations with the PLO 
than from conflict. 
There were two important documents that came out of the Oslo process of 1993.  
The first was the Declaration of Principles which was conditional on the letters of 
“mutual recognition” between the PLO and Israel.  The letter from the PLO to Israel 
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reasserted to Israel the same conditions that the United States had previously demanded 
from the organization as preconditions for negotiations: recognition of the right to Israel 
to exist, acceptance of Resolution 242 and 338 and a renunciation of terrorism and 
violence.  Israel also demanded that the PLO remove from its constitution the passages 
aimed at replacing Israel with a secular democratic state which it did in the letter.
6
   In 
return, Yitzhak Rabin stated that “the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.”7   
The question of how “mutual” this mutual recognition was has been subject to 
significant debate.  A cursory reading of the documents shows a fundamental inequality 
in the recognition offered by each side.  The PLO recognized, in no uncertain terms, the 
national rights of Israel: “The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in 
peace and security.”8  Rabin’s response did not offer this level of recognition of the 
Palestinians.  It was significant that Israel recognized “the PLO as a representative of the 
Palestinian people,” because this represented the first official recognition by Israel that a 
Palestinian people existed.
9
  But recognition of the PLO as a representative of the 
Palestinian people does not constitute a recognition of the national rights of the 
Palestinians, that is, the right to a state.  The consequences of this asymmetry of 
recognition would be numerous throughout the negotiation process of the ensuing 
decades.  First of all, recognition of Israel by the PLO meant that it conceded its national 
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claim to all of historical Palestine except the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Israel made no 
reciprocal concession of claim over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  This meant that 
negotiations over territory would go one way: West Bank and Gaza land to Israel.  It also 
meant, crucially, that Israel was able to see the West Bank and Gaza Strip as its own land 
to give away, not territory to which the Palestinians have a rightful claim.  It could give 
away whatever suited it and keep whatever it wanted.  This acceptance by the PLO of 
Israel with no recognition of the right to statehood and the asymmetry of power it 
allowed opened this exchange to criticism on the Palestinian side.  The fear was that this 
recognition gave up too much with no real promise of statehood.  In one fell swoop, the 
PLO gave up claims to 80% of historical Palestine and left the door open for further 
concessions to Israel.  This agreement allowed Israel to maintain its narrative that it had 
the right to 100% of historical Palestine.  And while it might choose to give some of it up, 
it made no promise to give up all of the occupied territory or to give it to a Palestinian 
state.   
With the exchange of these letters, the PLO and Israel then signed on to the 
Declaration of Principles.  That agreement stated that “the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations with the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to 
establish a Palestinian interim Self-Governing Authority… for the Palestinian people in 
the West Bank and the Gaza strip based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.”10  
This self-governing authority would control “the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, 
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except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.”11  These 
permanent status issues were “Jerusalem, refugees, settlement, security arrangements, 
borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors.”12  The beginning of the 
jurisdiction of this authority would begin with the withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza 
Strip and the “Jericho area.”  That would begin a five-year transitional period, with final 
status negotiations beginning no later than the third year of the transitional period.
13
  
However, while this authority will have a police force to control areas under its control, 
“Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as 
well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis,” and “Israeli military forces and 
civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
14
 
The most important thing to note with this agreement is that it left the question of 
what would succeed this interim authority completely unanswered.  Israeli negotiators at 
Oslo refused to include references to a Palestinian state, because, as we have noted 
before, Rabin and Labor still favored the so called Jordanian option.
15
  On top of that, the 
agreement made no indication that Israel would allow any sort of Palestinian sovereignty 
or self-rule except under Israel’s ultimate control.  Israel still maintained final say over 
security issues and, according the agreement, Israeli soldiers and civilians could move 
freely in the territories to be ceded to the interim authority.  And while this is perhaps an 
understandable precaution while the interim authority was finding its footing, the fact that 
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Israel made no indication it would ever give up its ultimate control over security puts in 
to doubt how independent either this authority or whatever its unspecified successor 
would be.  Similarly vague was the future of the land already grabbed by Israel and 
populated with settlements.  There included no mention of their withdrawal nor even an 
agreement to freeze their construction, simply a statement that they would be among the 
issues settled at a later date.  What the Declaration of Principles leaves us with is an 
unclear declaration that there are issues that need to be discussed but no concrete plan.   
The Palestinian vision was clearly a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with 
East Jerusalem as its capital.  It believed that the exchange of recognition and the 
Declaration of Principles put the Palestinian people on the path to the realization of this 
goal.  The Israeli vision was, as per usual with a Labor government, unclear at best.  It is 
safe to say that a Palestinian state was still unthinkable even with the signing of the 
accord.  Regarding the issue of Jerusalem, a supposed final status issue, Rabin said to the 
Knesset on returning from the signing that “united and unified Jerusalem is not 
negotiable and will be the capital of the Israeli people under Israel’s sovereignty and the 
subject of every Jew’s yearning and dreams for ever and ever.”16  So even though the 
status of Jerusalem was listed amongst the so called final status issues to be settled later, 
in the minds of Israel’s leaders, Jerusalem had been settled since its occupation in 1967.   
Clearly, then, there remained significant gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian 
future visions even at the optimistic occasion of the Oslo signing.  These gaps, combined 
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with Israel power advantage both in military might and recognition, lead to prescient 
criticism of the accords from various observers.  One such commentator was the head of 
the Palestinian delegation at Madrid, Haidar Abdul Shafi.  He warned in his introductory 
remarks at Madrid that “bilateral negotiations on the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the 
dissolution of Israeli administration, and the transfer of authority to the Palestinian people 
cannot proceed under coercion or threat in the current asymmetry of power.”17  He feared 
that since the Oslo accord did nothing to rectify this asymmetry of power and Israel had 
no intention of granting a Palestinian state, then Palestinian leaders were “trying to read 
into it what is not there.”18  To Shafi, the agreement was “phrased in generalities that 
leave room for wide interpretations.”19  He warned that, due to the accord’s generality, 
Israelis unwillingness to agree to the formation of a Palestinian state, and the general 
asymmetry of power inherent in the documents, “the peace plan will not be able to 
develop as Mr. Arafat expects it to.”20 
The most notable criticism of Oslo came from the great Palestinian academic 
Edward Said.  He was unequivocal in his immediate disgust with the agreement: 
Let us call the agreement by its real name: an instrument of Palestinian surrender, a 
Palestinian Versailles. What makes it worse is that for at least the past fifteen years the 
PLO could have negotiated a better arrangement than this modified Allon Plan, one not 
requiring so many unilateral concessions to Israel.
21
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Said points to the discrepancy in the level of the so-called mutual recognition, 
criticizes Arafat for ending the Intifada despite the fact that the occupation remained in 
place, and laments the fact that the vagueness of the plan leaves the question of 
Palestinian sovereignty and statehood on the back burner.  He warns that “rather than 
becoming stronger during the interim period, the Palestinians may grow weaker, come 
more under the Israeli thumb, and therefore be less able to dispute the Israeli claim when 
the last set of negotiations begins. But on the matter of how, by what specific mechanism, 
to get from an interim status to a later one, the document is purposefully silent. Does this 
mean, ominously, that the interim stage may be the final one?”22  It is probably safe to 
say, writing twenty years later and therefore well after the supposed five year lifetime of 
the interim stage, that this interim stage seems to have become the final one.  Said also 
points out that the security provisions outlined in the agreement means that the “primary 
consideration in the document is for Israel’s security, with none for the Palestinians’ 
security from Israel’s incursions.”23  This idea of Israel’s security first, Palestinian 
national rights second, was adopted by the United States over the course of the Oslo 
process and characterizes and underpins twenty years of failure. 
The last important issue that Said raises with the agreement is the way in which it 
dramatically constricts the constituency of the PLO.  Said points out that, with the signing 
of this accord, the Palestinian diaspora, who “who originally brought Arafat and the PLO 
to power” were written out of the peace process entirely.24  He states that it is true that 
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Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza would welcome the partial withdrawal of Israel’s 
soldiers and the economic cooperation.  However, this means little to the millions of 
Palestinian refugees living in the surrounding Arab states who are reduced in the 
agreement to a final status issue to be discussed later.  With Oslo, then, what we see is a 
true gap between national political discourse produced by the PLO and the population it 
is supposed to be representing.  Even within the territories, there was opposition.  Hamas 
opposed the signing of Oslo and would boycott elections for years.
25
  So while this 
discourse was still powerful enough to guide the course of the conflict, it was hardly 
representative of the whole.   
At this point it is perhaps appropriate to return for a third time to the provision of 
the 1968 PNC resolutions regarding a Palestinian state in the territories: 
The creation of such an entity would, moreover, constitute and interim stage during 
which Zionism could evacuate the territory of Palestine occupied during the June 5 war 
of its Arab inhabitants, as a preliminary step to incorporation it in the Israeli entity. In 
addition, this would lead to the creation of a subservient Palestinian Arab administration 
in the territories occupied during the June 5 war on which Israel could rely in combating 
the Palestinian revolution
26
 
It is arguable, and probably true, that the DFLP members who first pushed for the 
founding of a Palestinian state in 1974, the negotiators at Madrid and even the negotiators 
at Oslo had no intention of allowing the creation of “a subservient Palestinian Arab 
administration in the territories.”27  But as the Oslo process began to unfold, and the 
consequences of the asymmetry of power and vagueness of the Declaration of Principles 
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began to manifest themselves, this exactly what appeared.  The subservient entity was 
called the Palestinian National Authority. 
The “Interim” Stage 
Inevitably, the peace process stumbled at the outset.  The process was supposed to 
begin with the establishment of Palestinian self-rule in the Jericho area and Gaza but the 
parties could not agree on the size of the Jericho area until six months after the deadline 
had passed.
28
  The interim agreement that was supposed to set up wider self-rule did not 
come by July 1994 as stipulated but thirteen months later.  The Palestinian Authority 
elections did not occur until January of 1996.
29
  These delays did exactly what the PNC 
warned would happen in 1968.  It allowed Israel to expand settlement and control over 
areas it sought to strengthen Israeli claims and, consequently, weaken Palestinian 
claims.
30
  In 1993, the Israeli settler population in the occupied territories exceeded 
280,000.  By 1997, when final status negotiations were supposed to begin, that number 
was over 335,000.  And by the time these final status negotiations actually started in 
2000, there were nearly 400,000 Israeli settlers living in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank.
31
  The mechanism that allowed for this expansion was the interim 
agreement signed in September of 1995, known as Oslo II.  This agreement subdivided 
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the territory of the West Bank into areas of Palestinian and Israeli control that exist in 
2013; a decade and a half after the interim period was scheduled to end.  
Oslo II is a massive and baffling document.  Whereas the 1993 declaration of 
principles was a handful of pages, Oslo II’s main articles amounted to 27 pages with 284 
pages of annexes tacked on to the end.  It is not by any means a fun read and luckily an 
intensive analysis of the document is not within the scope of our study.  The main 
takeaway for our purposes is the extent to which the document reflected, just as Edward 
Said warned, an updated Allon Plan. 
One would expect such a long document to replace the vagueness that made the 
Declaration of Principles so problematic with some level of specificity.  And it is true that 
Oslo II is full of specific details.  Oslo II spelled out, in excruciating detail, the format for 
identification cards, the number of Palestinian policemen in each self-ruling district, the 
number of vehicles of that precinct and the number of weapons therein.  For example, the 
Ramallah village of Birzeit would have “70 policemen, 3 vehicles, 14 rifles and 23 
pistols.”32  However, the document is frustratingly vague on the future of the territory the 
PLO believed would make up its Palestinian state.   
The most visible consequence of Oslo II is the division of the West Bank into 
three separate zones of varied control, called Area A, Area B and Area C.  Area A was 
made up of large Palestinian population centers, major cities like Nablus, Ramallah, 
Bethlehem, etc.  Area A would be under complete Palestinian civil and security control.  
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Area B was made up of rural areas of Palestinian population, smaller towns and villages.  
The newly established Palestinian Authority (PA) would control civil aspects of life and 
internal security but Israel would have final say over security.  These areas of Palestinian 
control were not made contiguous, but separated by an ocean of complete Israeli control: 
Area C, the largest area with the smallest Palestinian population, was the home to the 
Israeli settlements, military bases and access roads.  It was put under complete Israeli 
civil and military control (fig. 8).
33
   
This huge gap in interpretation of Oslo II speaks to the vagueness over the future 
status of 70% of the West Bank, Area C.  It was also why Arafat could claim that Israel 
promised to withdraw from 80% of the West Bank (that is, all of Areas A and B and the 
parts of Area C without physical Israeli infrastructure) and at the same time Rabin could 
brag that he was able to confine 90% of the Palestinian population of the West Bank to 
30% of the land (Areas A and B).
34
  For Rabin and his government, this was crucial.  And 
the fact that they were able to write the agreement with no future promises about Area C 
came as a surprise even to the Israeli negotiators.  The Palestinian delegation sought 
concrete clauses to guarantee Israeli withdrawal from Area C but the Israeli delegation 
went over the negotiators heads and straight to Arafat who agreed to accept the vague 
promise of future transfer with no real guarantee in writing.
35
  So while the transfer of 
Areas A and B to Palestinian control happened rather quickly, eighteen years later, we are 
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still waiting for Israel’s unilateral decision to withdraw from Area C.36  At the time of 
writing, Israeli annexation of Area C seems far more likely than any withdrawal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8: The Oslo II Demarcations (Source: PASSIA) 
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With this hindsight and a quick look at the map of Oslo II it seems the process 
played out exactly as Said warned it would.  The map of Area A and B share an uncanny 
resemblance with the general areas that were meant to go to Jordan in the Allon Plan and 
because of the lack of any concrete plans for the future of the territory, the “interim 
stage,” which was supposed to last until 1999, is nearing the completion of its second 
decade of life.  Israel was able to get most of the land of the West Bank with a minimal 
amount of Palestinians leaving plenty of room for the expansion of settlements.  In 
presenting the agreement to the Knesset, Rabin is clearer about his interpretation of this 
agreement: 
We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include 
most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and 
alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents 
living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  We would like this to be an entity which is 
less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its 
authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be 
beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 
1967 lines.
37
 
Furthermore, the security border of Israel would be in the Jordan Valley and 
unified Jerusalem would include large East Jerusalem settlements.
38
  He admits that Israel 
agreed to withdraw from some of the 70% of the West Bank completely under its control, 
but proudly states that “we have not committed ourselves, and I repeat, we have not 
committed ourselves to the scope of the redeployment at each stage.”39  Perhaps most 
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tellingly, Rabin, on the occasion of the agreement’s ratification in Knesset, called for “the 
establishment of blocs of settlement in Judea and Samaria.”40   
So it seems that at the end of the day, all we see from Israel in this great period of 
optimism over the prospects for peace is a rehashing of a Labor policy from 1968.  That 
policy, the Allon Plan, called for Israeli settlement and annexation of most of the West 
Bank, with a large unified Jerusalem and a corridor to the Jordan Valley which would 
become Israel’s eastern border.  The only thing that has changed, then, was that instead of 
returning that Palestinian populated areas to Jordan, Rabin and his government, forced by 
the Intifada, to allow the PLO control over these areas.  There would be no Palestinian 
state. And with U.S. backing over Israel’s interpretation of the Oslo II document and the 
asymmetry of diplomatic and military power, Israel has been able to prolong this status 
quo without giving up on these demands for almost twenty years. 
Oslo Post Rabin 
Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4
th
, 1995 by a right-wing Israeli 
angry that Rabin was going to “give our country to the Arabs.”41  Rabin was succeeded 
by Shimon Peres who on schedule withdrew from Areas A and B.  However, six months 
later, Likud won the election and Oslo opponent Benjamin Netanyahu became prime 
minister.
42
  In the summer before Rabin’s assassination, Netanyahu, the current prime 
minister of Israel, participated in anti-Rabin rallies characterized by pictures of Rabin in a 
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Nazi SS uniform in the target of a gun sight and declared that “no Jew hitherto ever 
longed to give up slices of the homeland.”43   
 Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy towards negotiation with the Palestinians was 
Israeli sense of security first, peace process second.  We have noted above that Rabin put 
a huge emphasis the ability of the Palestinian Authority to control security threats to 
Israel and that the state of Israel in all agreements has final security say in the territories.  
But Netanyahu set forward a firm position that the first concern in any agreement is 
Israel’s sense of security.  Any Israeli concession would be dependent on the Palestinians 
appeasing Israeli security concerns.  In presenting his new government to the Knesset, 
Netanyahu stated that “peace is based first of all on the security of Israel and its citizens.  
The test of peace agreements is security, and on this we shall not compromise.”44  He 
blames the closures and movement restrictions Israel imposes on West Bank and Gaza 
Palestinians on Palestinian resistance: “it is the lack of security which causes closures, 
paralysis and economic stagnation.  With security, we will be able to create freedom of 
movement, and open economy and prosperity for all.”45  In the same speech that 
Netanyahu demanded a cessation of hostilities and resistance by Palestinians before the 
conducting negotiations, he also, ironically, demanded that the Palestinians enter 
negotiations “without preconditions.”46   
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 Netanyahu, it seems, made no connection between threats to Israel’s security and 
its expansionist settlement policy.  While calling for Palestinians to end attacks on Israeli 
soldiers and civilians and negotiations without preconditions, he stated that his 
government “will encourage pioneering settlement in the Land of Israel: in the Negev, the 
Galilee, Judea and Samaria, and the Golan.  The settlers are the real pioneers of our day, 
and they deserve support and appreciation.”47  There was no gap between discourse and 
reality for Netanyahu regarding this issue.  He reversed the ban on the construction of 
new settlements that had been in effect for the previous four years.
48
  The bypass roads 
that divided the areas of Palestinian control and connected these settlements to each other 
and to Israel were also expanded by the Netanyahu government.
49
  
 Despite the fact that the Netanyahu government did make agreements with the 
PLO (the Hebron Accord in 1997 to divide the city into Palestinian and Israeli zones of 
control and the Wye Memorandum a year later), post Rabin Oslo was a period of decline 
for the peace process.
50
  Netanyahu refused to implement the withdrawals stipulated in 
the first of these two agreements and delayed the enactment of the second because of 
opposition from his own party.
51
  This opposition forced him to look for support from 
Labor politicians and eventually led to the collapse of his anti-Oslo cabinet.  The 1999 
prime ministerial elections would bring into office Labor leader Ehud Barak who moved 
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away from Netanyahu’s security before negotiation and stated he was willing to “start 
with peace [in order to] achieve security.”52   
 The main take-away from these three years of Likud power is the extent to which 
the party was committed to complete retention of the territories; a policy they justified in 
the name of security.  Even Netanyahu who tried his hardest to put forward a framework 
aimed at completely undermining the Oslo process lost his party’s support for negotiating 
with the PLO.  In fact, the major right wing voices of the Likud Party, such as Yitzhak 
Shamir, left to create a revival of the old Herut Party that advocated for expulsion of 
Palestinians from the territories.
53
  When Netanyahu would eventually become prime 
minister again about a decade later, his policy of Israeli security above all would once 
again provide the Israeli approach to negotiation.  These three years of settlement 
expansion and Israeli unilateralism and rejectionism hardly laid a productive environment 
for the final status discussions that were supposed to begin in 1999.  Despite this, Barak 
and the PLO tried to revive what was left of Oslo in Camp David. 
Camp David and the End of Oslo 
 Ehud Barak came to office seemingly more willing to take risks and give 
territorial concessions in order to achieve peace.  As we noted above, Barak said he was 
willing to “start with peace [in order to] achieve security;” an about face from 
Netanyahu’s policy of the previous three years.54  He also sought to change the 
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piecemeal, step by step process that was originally spelled out in the Oslo Accords.  He 
had no interests in signing more interim agreements.  Rather Barak sought a single 
agreement that would cover all of the issues in one go.
55
  However, Barak had significant 
opposition at home to any territorial concession.  He also accelerated settlement building 
upon taking office to a rate that exceeded the pace under Netanyahu but would eventually 
freeze the issuing of building permits in December of 1999.
56
  
 Fearing complete stagnation of the peace process, US President Bill Clinton 
called Barak and Arafat to Camp David in an effort to reach an agreement on the final 
status issues in July of 2000.
57
  By all accounts, the summit was haphazardly thrown 
together.  The Palestinians were not prepared but came on promises by Clinton that they 
would not take the blame should the talks fall apart (promises that he would break when 
the talks did fall apart).
58
  The Israelis and US officials were less than ready for talks as 
well but Barak’s precarious political position in Israel and United States presidential 
elections on the horizon forced Clinton to call for the summit sooner rather than later.
59
 
 To call what occurred at Camp David “negotiation” would be quite a stretch.  
Barak made Arafat a nonnegotiable, take it or leave it offer.  Barak refused to speak to 
Arafat throughout the summit and refused to put into writing the terms of the proposed 
agreement so as not to give his opponents at home ammunition against him.
60
  Arafat 
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refused the offer.  The PLO had been burned before by vague Israeli promises that were 
never kept, redeployments that were planned and never occurred, and settlement freezes 
that were not upheld.  And while the Oslo process had not always worked out in the 
Palestinians’ favor, they did not want to throw away what they had already achieved in 
writing for vague Israeli assurances on vital issues.
61
  For his decision to walk away, 
Arafat was painted in the American press as a rejectionist, while Barak was seen as a 
brave leader who had made generous concessions to the Palestinians.  This view was 
compounded by Clinton’s blame of Arafat for the failure to reach an agreement.   
 So what was the generous offer that Barak made Arafat and the PLO?  It is fair to 
say that the offer, should we believe that Barak either meant to stick to it despite the fact 
that it was unwritten or that the Israeli public and his political rivals would allow it to be 
enacted, was unprecedented.  Barak did away with the piece by piece process laid out in 
the original Declaration of Principles and gave unofficial (and unwritten) positions 
regarding the whole of the West Bank and the final status issues.  The initial Israeli 
position was to hand 66% of the West Bank over to the Palestinians with Israel 
maintaining control over the major settlement blocks and series of access roads that cut 
the territories into three non-contiguous sections.
 62
  Israel would retain control of the 
territory stretching east from Jerusalem to the Jordan River and a further14% of the land 
would be retained for a period of twelve to twenty years.  Israel would keep permanent 
control over the west bank of the Jordan River and the settlements within Hebron.  After 
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the twenty year period, the Palestinians would potentially have control over 80% of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
63
  With the West Bank divided into these three sections, 
Palestinians would move from canton to canton via a series of tunnels, bridges and Israeli 
controlled checkpoints.
64
  It’s hard to see this potential territory, with its physical 
divisions and permanent foreign military and civil presence, as a sovereign state in even 
the loosest of terms.  Barak would eventually move away from these initial positions to 
offer 89.5% or 91.5% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but these still did not address the 
fundamental Palestinian opposition to the initial proposal.  As we have emphasized 
before, the Palestinian future vision was the establishment of a state on the whole of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.  Even as late as 2000, this 
was still a controversial decision by the PLO. To give up claims over the whole of 
historical Palestine was to cede to Israel 78% of the territory and the original homes of 
the majority of the Palestinian nation who were, and still are, refugees.  Giving up yet 
more territory of the 22% that was left was a step too far for the PLO, as was the 
permanent Israeli civilian and military presence in what was supposed to be the 
independent state of Palestine.
65
  
 Camp David brought to the fore two other crucial issues that had been on the back 
burner throughout the negotiations before: Jerusalem and refugees.  Initially grouped with 
the final status issues, they had not been addressed in depth before Camp David.  It 
became apparent at the summit how far apart the two sides were over these issues.  
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Speaking as an observer who has studied the Israeli-PLO conversations of the last 
twenty-five years, it has become clear to me that there are two issues about which the 
PLO will never compromise because to do so would basically mean the death of the 
organization: the right of return for refugees and control over East Jerusalem.  
Unfortunately for everyone involved, there are two issues about which the Israelis would 
never compromise: no right of return for Palestinian refugees (because this would 
threaten the Jewish demographic nature of the state) and no cession of control on any of 
greater Jerusalem.   With these two issues finally on the table at Camp David, this gaps 
between the Israelis and the PLO became vividly clear. 
 In an effort to appease the Palestinians regarding Jerusalem without actually 
giving up any territory, Barak and his negotiators put forward a plan to create two 
separate capitals, “Jerusalem” and “al-Quds.”  “Al-Quds,” the Arabic name for the city, 
under this Israeli imagination, would be a small Palestinian East Jerusalem village by the 
name of Abu Dis that was completely disconnected from the Old City and the holy sites 
of Jerusalem.
66
  “Jerusalem,” in the Israeli vision, would mean the whole of the territory 
annexed in 1980 plus the large East Jerusalem settlements, which would extend the city 
nearly halfway to the Jordan River and would put “al-Quds” under Israeli control and 
separated from the rest of the Palestinian “state.”67  This was obviously not acceptable for 
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the PLO who demanded sovereignty over the whole of the eastern part of the city as well 
as control its Old City holy sites.
68
   
Regarding the right of return, Arafat would not budge.  Barak proposed that the 
Palestinian refugees be permitted to the Palestinian “state” and a limited number would 
be allowed to return to their actual homes in what was now Israel, but this was not good 
enough to bridge the gap.
69
 Again, this position by Arafat is understandable.  The 
majority of Palestinians, who his organization was designed to represent, were from areas 
that would not be included in the Palestinian “state” proposed by Barak.  If the PLO 
could not succeed in the creation of a single state in the whole of historical Palestinian, 
the least it could do was ensure that its people could return to their homes.  To accept 
anything less would be a death sentence for the organization and perhaps even for Arafat 
himself.   
 Before the conclusion of the talks, Barak made his final offer:  
“seven out of the nine outer neighborhoods [of Jerusalem] would come under Palestinian 
sovereignty; in the inner neighborhoods, they would be in charge of planning and zoning; 
and in the Old City, the Muslim and Christian neighborhoods would come under 
Palestinian sovereignty. [As for] the Temple Mount/Haram [al-Sharif], the UN Security 
Council would pass a resolution to hand custodianship over it jointly to Palestine and 
Morocco [chair of the higher Islamic Commission based in Jerusalem]… there would be 
a “satisfactory solution’ to the refugee problem.”70 
Barak gave this proposal (again unofficial and unwritten) to Clinton to hand on to 
Arafat.  Arafat was not permitted to ask questions of the language or get clarification 
about terms like “custodianship”, “sovereignty” or “satisfactory solution,” because 
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Clinton refused to pass these questions on to Barak.
71
  Arafat knew he could not return to 
his people with these vague assurances of such huge issues so he left the offer on the 
table.  He also refused to accept a Palestinian “state” within which the movement of the 
Palestinian people would be controlled by Israeli border police, soldiers and checkpoints.  
To the Palestinians, that was not sovereignty. His decision to leave the offer was not an 
outright rejection as was so often reported in the aftermath but the only decision he could 
take as he was unable to actually negotiate the terms of the agreement.  The proposal was 
unacceptable to the Palestinians and with no ability to change it, they had to walk away. 
With the serious decline of the Oslo Process that had occurred under Netanyahu 
and the serious opposition Barak faced regarding territorial concessions, the failure of 
Camp David should have come as no surprise.  The two sides were too far apart for a 
short summit with little actual negotiation to bridge any gaps.  Barak’s positions at Camp 
David do in a sense offer a new Israeli future vision considering the fact that it openly 
discussed the establishment of a Palestinian state, which had not been a feature of 
previous Israeli discourse, this change seemed to be supported by the majority of Israelis 
who supported a two state solution at the time.
72
  But that state was still far from the one 
envisioned by the Palestinians as it would still be home to hundreds of thousands of 
Israeli settlers, the territory would be divided and movement would be controlled by 
Israeli security forces.  But even though a majority of Israelis said they supported the 
creation of a Palestinian state as a means to finally achieve peace, clearly what Barak was 
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offering, especially regarding Jerusalem, was giving up too much in the eyes of the Israeli 
electorate.   
In the subsequent elections, Likud politician Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israel’s 
settlement project under Menachem Begin and the man found indirectly responsible for 
the massacres at Sabra and Shatila in 1982, would sweep to victory.  With his arrival in 
office, he would begin his war on the Palestinian Authority, which, combined with the 
Second Intifada that he almost single-handedly sparked with a show of force on the 
Haram al-Sharif, would lead to some of the bloodiest years in the entire history of the 
conflict.  By the end of this second uprising in about a decade, Oslo would become a 
memory of an optimistic time more than a plan to reach a peace agreement in the future.  
248 
 
Chapter 9: The Second Intifada and the Destruction of Oslo; 2000-2012 
The acclaimed Palestinian film Paradise Now, released in 2005, tells the story of 
two childhood friends, born and raised in a refugee camp in Nablus, who were recruited 
for a suicide bombing operation in Tel Aviv.  The film shows the human side of the 
Palestinians who make this desperate choice to take their own lives.  It is not aimed at 
condoning their actions but explaining the environment created by occupation that would 
lead young Palestinian men and women to turn to suicide bombing.  It is never explicitly 
stated the year in which the events of the film take place, but it seems to occur towards 
the end of the nineties, as Palestinian faith in the Oslo Process had worn thin.  The feeling 
of disillusion with the peace process is adeptly summed up by one of the friends while 
recording the video explaining his actions: 
Israel views partnership with and equality for the Palestinians under the same democratic 
system as suicide for the Jewish state. Nor will they accept a two-state compromise even 
though that is not fair to the Palestinians. We are to either accept the occupation forever 
or disappear. We've tried with all possible means to end the occupation with political and 
peaceful means. Despite it all, Israel continues to build settlements, confiscate land, 
Judaize Jerusalem and carry out ethnic cleansing. They use their war machine and their 
political and economic might to force us to accept their solution: that either we accept 
inferiority, or we will be killed.
1
 
Here we see the Palestinian feeling, as represented in film, at the current state of 
things.  Despite all the Palestinians had given up, particularly 78% of their claimed 
homeland, they were no closer to founding a state that would coexist on equal terms with 
Israel.  In fact, following the period of optimism that accompanied the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles, Palestinian life in many ways got worse than before.  First of 
all, from the beginning of the Oslo Process in 1993 to 2000, the number of settlers in the 
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occupied territories doubled, thirty new settlements were built, and 500 kilometers of 
access roads between the settlements and Israel divided the islands of Palestinian 
control.
2
  In addition, Israel began preventing Palestinians from working inside of Israel, 
where they had found employment for the first two and a half decades of occupation.
3
  
The most notable and frustrating phenomenon that appeared over the course of the peace 
process were the series of Israeli controlled barriers and checkpoints that separated 
Palestinians from each other and limited their movement from one island of Palestinian 
control to another.  These checkpoints would be closed at unpredictable times for 
seemingly no reason, effectively confining the Palestinian population of the West Bank to 
Areas A and B.  The Israeli soldiers stationed at these checkpoints would engage in 
random beatings of Palestinians.
4
  Added to the humiliation of occupation that had only 
increased under Oslo was the corruption and ineffectiveness of Arafat’s Palestinian 
Authority.
5
  All of this created a tense situation that would eventually be set off with a 
provocative Israeli spark. 
That spark came while Ehud Barak was still prime minister, but he would not be 
the one to provide it.  Rather, it was opposition leader Ariel Sharon who caused the pot to 
boil over.  Sharon sought to capitalize in the domestic political scene on Ehud Barak’s 
seeming willingness to give Palestinian some level of control over parts of Jerusalem at 
Camp David.  To demonstrate Likud’s commitment to an indivisible Jerusalem and assert 
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Israel’s control over the city, Sharon, accompanied by Likud politicians, press and 1,000 
armed police, ascended the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif on September 28
th
, 2000.
6
   
Palestinian demonstrations in protests of Sharon’s visit broke out immediately.  
Initially these protests reflected the largely non-violent demonstrations of the First 
Intifada.  Israeli soldiers met these demonstrating West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian 
citizens of Israel with live fire, aiming to kill.
7
  As widespread demonstrations were met 
with massive firepower, the Palestinian factions turned armed resistance.  Armed 
resistance in this first period was not universally used by the Palestinians.  According to 
Israeli military reports, only about one quarter of Palestinian demonstrations between 
September and the end of the year included Palestinian use of firearms.  However, 
demonstrations were universally met by the Israelis with lethal force.
8
  By the end of 
2000, 365 people were killed: 325 Palestinians, 36 Israelis and 4 others.
9
  The most 
visible tactics of armed resistance by Palestinians were the suicide bombings within 
Israel.   Nearly all of the Palestinian factions, not just Hamas and Islamic Jihad, planned 
and sponsored their own bombing operations, each desperate not to be upstaged by the 
others in terms of prominence and legitimacy.
10
  The visibility of these bombings and the 
outrage and condemnation they caused, however, clouded the reality about the violence 
of the Second Intifada.  Hardly a contest between equals, the Second Intifada between 
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2000 and 2005 saw three Palestinian deaths for every one Israeli death.
11
  Most crucially 
for our purposes, the Second Intifada gave Sharon the legitimacy he needed to kill Oslo 
once and for all. 
Operation Defensive Shield 
In 2003, Israeli scholar Baruch Kimmerling published a book about Ariel 
Sharon’s military and political career entitled Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the 
Palestinians.  Kimmerling defines “Politicide” as “a process that has, as its ultimate goal, 
the dissolution of the Palestinian people’s existence as a legitimate social, political and 
economic entity.”12  He titles his section on Sharon’s first term as prime minister, 
encompassing the early years of the Second Intifada we have been discussing, “The Third 
Attempt at Politicide.”  Sharon’s first attempt at politicide was in the early years of the 
state of Israel, including the massacre by his unit of 67 Palestinians in the town of 
Qibya.
13
  The second was during his term as defense minister which included the 
invasion of Lebanon and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila.
14
  Now prime minister, and in 
the wake of the September 11
th
 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
(events which led American President George W. Bush to give Sharon free reign to 
suppress the Intifada as he saw fit), Sharon launched his third attempt at the destruction 
of the Palestinian people and it came in the form of Operation Defensive shield.
 15
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Planned much earlier than spring 2002 when it was launched, Operation 
Defensive Shield was a full scale Israeli invasion of the occupied territories aimed at 
retaking Palestinian controlled areas for the stated goal of wiping out “the Palestinian 
terror network.”16  The operation was conducted throughout the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip with no concern over Oslo II’s Area A, B or C designation. 17 Hebron and Jericho 
were the only major Palestinian cities left untouched.  The assault, carried out with 
helicopter gunships, tanks and bulldozers, was characterized by home demolition, mass 
arrests and the leveling of city blocks.
18
  The most notable incident of the operation was 
the Israeli siege of the Jenin refugee camp, the only place the Israelis encountered real 
armed resistance to the operation.  In response, the IDF reduced nearly the entire camp to 
rubble, leaving 5,000 Palestinians homeless.
19
 
The operation, as described by Kimmerling, “not only destroyed political 
organizations and their facilities but civilian institutions like universities, schools, clinics, 
churches and mosques under the pretext that terrorists were hidden inside.”20  Sharon’s 
determination to crush the Palestinian resistance by destroying its institutions had tacit 
approval from the neoconservative Bush administration.  Sharon found it easy enough to 
apply the old stance “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” to the Palestinian Authority, who 
he held responsible for the violence and pressed on, military and unilaterally asserting 
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Israel’s control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.21  Kimmerling puts forward a grim 
vision of Sharon’s plan for the future of the territories:  
All of these conditions are, according to Sharon, designed to lower Palestinian 
expectations, crush their resistance, isolate them, make them submit to any arrangement 
suggested by the Israelis, and eventually cause their “voluntary” mass emigration from 
the land.  Sharon is pragmatic and aware that international opinion will not accept either 
large-scale ethnic cleansing or the transformation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
into a Palestinian state.
22
 
The Separation Barrier 
The most visible lasting legacy of this unilateral violent Israeli assertion is the 
separation barrier that began construction under Sharon.  Israel announced in April or 
2002 that it would build a series of walls, barbed wire and electric fences and trenches in 
an attempt to completely isolate the Palestinians of the West Bank from Israel.
23
  Rather 
than build the wall along the so-called 1967 borders, the line that separates Israel proper 
from the occupied territories, the planned route of the wall cut deeply into the West Bank 
in certain areas to incorporate large settlement blocks, water aquifers, and Palestinian 
land along a 450 mile route.
24
  This winding route of the wall leaves 8.5 % of the West 
Bank on the west side of the barrier, essentially annexing that land to Israel.  Along with 
that land comes about 250,000 Palestinians, including those of East Jerusalem now 
separated from the rest of the West Bank.
25
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The stated goal of the separation barrier, as is the case in so many instances, was 
Israel’s security.  It was presented as a plan to prevent suicide bombings by stopping 
potential bombers from entering Israeli territory.  And the facts about suicide bombings, 
at face value, seem to indicate that it has been successful in this account.  The Israelis 
estimate that the number of Israelis killed by terrorist attacks in Israel has been reduced 
60% since the construction of the barrier and suicide bombings have been reduced by 
90%.
26
  However, a second look reveals another story.  The separation barrier was not 
built overnight.  Writing in 2013, it is still not complete.  As such, there were, and still 
are, gaps in the barrier that are easy enough to get around especially when Israel was 
touting these statistics in the second half of the last decade.  As Kimmerling notes in a 
discussion about checkpoints, “in reality, the checkpoints provide no real security 
because Palestinians intending to cause harm have 101 alternative ways to enter Israel.”27  
Additionally, as we noted above, a quarter of a million Palestinians, including Jerusalem 
residents, live on the “Israeli” side of the barrier and as such, the barrier hardly separates 
Palestinians from Israelis or Palestinians from Israel proper.  With an unfinished wall and 
a large population not divided from Israel, it would seem that separation barrier cannot 
fully explain the drop in suicide bombings within Israel that occurred as it was being 
built.  Far more likely, was the truce called by Hamas with Israel in 2005 and the 
agreement by the Palestinian factions, with the exception of Islamic Jihad, to a state of 
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calm.
28
  It was not that the Palestinians could not enter Israel to conduct suicide 
operations; rather, they chose not to. 
So what was the purpose of the wall if it did not ensure the security of the Israeli 
people?  Kimmerling points to arguments that the barrier and checkpoints exist to calm 
the Israeli population by giving them a sense that their government is protecting them.
29
  
This is likely an element of the decision but it is probably not the whole story.  Rather, it 
was more likely a unilateral act by Sharon’s government to establish new facts on the 
ground, just as settlements had done the same for the previous three and a half decades of 
occupation.
30
  The act of encircling major settlement blocks and East Jerusalem in 
concrete sends both a symbolic and practical message to the Palestinians and the world: 
these are ours, permanently.  This attempt at permanently tying the settlements to the 
state of Israel was another way, like Operation Defensive Shield, of undermining 
Palestinian political society and the Oslo process.  It was, and still is, aimed at 
challenging the viability of a Palestinian state and separating Palestinians from the land 
of the West Bank to make it easier for future permanent Israeli absorption.  Despite the 
kicking Sharon gave to Oslo in the first few years of the 21
st
 century, attempts were made 
to push some sort of process along but these, understandably, amounted to little.  We will 
take a quick look at them and then move on. 
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The Roadmap and Aqaba Summit 
The Road Map to Peace, or to give it its official title, “A Performance-Based 
Road Map to a Permanent Two State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” was a 
plan written and agreed upon by the “Quartet” (Russia, the EU, the UN and the United 
States) in summer 2002.
31
  As described by Charles D. Smith: 
The Road Map set out three development phases.  To undertake Phase 1, the Palestinian 
leadership would “issue [an] unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist.”  
Israel, for its part, would issue a similar statement “affirming its commitment to the two-
state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state as expressed by 
President Bush.”32  
The term “performance-based” meant that the Israelis and Palestinians would 
undertake steps simultaneously.  This rubbed Sharon the wrong way.  He stated that 
“Israel can no longer be expected to make political concessions until there is proven calm 
and Palestinian governmental reforms.”33  This was the stance that Netanyahu took: 
Palestinian cessation of resistance first, peace process second.  Sharon also did not like 
that the plan demanded that Israel “dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 
2001,” and completely freeze on all settlement building, including natural growth.34  
Finally, Sharon objected to the language describing the Palestinian state as “independent, 
viable [and] sovereign.”35   
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Because of these objections, Israel “accepted” the Road Map, providing the 
United States cave to a list of fourteen demands.  Most crucial of these were points five, 
which emphasized that the Palestinian “state” would have “certain aspects of sovereignty, 
be fully demilitarized… and Israeli control over the entry and exit of all persons and 
cargo, as well of its air space and electromagnetic spectrum” (hardly an independent, 
sovereign state) and point six which demanded a waiver of the right of Palestinian 
refugees to return to the state of Israel.
36
  Despite the fact that the Quartet stated the Road 
Map was not to be altered, Bush caved into Israeli lobbying.
37
  In his Aqaba Summit 
address on the Road Map, Bush made a distinction between authorized and illegal Israeli 
outposts built since 2001 and in his subsequence speech in the Rose Garden, he described 
the future Palestinian state as “stable, peaceful, viable, [and] democratic,” but not 
independent or sovereign.
38
  This was less the articulation of an Israeli future vision 
regarding a Palestinian state and more an attempt to prevent such a state from ever 
appearing.  The fourteen points demanded that a Palestinian state could only be 
established through direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israel.
39
  With Oslo 
completely sidelined, if not destroyed, and Sharon’s refusal to speak to Arafat, no 
negotiations meant that there would be no Palestinian state.  
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The Gaza Disengagement Plan 
Sharon’s last significant act aimed at erasing Oslo and the prospect of a 
Palestinian state was his unilateral evacuation of all Israeli settlers and soldiers from the 
Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the north of the West Bank.  While this might 
seem like a productive step for the eventual founding of a state that would include the 
Gaza Strip, a deeper look shows it was a way to trade a piece of territory filled with a 
population that gave Israel nothing but trouble for permanent control over the West Bank.  
First of all, the disengagement was hardly a complete disengagement, as Israel would still 
control the borders, imports, exports, airspace, trade and electricity of Gaza.
40
  The plan 
itself was written first in November of 2003 and announced to the Israeli public in April, 
2004.
41
  Sharon took the plan to President Bush before he announced it to the Israeli 
public as he wanted Israel to be free from the 2005 Road Map deadlines for final status 
negotiations, allowing Israel to postpone these talks indefinitely, and he wanted U.S. 
permission to annex the larger settlement blocks in the West Bank in exchange for ceding 
those in Gaza.
42
  He received almost exactly what he wanted from President Bush.  While 
the U.S. president stopped short of using the word “annex,” he did issue a statement 
welcoming the plan and stating that “it is unreasonable to expect that the outcome of the 
final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the 1949 armistice lines… It 
is realistic to expect that any final status agreements will only be achieved on the basis of 
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mutually agreed changes that reflected these realities.”43  What we see with this statement 
is an acknowledgement by the United States that nearly forty years of “facts on the 
ground” settlement policy had worked.  Israel had tied itself too closely to the West 
Bank, in the eyes of the United States, to be separated from it.  With the Gaza 
disengagement plan, then, Israel received U.S approval for unilateral action determining 
the future status of the territories without consultation with the Palestinians.  Essentially, 
it was U.S. approval to disregard Oslo.  One of Sharon’s aid’s Dov Wiesglass describes 
the consequences of the disengagement plan thusly: 
The significant of our disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace-process… it 
supplies the formaldehyde necessary so there is no political process with the 
Palestinians… when you freeze the process, you prevent the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders, and 
Jerusalem.  All with [an American] presidential blessing and the ratifications of both 
houses of Congress.
44
 
This plan would be one of Sharon’s last acts as leader of Israel.  The plan, despite 
the seemingly favorable implications for Israel’s future control over the territory of the 
West Bank, was not popular at home, particularly among the right wing pro-settler 
corners of the Likud party.  Netanyahu capitalized on this to retake leadership of the 
party, at which point Sharon formed a new party, Kadima, which included old Likud and 
Labor members.
45
  Kadima would eventually win the 2006 elections but before they were 
called, Sharon had a stroke and fell into a coma and remains in that state until today.
46
  
Sharon was succeeded by Ehud Olmert, the former mayor of Jerusalem who 
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accompanied Sharon on his trip to the temple mount in 2001.
47
  Olmert would continue 
Israel’s policy of unilateral action, announcing that the separation barrier would no longer 
be a temporary measure but a permanent boundary.
48
  The Israeli parliamentary elections 
were not the only ones that took place in the land of historical Palestine in 2006.  The PA 
held elections as well, and their results would have profound effects on the course of the 
conflict. 
2006 Palestinian Authority Elections 
We have not discussed Hamas much throughout the course of the Oslo process 
primarily because they were, mostly by their own choice, not involved.  Hamas, unlike 
the PLO, did not accept the two state solution as the best way to solve the conflict.  It 
refused to recognize the state of Israel or renounce armed struggle because it maintained 
its original future vision from its 1989 charter; a Palestinian state on the whole of 
historical Palestine.  It was not, and still is not, a member of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization and did not participate in the 1996 legislative elections.  This was not out of 
opposition to the concept of democracy as Hamas fielded candidates in local municipal 
elections since its creation but rather because of opposition to the terms of Oslo 
Accords.
49
  Hamas decided to field candidates in the 2006 elections.  The Bush 
administration, who had spent the last four years championing democracy in the Middle 
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East, most notably by invading and occupying Iraq, accepted Hamas’ candidacy.50  
However, when Hamas, running on a list entitled “Change and Reform,” won a majority 
in the parliament, the United States immediately sanctioned the Palestinian Authority by 
withdrawing funding and encouraging the European Union to do the same.
51
  Israel 
cracked down as well by withholding tax revenue collected by Israel on behalf of the PA 
which amounted to about $50 million a month.
52
  Israel’s cabinet also designated the now 
Hamas dominated Palestinian Legislative Council a “terrorist authority” and refused to 
negotiate with it unless it recognized the state of Israel, adjusted its charter accordingly, 
renounced terrorism and recognized the agreements of the previous decade between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians.
53
  
 While the election was not as much of a landslide in favor of Hamas as the make-
up of the parliament would suggest (Fatah made serious mistakes including running two 
or more Fatah candidates for the same seat), the level of support came as a huge surprise 
to everyone.  The Palestinian support for Hamas, however, did not indicate a massive 
shift from secularism to Islamism in the territories.  Rather, as the name of Hamas’ 
candidacy indicated, Palestinians were tired of the Fatah lead PA’s ineffectuality and 
corruption.  They also felt that Mahmoud Abbas (who took over from Arafat as the leader 
of the PA at the US and Israel’s urging) was acting according to Israel’s demands and not 
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the needs of the Palestinian people.
54
  Hamas, however, had gained respect from the 
Palestinian population for its active resistance to the occupation and the free health and 
social services it provided.
55
   
The new Hamas government suffered heavily from the sanctions imposed by 
Israel and the United States which led to skyrocketing unemployment and poverty rates.
56
  
Israel also closed off Gaza from exporting and importing goods as well as people.  It 
stated that this was to stop suicide bombers (even though the number of suicide bombers 
that came from Gaza in the previous three years was next to zero) but more likely it was 
aimed at shaking Hamas from power by making them seem responsible for the growing 
hardship caused by Israeli and US sanctions.
57
  Blockaded and isolated, the factions in 
Gaza began instead launching rockets into Israeli territories, which, though largely 
ineffectual, inspired brutal Israeli responses.
58
  The most notable of these brutal attacks 
came in December of 2008 when Israel broke a truce and engaged in a ground invasion of 
the Gaza Strip to prove Kadima’s mettle to the Israeli electorate.  After the three weeks of 
Israeli muscle-flexing to impress its constituents, 1,400 Palestinians were dead, compared 
to 13 Israelis (although four were of these were killed by Israeli friendly fire).
59
  The 
attack failed to shake Palestinian support for Hamas in Gaza and Kadima failed to win a 
decisive majority or to form a coalition.
60
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 We need to take a quick step back, however, to 2007 where Hamas and Fatah 
were operating, despite tensions, under the umbrella of a unity government brokered by 
the Saudis.
61
  The Bush administration desired to completely overthrow Hamas with help 
from Israel and Fatah and there were reports that Fatah brigades were being trained in the 
United States for an attack on Hamas in Gaza.
62
  Hamas, however, preempted this attack 
and forced the remaining Fatah personnel out of the strip.  This left us with the situation 
we see today where Hamas rules in Gaza and Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah control the 
West Bank.
63
 
 Before we move on to the re-election of Netanyahu in 2009, we should look 
briefly at the program Hamas articulated before the schism in the Palestinian Authority.  
While it was true that Hamas did refuse to recognize Israel and give up claims to the 
whole of historical Palestine, Prime Minister-elect Ismail Hanieh’s speech announcing 
the Hamas platform for the united government indicated that Hamas was open to 
accepting the PLO’s future vision for peace: 
The government will work with the Arab brothers and with the international community 
for the sake of ending the occupation and regaining the legitimate rights of Palestinian 
people, mainly the establishment of the independent Palestinian state with full 
sovereignty on the territories that were occupied in 1967 with al-Quds as its capital, so 
that we can build a solid basis for peace, security and prosperity in the region for the sake 
of coming generations.
64
 
 While this makes no reference to Israel, the idea of building a Palestinian state as 
a basis for peace is a changed tune from the original Hamas charter.  In fact, over the last 
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several years of Hamas’ rule in Gaza, Hamas has made serious indications that they 
would accept a negotiated two state solution, although they have not said it in so many 
words.  While they have not formally recognized the Oslo Accords or joined the PLO, 
Hamas has offered Israel a long-term ceasefire, which is not the same as a negotiated 
solution but it is an idea that high level Israeli officials have seriously considered as a 
solution.
65
  Additionally, the head of the Hamas political bureau Khaled Meshal has said 
on numerous occasions that Hamas would respect a negotiated two state solution if that is 
the accepted by the majority of Palestinians.
66
  It seems, then, that Hamas was forced to 
go through similar changes regarding future visions that the PLO went through a couple 
decades earlier.  While these changes by the PLO were made in search international 
recognition, for Hamas these came with the reality of holding political office and the 
desire to maintain it in the face of its rivals.   
The Second Netanyahu Era 
Despite the fact that Kadima won one more seat than Netanyahu’s Likud in the 
2009 elections, party leader Tzipi Livni’s failure to form a coalition opened the door for 
Netanyahu take the office of prime minister.
67
  Netanyahu was able to form a coalition by 
including parties even further right than Likud, most notably Shas, an ultra-orthodox 
party, and Yisrael Beiteinu, which represents primarily soviet immigrants.  The election 
signaled a change in the Israeli relationship to the peace process.  We analyzed in detail 
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Sharon’s attempt to completely derail the Road Map to peace yet his successor, Ehud 
Olmert, actually signaled a willingness to cede territory according to the Road Map 
formula for peace with the Palestinians.  And while the land he proposed to cede never 
came close meeting the Palestinian vision of a state and issues like Jerusalem and right of 
return for refugees were non-starters, this seeming willingness to give up some control in 
exchange for peace had disappeared during Sharon’s time in office.  However, with 
Netanyahu’s return to the office of prime minister came a return to his policy of Israel’s 
security first, peace process second.  He had no interest in withdrawing from any West 
Bank settlements, particularly not those surrounding East Jerusalem, and demanded from 
the new Obama administration a renewal of Bush’s 2004 statement that it would be 
unrealistic to expect a return to the 1967 borders.
68
  This demand immediately put 
Netanyahu in conflict with newly elected U.S. President Barak Obama who had stated 
that peace should be based on the 1967 borders and required a viable Palestinian state.
69
  
Initial American efforts to get an Israeli settlement freeze came to nothing.  Though 
Netanyahu agreed to a ten month freeze, it was only partial as it did not extend to East 
Jerusalem and did not apply to thousands of new units already approved for 
construction.
70
  The ten months came and went and no talks took place and no progress 
was made.   
The issue of settlements was not the only thing holding back negotiations between 
Netanyahu and the PA.  A speech Netanyahu delivered in 2009 at Bar-Ilan University 
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about his vision of peace highlights the other issues preventing agreements between the 
Israelis and Palestinians not only on the final status issues but also on the correct path to 
reach them.  We noted above that Netanyahu demanded from the Palestinians a complete 
session of resistance to the occupation on the part of the Palestinians and a complete 
surrender to the security concerns of the state of Israel before any negotiations could take 
place.  This is the first major disconnect that we will see over Netanyahu’s time in office 
between him and the Palestinians.  For the Palestinians, as we have discussed before, 
statehood was a necessary step to reach peace, as an occupied people could not negotiate 
on equal terms with the occupying country.  In this speech, Netanyahu added two more 
conditions that effectively derailed the peace process as long as he was in office. 
Netanyahu states in the course of his speech that in his “vision of peace, in this 
small land of ours, two peoples live freely, side-by-side, in amity and mutual 
respect.  Each will have its own flag, its own national anthem, its own government.”71  
More than anything else this statement shows the extent to which the two state solution 
paradigm had been engrained in the discourse of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that 
someone with Netanyahu’s views would have to pay lip service to it.  As we will see 
shortly, Netanyahu had no intention of allowing the creation of a Palestinian state except 
in the loosest of terms (certainly not one that would be independent and sovereign) and 
would make every attempt to ensure that negotiations would never reach the point of 
Israel needing to actually cede territory. Despite this, however, he needed, perhaps due to 
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U.S. pressure or to appease parts of the Israeli electorate, to mention his support for the 
creation of a Palestinian state. 
Regarding negotiations, he says to the Palestinians, “I turn to you, our Palestinian 
neighbors, led by the Palestinian Authority, and I say: Let's begin negotiations 
immediately without preconditions.”72  By this, he means that Israel is demanding 
negotiations begin without stipulations such as a settlement freeze or the 1967 borders as 
the basis of a solution.  With that said, he then sets about listing three preconditions of the 
Palestinians without a trace of irony.  The first of these is the most peculiar and one we 
have hardly encountered before in six decades of Israeli national political discourse.  He 
states that “a fundamental prerequisite for ending the conflict is a public, binding and 
unequivocal Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.”73  
We have seen time after time demands from the Israelis that its enemies, whether it was 
the PLO, Egypt or Jordan, recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist.  However, the 
demand that the PLO recognize Israel as a Jewish state is new and rather nefarious.  First 
of all, it is a rather silly demand.  It is difficult to think of any other state that would 
demand another state to recognize how it self-identifies.  Secondly, and more 
importantly, it is a demand to which no Palestinian leader will ever acquiesce because the 
consequences would be devastating.  The PLO paints itself as the representative of the 
Palestinian people.  That means it has to take into account the will of not only West Bank 
and Gaza Palestinians but also Palestinians in the refugee Diaspora and within the state of 
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Israel.  There are more than a million and a half Palestinians living as citizens of the state 
of Israel and while there were Jews of Palestinians origin, those people who identify as 
Palestinian nationals are almost entirely non-Jewish.
74
  Therefore recognizing Israel as a 
Jewish state would mean recognizing that these 1.6 million non-Jewish Palestinians do 
not belong in the land they call home.  That is to say, it would be a statement by the PLO 
that the Palestinians have no tie to the parts of historical Palestine that became the state of 
Israel.  While it is true that the PLO officially gave up claims to that territory as part of a 
Palestinian state in 1989, they have not, and likely never will, give up the demand that 
Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes in historical Palestine.  To 
recognize Israel as a Jewish state would be negation of this right because it would be an 
acknowledgement that Israel is not home to the refugees forced from the state.  No 
Palestinian leader would give up this demand for the fulfillment of the right of return for 
the Palestinian refugees.  A cynic would speculate that Netanyahu knows this and that 
this prerequisite is designed to prevent negotiations from taking place, therefore 
preventing the possibility of Israel ceding control of any territory. 
This cynical view is fed by the second precondition that Netanyahu puts forward 
in his speech: “Tiny Israel successfully absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jewish 
refugees who left their homes and belongings in Arab countries. Therefore, justice and 
logic demand that the Palestinian refugee problem be solved outside Israel's borders.”75  
In other words, Palestinian refugees will not be permitted to return to their home inside 
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Israel.  As noted above, this is a condition to which no Palestinian leader will ever agree.  
It is probably the most widespread demand amongst the Palestinian population, above 
even control over East Jerusalem.  With the refugee issue a non-starter, no agreement will 
be reached on the Palestinian state and therefore no state will be founded. 
Netanyahu’s final precondition seems less controversial and less aimed at 
preventing a peace process.  He states that “the territory under Palestinian control must be 
demilitarized with ironclad security provisions for Israel.”  The notion of a demilitarized 
state has been accepted by Palestinian negotiators before.  However, “ironclad security 
provisions for Israel,” although unspecified, would likely make the Palestinian “state” 
neither sovereign nor independent.  Amongst the probable demands made under these 
auspices would be a permanent IDF presence in the Jordan valley, control of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip’s airspace, control over the entries and exists to the “state” and a 
permanent military presence to protect the Israeli settlements that will have not been 
evacuated.  While we are mostly speculating on Netanyahu’s exact intentions, these are 
all conditions we have encountered in 45 years of Israeli documents on the future of the 
territories.    
 Netanyahu finishes up his speech with a helpful summation of the preconditions 
for the negotiations that would occur without preconditions: “If we receive this guarantee 
regarding demilitarization and Israel's security needs, and if the Palestinians recognize 
Israel as the State of the Jewish people, then we will be ready in a future peace agreement 
to reach a solution where a demilitarized Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish 
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state.”76  The unavoidable suspicion is that Netanyahu’s intention is to prevent 
negotiations in order to avoid even the possibility of Israel ceding control of any territory 
in the West Bank.  When the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators finally met in the 
beginning of 2012, the Israelis stated that “their guiding principle for drawing the borders 
of a future two-state solution would be for existing settlement blocks to become part of 
Israel.”77  Unsurprisingly, the Palestinians rejected this.  Refusing to negotiate while 
settlements were still being constructed and tired of Netanyahu’s demands, the 
Palestinian Authority in 2011 would take a page from the Israeli handbook and make a 
unilateral act aimed at altering the situation on the ground.   
The Statehood Bid 
The most common unilateral action on the part of Israel we have seen up to this 
point has been land expropriation for the purpose of settlement, the goal of which was to 
create facts on the ground that would make it impossible to separate the West Bank from 
Israel’s control.  By any measure, that activity has been extremely successful.  By the end 
of 2012, more than 650,000 Israeli settlers lived in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
which, in the minds of many (including former President Bush as he wrote to Sharon in 
the context of the Gaza disengagement), makes the complete retreat of the settlement 
enterprise impossible.
78
  In 2011, The Palestinian Authority, faced with this constant 
settlement expansion the expression of Israeli control it represented, decided to make a 
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unilateral action of its own.  As it lacked the military might and sovereignty that allowed 
Israel to prove ties through the building of homes, it turned outside to the United Nations 
in an effort to gain international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinians to statehood in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
79
  In September of that 
year, PA President Mahmoud Abbas submitted Palestine’s application to the UN Security 
Council for full membership of the UN as a state “on the basis of the 4 June 1967 
borders, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.”80   
An U.S. diplomatic push against the application stalled the statehood bid 
indefinitely.  The members of the Security Council stated that they could not “make a 
unanimous recommendation,” regarding the prospect of full membership for Palestine.  
More than anything else, the episode was an embarrassment for Obama and his 
administration who found themselves openly blocking the bid despite stating previously 
that they supported the creation of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders.
81
  
In fact, Obama gave a speech to the UN the day that Abbas submitting Palestine’s 
application undermining that initiative and stating that only direct negotiations between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians could bring about a solution to the conflict.  Unlike in 
previous speeches, including one earlier that year, he made no mention of the 1967 
borders in this speech.  This was likely due to pressure from Netanyahu who, just a few 
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months previous, had told the U.S. congress, to multitudes of applause, that Israel could 
not and would not return to the borders that had existed before the 1967 War.
82
 
Both Abbas and Netanyahu gave speeches to the General Assembly on the 
occasion of Palestine’s statehood application to the Security Council.  Looking at these 
speeches side by side is what first inspired this study.  These two speeches highlighted 
the fact that not only are the two sides miles apart on the so-called final status issues, but 
they are at-odds about the process that would bring them to the table.  To Abbas, the 
settlement enterprise is “is the primary cause for the failure of the peace process, the 
collapse of dozens of opportunities, and the burial of the great hopes that arose from the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization and Israel.”83 He fears that “The occupation is racing against time to redraw 
the borders on our land according to what it wants and to impose a fait accompli on the 
ground that changes the realities and that is undermining the realistic potential for the 
existence of the State of Palestine.”84   
Abbas also makes reference to Netanyahu’s new precondition for negotiation, 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish state:  
In addition, we now face the imposition new conditions not previously raised, conditions 
that will transform the raging conflict in our inflamed region into a religious conflict and 
a threat to the future of a million and a half Christian and Muslim Palestinians, citizens of 
Israel, a matter which we reject and which is impossible for us to accept being dragged 
into.
85
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The fear by Abbas is that the continuation of the occupation and therefore the 
continuation of Israel’s ability to expand and settle unchecked will lead to the death of 
the two state solution.  He believes that as long as Israel has this absolute power, the 
Palestinians will not be able to negotiate a just solution based on the 1967 borders and 
that the PLO’s future vision for an independent state would disappear.  This is why, then, 
that he takes the case of Palestinian statehood to the UN and ends his speech by saying to 
the member states that “your support for the establishment of the State of Palestine and 
for its admission to the United Nations as a full member is the greatest contribution to 
peacemaking in the Holy Land.”86  He has come to find that the PLO’s 1968 warnings 
about a Palestinian authority and Palestinian Madrid negotiator Haidar Abdul Shafi’s 
concerns have come to be realized.  There can be no just peace negotiated with such an 
imbalance of power.  By taking this step, Abbas, on behalf of the PLO sought to rectify 
this power imbalance, if not on the ground then at least in the international community, to 
reassert Palestinian claims to the parts of the West Bank lost to settlement.  Once this 
equal footing is achieved and settlements cease, the Palestinians will be in a position to 
negotiate with Israel, state to state. 
Netanyahu’s speech reiterates the policy of reciprocity that has characterized both 
of his terms in office: Israel’s security first, peace process second.  Early on in the speech 
Netanyahu says of the Palestinian statehood bid that “the Palestinians want a state 
without peace.”87  Later on, Netanyahu describes the apparent security concerns that 
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Israel faces, especially the issue of defensible borders and the need for a permanent 
military presence in the West Bank, and states that “all these potential cracks in Israel's 
security have to be sealed in a peace agreement before a Palestinian state is declared, not 
afterwards, because if you leave it afterwards, they won't be sealed. And these problems 
will explode in our face and explode the peace.” 88  And the statement that most clearly 
betrays his mindset comes soon after:  “The Palestinians should first make peace with 
Israel and then get their state.”89  
Netanyahu here reiterates his policy of Israel’s security first, Palestinian rights to 
self-determination second.  He makes it clear that in order for Palestinians to “get” their 
state, they must “make peace,” that is, end resistance to the occupation. Additionally, by 
arguing that settlements are not the issue preventing the resolution of the conflict but “a 
result of the conflict,” Netanyahu is articulating his belief that the building of settlements 
is a part of Israel’s security.90  Therefore, in order to fulfill Israel’s security concerns and 
“get their state,” the Palestinians must allow Israeli annexation of settlement blocks and 
thus its definition of defensible borders.  In effect, Netanyahu is demanding that the 
Palestinians cede not only the 78% of their homeland that became the state of Israel but 
significant parts of the 22% that they have left.  Once they do this, abandon the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, and end resistance to the occupation, it is paramount to 
Netanyahu to seal this surrender in a peace agreement, thus rendering illegal any attempt 
to reclaim territory in the West Bank or East Jerusalem that would now be as much a part 
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of Israel as Tel Aviv. Only then would Netanyahu give them whatever is left for their 
“state.”  That is as long as they accept complete Israeli control of their airspace and a 
permanent Israeli military presence in the West Bank.  This is not a peace, but a 
pacification of the Palestinians.   
Netanyahu’s use of the word “get” in this context is particularly telling.  He 
believes that the West Bank is something that belongs to Israel and therefore something 
they would be giving away. A Palestinian state would not be on Palestinian land but 
gifted Israeli land.  The persistence of this mentally speaks to the imbalance of power 
inherent in the initial Oslo documents.  While the Palestinians were forced to cede claims 
to what is now the state of Israel, Israel was able to keep its claims (and settlement 
enterprise) in the West Bank.  A report commissioned by Netanyahu’s government 
clarified this mentality.  Called the Levy Report after the panel’s head Edmund Levy, the 
document concludes that not only do Israelis “have the legal right to settle in Judea and 
Samaria” and that “the establishment of settlements cannot, in and of itself, be considered 
to be illegal,” but also that Israel’s control over the West Bank is not an occupation under 
international law.
91
  And while Barak Obama’s administration rejected these findings, his 
diplomatic blitz to prevent the acceptance of Mahmoud Abbas’s application for statehood 
and his decision to back down from his demand that peace be based on the 1967 borders 
seem to indicate that the framework put forward by Netanyahu has tacit U.S. approval.
92
  
Unfortunately for the prospects of peace, this is a framework to which no Palestinian 
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leader will ever acquiesce.  The Palestinian people are not willing to lose any more of 
their land or cede control of East Jerusalem permanently to Israel.   
A year after the original statehood bid at the United Nations, President Mahmoud 
Abbas returned to the UN was a different application for statehood.  This time he went to 
the UN General Assembly looking to upgrade the PLO’s observer status to Palestine as a 
non-member observer state, a status they would share with the Vatican.
93
  Going to the 
General Assembly rather than the Security Council meant that there would be no 
opportunity for a veto from the United States like there was with the Security Council.  
This did not mean the U.S. would let this go uncontested.  It undertook an all-out 
diplomatic push in an attempt to stop both the Palestinian Authority from going forward 
with the initiative and the members of the UN from voting in favor of it.  This did not 
work as 138 members voted in favor with 41 abstentions to nine against (Czech Republic, 
the United States, Israel, Canada, Panama, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands and 
Micronesia).
94
  The real story here was not necessarily who voted in favor, but those who 
abstained rather than voting against.  Countries like Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Australia who have traditionally strongly supported Israel choose to sit out the vote rather 
than vote against the statehood bid.
95
  Despite this overwhelming support, however, the 
actual effects of this status upgrade remain to be seen on the ground.  There is a chance 
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that the newly recognized Palestinian “state” attempts to join the International Criminal 
Court in order to prosecute Israel over aspects of the occupation but as of writing this has 
yet to occur.
96
  The real question, however, is whether the time for a two state solution 
has passed despite this global support for a Palestinian state.  Is it possible to remove 
650,000 settlers from the West Bank?  Can the future vision of Palestinians and Israelis 
ever truly be reconciled so a solution can be reached in the Oslo framework?  Twenty 
years on from the signing of the original Declaration of Principles, optimism on this issue 
is hard to muster. 
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Epilogue: The Death of Paradigm? 2012-2013 
In September of 2012 I attended a conference at the office of the General 
Delegation of the PLO to the United States in Washington DC. This wordy title is due to 
the fact that the United States has not recognized a Palestinian state and therefore there 
can be no Palestinian embassy in the capital.  At the conference, the head of the 
delegation (referred to as Ambassador by the staff but, for the reason described above, 
not graced with that title by the U.S. government) outlined the Palestine Liberation 
Organization’s positions on the status of the peace process nineteen years on from Oslo.  
And while the PLO and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas still participate 
in the process that began in 1993 with the signing of the Declaration of Principles, it was 
clear that their faith in the ability of that document to bring about a Palestinian state was 
waning.  The office no longer refers to negotiations between the two parties as the “Peace 
Process” but instead as the “Political Process.”  The clear implication of this discursive 
change is that the PLO sees negotiations not as a productive route that will eventually 
lead to a peaceful solution but rather a fruitless political exercise that will lead to nothing.  
Twelve years on from the supposed end of the interim process that the Palestinians 
believed would bring them a state, it is hard to argue with this assertion.  Perhaps what 
we see with the Palestinian Authority today is exactly what the 1968 PNA resolutions 
warned against.  It is an entity that owes “its existence to the legitimization and 
perpetuation of the state of Israel.”1  Its creation has led to “an interim stage during which 
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Zionism could evacuate the territory of Palestine occupied during the June 5 war of its 
Arab inhabitants, as a preliminary step to incorporation it in the Israeli entity.”2  And its 
obligation to security cooperation with Israel has certainly on numerous occasions meant 
that it is an authority “on which Israel could rely in combating the Palestinian 
revolution.”3 
This is obviously not what Arafat and the PLO intended to create when they 
signed the Declaration of Principles in 1993 but the power imbalance and the lack of 
accountability from which Israel benefited has led to the situation we see today.  As we 
will cover shortly, the Israeli settlement enterprise in this interim period has been 
accompanied, especially in the last couple months, with a groundswell of support for the 
complete integration of some, if not all, of the West Bank into the state of Israel.  This 
perhaps best explains the mindset behind the PA going to the UN for statehood.  The PA 
wants to remove its legitimacy for existence from the Oslo Process; a process which has 
led to a consolidation of Israeli power in the territory they claim rather than the creation 
of the state they believe they were promised.  It wants to stand on its own and negotiate 
from a position of equal footing in an attempt to save the 22% of historical Palestine they 
claim for a state.   
However, the Palestinian Authority does, for better or worse, owe its legitimacy 
to the state of Israel and the negotiation process which is why it put out a short booklet 
describing the Palestinian position on issues regarding the conflict.  Just as with all 
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Palestinian documents we have discussed since 1988, the vision remains more or less 
unchanged.  The booklet reaffirms the PLO’s desire to establish a Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital and states that Hamas shares 
this vision.
4
  It insists that the Palestinian state be independent, sovereign and territorially 
contiguous.  It demands a just solution to the refugee problem.  It states that the 
Palestinians will not accept a permanent Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley 
and reiterates that they have the right to resist occupation in a peaceful manner until it is 
eliminated.
5
  It states that a one-state solution (a single state on the whole of historical 
Palestine) is not the choice of the PLO but “Israeli policies are making this solution 
inescapable.”6  The question is, then, how much longer this interim stage can continue 
until a de-facto single state reality arises.  It can be argued, although the PLO does not 
say this in official political discourse, that the occupation has already resulted in the 
creation of a de-facto single state.  As we have seen above, it has been the policy of 
numerous Israeli governments to consolidate this sovereignty making the territories 
inexorably linked to the state of Israel.  More and more people are starting to believe that 
they have succeeded.   
In the spring of 2013, Israel held elections for a new Knesset.  A significant and 
vocal number of the incoming members have made the news praising what the 
Palestinian Authority is mourning; the end of the viability of the two state solution.  Two 
major storylines came out of the recent Israeli elections.  The first was the surprising 
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success off Yair Lapid and his new party Yesh Atid (There is a Future).  Lapid is a media 
personality turned politician whose party earned 19 seats in the new Knesset putting him 
in the position of kingmaker for the formation of the upcoming government coalition.
7
  
Netanyahu, on the other hand, suffered heavily.  His Likud party was expected to win 
over 40 seats but ended up with just 31.
8
  This fact, combined with the perception in the 
U.S. media that Lapid is a centrist, led to a narrative by this same media that the election 
signaled a shift away from Netanyahu’s right wing expansionism and thus the possible 
return to a real peace process with the Palestinians.
9
  A closer look reveals that this could 
not be further from the truth.  Lapid had been purposefully vague about his position on 
the occupation of the Palestinian territories instead focusing on social and economic 
issues.  He sought to appeal to the popular cries for mandated military service amongst 
the religious communities and over cost of living and affordable housing issues for young 
middle class Israelis.
10
  His success campaigning on these issues shows the extent to 
which peace with the Palestinians has fallen from mainstream Israeli political 
conversation.  He did not articulate positions on the future of the Palestinian territories 
because he did not need to.   
There is little reason to believe, however, that had he articulated positions on this 
issue that they would be much different from Netanyahu’s.  He announced his foreign 
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policy platform in the huge northern West Bank settlement of Ariel, stating that “there is 
no map on which Ariel isn’t a part of the state of Israel.”11  In addition to tacitly calling 
for the annexation of settlements, Lapid professed his support for an undivided Jerusalem 
under Israeli control and had argued a few years earlier that an end to the occupation 
would mean death for himself and his countrymen.
12
  The most obvious sign that he 
lacked real differences with Netanyahu over the future of the Palestinian territories was 
the fact that he joined Netanyahu’s coalition as finance minister.13  Any difference 
between the leaders of the two most successful parties in the last election rests in 
domestic rather than external politics. 
The real story of this past election was the rightward shift which was masked by 
Lapid’s alleged leftward push.  A number of new vocal rightwing politicians calling for 
annexation of either most or all of the West Bank scored victories in the election.  These 
politicians, however, do not come from the Revisionist Zionist tradition that provided the 
intellectual foundation of Likud and its annexationist leaders like Begin and Shamir.  
Rather, these politicians come from a religious Zionist tradition which had initially been a 
quiet faction within Israel.  Over the course of the history of the state, however, this 
group found its voice and political clout and has found itself in a position of great 
political influence in both the settler movement and state political institutions.
14
  The 
most notable of these fresh faced right-wing politicians is a man by the name of Naftali 
                                                 
11
 Blumenthal, “Israeli Elections.” 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Lahav Harkov, “PM Inks Coalition Deals With Bennet, Lapid,” The Jerusalem Post, March 15th, 2013. 
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Bayit-Yehudi-and-Likud-Beytenu-sign-coalition-agreement  
14
 Remnick, “The Party Faithful.” 
283 
 
Bennett.  Bennett founded the Jewish Home party which took eleven seats in the 
election.
15
  Bennett is vocal and clear about his plan for the future of the territories in a 
way that calls back to the Likud platforms of the seventies and eighties.  He starts at the 
position that the whole of the territory of historical Palestine belongs to Israel and states 
that he will do everything in his power “to make sure [the Palestinians] never get a 
state.”16  He attacks Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan University speech for its stated support for the 
two state solution (although as we described above, Netanyahu put forward conditions 
that would essentially put negotiations off indefinitely).  He argues that the past failures 
of the Oslo accords and the Gaza disengagement plan to find peace prove that there will 
never be a negotiated peace with the Palestinians.  Painting himself therefore as a realist, 
he proposes that Israel annex Area C of the West Bank.  The Palestinians in this area 
would be under Israeli control but only have the right to Jordanian citizenship.  The major 
cities, currently Area A and B, would exercise some sort of unspecified self-rule under 
Israel security control.  Gaza would be turned over to Egyptian control.
17
  Israel would 
retain “the security umbrella on 100 percent of the area.”18  This should sound familiar; 
the autonomy plan negotiated alongside the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement of 1979 
carried many of the same principles.  This purported realistic approach, combined with 
Bennett’s hip appearance due to his knowledge of pop culture and iphone use, has had a 
broad appeal to young Israelis who grew up in the midst of the post-Rabin failures of 
Oslo.  
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While Bennett is the best known of the new right wing, he is not alone in calling 
for this sort of annexation. David Remnick, in his excellent New Yorker article on 
Bennett and other right wing parties and politicians involved in the January election, 
states that this sort of annexation plan “has become a commonplace on the right.”19  Even 
Netanyahu’s Likud took a right wing dive in the recent elections.  Netanyahu made a deal 
before the elections with Avigdor Lieberman, his former minister of foreign affairs, 
whose party is right of Likud on the political spectrum.
20
  Within the party, twelve of the 
top twenty names on the part list support some form of annexation.
21
  One of the young 
stars of the Likud party is a woman by the name of Tzipi Hotovely who became Deputy 
Minister of Transportation in the new government.  She describes her political views as 
nearly identical to those put forward by Bennett but chose to run with the larger and more 
established Likud party to ensure maximum influence in the current government.
22
  This 
rise of right wing politicians has been coupled with a rise in the power of the Israeli 
settler movement.  Representing seven percent of the voting population, settlers took 20 
seats in the elections, 17% of the total number available.
23
  A settler sits as the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court and settlers and their allies direct Shin Bet, the internal 
security agency of Israel, and religious nationalists have make up nearly half of the 
officer core of the IDF.
24
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Overall, the policies of these new right wing politicians and parties are nothing we 
have not seen before in this study.  Since the end of the 1967 War, numerous annexation 
plans have appear and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been the norm.  
However, the elections in January of this year do signal two significant changes.  The 
first is the rise to political power of the settlers.  While settlement of the occupied 
territory has been a constant supported by many in the Israeli political mainstream, the 
rise to power of the settlers themselves is new.  One left wing journalist describes it as 
“the takeover by a colonial province of its mother country.”25  The second is the breaking 
of the two state solution paradigm by these right wingers.  Netanyahu, as we have 
covered before, had no intention of granting the Palestinians anything that resembles a 
sovereign, independent state but he still had to pay lip service to the process, as did 
Olmert and Sharon before him.  Bennett and his intellectual allies are heralding the end of 
the Oslo process and see themselves as freed from the two state solution paradigm.  They 
feel no need to pay it lip services as cover for expansionist actions.  This is not 
necessarily new as successive Israeli governments before 1993 advocated expansion and 
annexation without a allowing the creation of a Palestinian state.  It is, however, new in 
the post Oslo era.  This is the first time we see mainstream political discourse on either 
side of the conflict openly advocated for a solution other than the one outlined by Oslo 
for nearly two decades.  This is not to say that 100 percent of Israelis and Palestinians 
advocated for two states throughout the Oslo process (obviously there were always 
dissenters who desired the whole territory for their own national movement).  However, 
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to see this being openly advocated for by politicians with rousing success is new for the 
current era.  Or perhaps it is the start of a new era.   
This new Oslo-free framework is throwing up some interesting positions.  For 
example, a recent article on a left-wing Israeli blog describes three noted right wing 
politicians who call for the demolition of the separation barrier.
26
  To these politicians, 
the wall no longer represents a vital security apparatus but a potential future political 
border that would limit Israel’s territory.  One of these politicians, the former defense 
minister for three Likud prime ministers (Begin, Shamir and Netanyahu), states that the 
wall is doing Israel harm in the international arena and causing “hardship for the 
Palestinians in their day-to-day lives.”27  What is most notable is the way that all three 
attack the wall for its inability to prevent terrorism and its role as a source of Palestinian 
unrest.  One of these politicians, a candidate on Naftali Bennett’s party list, goes so far as 
to say that the “wall… is not what prevented the terrorist attacks.  Terrorism prevention 
was possible and is still made possible today through the presence and activity of the IDF 
in the Arab cities of Judea and Samaria.”28  The clear implication of that statement is that 
future prevention of terrorist attacks requires future activity of the IDF in the Palestinian 
parts of the West Bank.  It is not surprising that this member of Bennett’s annexationist 
Jewish Home seems to be calling for a permanent IDF presence not only in special areas 
of the West Bank, but throughout its major cities and towns and a removal of the wall 
that potentially limits Israel’s size.  It goes in line with the plan for a total annexation of 
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the West Bank.  On the other hand, however, leftists are clinging to the wall as the last 
thing saving the possibility of a two state solution despite the humanitarian nightmare it 
creates for the Palestinians.
29
  They see the two state solution, and therefore they see the 
wall, as the only way to prevent the coming of a bi-national state, the demographics of 
which would lead to either the end of Israel’s Jewishness or Israel’s democracy. 
The Palestinian population viewed the recent elections with not an insignificant 
amount of despair.  A Palestinian academic interviewed by Remnick just prior to the 
actual elections had this to say: 
This is all very bad news for the Palestinians.  If Netanyahu and this new crowd come to 
power, there will be two casualties—the Palestinian Authority and the two-state solution. 
The simple practical changes on the ground—the settlement projects, the daily incidents 
of settler violence against our people—just do not allow for a two-state solution. Also, 
the radicalization of public opinion in Israel and the radicalization of the leadership 
reinforce each other. And that, of course, has an influence on public opinion in Palestine. 
The percentage of people here who support armed struggle is going up for the first time 
after ten years of decline. The Palestinian majority is still in favor of a two-state solution, 
but hopes are fading all the time.
30
 
Just as the Israeli mainstream political discourse is starting to come full circle and 
return to demands for annexation and no Palestinian state, here the vice-president of 
Birzeit University warns that the same thing is happening on the other side of the Green 
Line.  There is starting to be more and more Palestinians seeking a single bi-national state 
which, as we covered above, was the original future vision of the PLO.  And there is 
growing support for the return to the use of armed struggle as the means to achieve it.   
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Where does this all leave us then?  With the Israelis starting to turn the corner on 
coming full circle and the Palestinians catching up all the time, it seems we could be 
headed for another phase of the conflict.  Even the new U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry acknowledges that the possibility of a two state solution could be dead within two 
years.
31
  It is impossible to tell at this point if the return to the future visions of the sixties 
and seventies will mean a return to the kind of conflict that existed in that same period.  
For now, there is still a Palestinian Authority and the current leaders of Israel and the PA 
say they believe in the peace process.  But it is hard to say for how much longer even the 
fig leaf of these statements will be true.
                                                 
31
 Tovah Lazaroff, “Kerry: 2 State Solution May Be Dead Within 2 Years,” The Jerusalem Post, April 17th, 
2013. http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Kerry-2-state-solution-may-be-dead-within-2-years-
310156.  
289 
 
Conclusion 
The story of the Palestinian and Israeli national political discourse since the start 
of the occupation in 1967 is one of irreconcilable future visions.  Regardless of which 
national-political group articulated a future vision, whether it was Fatah, the PFLP, the 
DFLP or Hamas on the Palestinian side or the Labor or Likud party on the Israeli side, 
the claims of the two national movements remained fundamentally opposed. 
This is not to say that the future visions of the Palestinians and Israelis were either 
universal or unchanging.  We saw that in 1967, the vision of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization was the establishment a secular, democratic Palestinian state.  We read time 
and time again that the PLO would not accept a state on anything less than the whole of 
historical Palestine.  We traced how this evolved in 1974, in the wake of Black 
December, when the DFLP proposed, and the PLO eventually adopted, a plan to establish 
a Palestinian national authority in any part of the land liberated from Israel.  We saw 
how, after a second expulsion, this time from Beirut, Arafat and the PLO began moving 
towards the renunciation of claims to the territory that became Israel and instead aim for 
a state in a federation with Jordan.  We recounted the events of the First Intifada that led 
to the official adoption by the PLO of its currently held future vision: the establishment 
of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital 
and return for the refugees.  During this time period we encountered Hamas who stuck by 
the PLO claims of the sixties and seventies; that of a single Palestinian state in historical 
290 
 
Palestine.  And finally we followed the signing of the Oslo Accords and their subsequent 
failure resulting in the Second Intifada and the status quo of 2013. 
On the Israeli side, we analyzed the discourse of the Labor party stewards of 
Israel in the wake of the war.  We encountered repeatedly the demand for a Jerusalem 
forever united under Israeli control.  We saw that the Labor party intended to annex 
sizable portions of the West Bank to create so-called defensible borders and we saw the 
beginnings of settlement to permanently tie the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
to the state of Israel.  We recounted the election triumph of Menachem Begin in 1977, the 
first non-Labor party leader of Israel, who ran on a platform of complete annexation of 
the occupied territories.  From there, the debate was between the expansionist Labor 
party, who advocated for partial annexation and settlement of the West Bank and 
returning portions of the territory to Jordan, and the maximalist Likud, who demand 
permanent Israeli annexation of the occupied territories.  With the First Intifada and the 
eventual signing of the Oslo Accords, we saw Israeli willingness to negotiate with the 
PLO but no intention of granting an independent state.  With Rabin’s death and 
Netanyahu’s rise to the office of prime minister, we saw the purposeful derailing of the 
peace process, followed by Barak’s ultimatum and Sharon’s attempts to complete destroy 
the Palestinian political institutions.  We described the pull-out from Gaza and the 
building of the separation barrier, more failed peace talks and finally the re-election of 
Netanyahu. Throughout this period, whether Labor or Likud was in power, we saw the 
intention to annex some of the West Bank, the expansion of strategically  placed 
settlements that reduced the Palestinian controlled territory to a series of small, separate 
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entities, and the reiteration of the demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control 
and a refusal of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. 
It is easy to understand why the future visions of the Palestinians and Israelis were 
irreconcilable for the first twenty-five years of the occupation.  Throughout that time 
period, each side was actively attempting to eliminate the national tie to the land of the 
other.  Both national movements were claiming exclusive control over the exact same 
piece of territory.  So long as the PLO desired to establish a state in the territory occupied 
by Israel and so long as Israel aimed to maintain its status as a nation-state, there would 
be no middle ground.  But an opportunity came with the First Intifada to make these 
irreconcilable claims into merely contradictory claims that could be negotiated.  This 
opportunity was not seized, however, and despite the advent of the Peace Process, the 
future visions of the Palestinians and Israelis remained fundamentally and inescapably 
irreconcilable. 
In 1989, the PLO paved the way for a possible end to the fundamental 
intractability of this conflict when it renounced all claims to the 78% of historical 
Palestine that became the state of Israel (although Israel has never, to this day, defined its 
borders) and instead aimed for the creation of a Palestinian state on the 22% that 
remained.  Israel, however, refused at the same juncture to relinquish its claims to that 
22% percent and opted instead to continue settlement of the West Bank.  In Israel, the 
vision of the permanent future of the territories differed between those who sought 
complete annexation and those who preferred substantial annexation, but the framework 
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was universal: this land belonged to the state of Israel, if a Palestinian entity were to be 
established, it would not be on Palestinian land but Israeli land gifted by the state.  This 
vision would not have in itself been problematic had it not been enshrined in the 
framework of the peace process and subsequently adopted by the United States 
government.  The unequal recognition in the original Declaration of Principles allowed 
Israel to maintain its view that the West Bank and Gaza Strip was Israeli land to give 
away.  Therefore, all negotiations conducted on the basis of the Declaration of Principles 
would be over land Israel chose to cede (if any).  We have seen this mentality throughout 
the peace process, from Rabin advocating for a Palestinian entity that was less than a 
state under Israeli security controls to Netanyahu announcing at the UN that once the 
Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, they will “get” their state.   
The US adoption of this “gift” framework has always been clear.  Bill Clinton 
attacked Arafat because he turned down Barak’s “generous offer.”  During the Bush 
Administration, as related in a series documents released by Al Jazeera dubbed the 
Palestine Papers, Condoleezza Rice in a round of negotiations tells a Palestinian official 
that no “Israeli leader is going to cede Ma’ale Adumim (one of the large settlements on 
the outskirts of Jerusalem).”  When the Palestinian negotiator, a man by the name of 
Ahmed Qurei, replied that neither would any Palestinian leader, Rice told him “then you 
won’t have a state!”1  The fact that this came in the same round of negotiations during 
which the Palestinian negotiators proposed that Israel annex all of the East Jerusalem 
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settlements except one further illustrates the point.  Under the Oslo framework, Israel 
gets to decide what to keep and what to give away.  The Palestinian claim to the land that 
became Ma’ale Adumim was secondary to the Israeli claim despite the fact that it is in 
the West Bank.  And what has become clear over two decades of negotiation is that the 
land subsequent Israelis governments aim to take from the West Bank and Jerusalem 
exceeds any amount that would be compatible with the Palestinian future vision.  
Unsurprisingly, then, there has been no negotiated peace that has resulted in the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.  As long as Israel is able to negotiate from a position 
where it holds final claim over any territory, there likely never will be.  This does not 
even take into account the two most fundamental issues of the conflict which have 
remained non-starters throughout negotiations: the fate of the refugees and Jerusalem.  
These are two issues from which no Palestinian or Israeli leader will back down for the 
sake of their careers or even their lives.  As long as Israel maintains its control over the 
whole of historical Palestine, however, it has the ability to dictate the future of these 
issues.  Despite the opportunity, the claims remain irreconcilable.  
The failures of Oslo and the recent Israeli elections have brought this 
irreconcilability of the Palestinian and Israeli future visions into stark relief.  The once 
dominant two-state solution is beginning to break down within Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territories and in its place is a reemergence of the future visions that existed at 
the start of the occupation in 1967.  More and more Israeli politicians are calling for 
outright annexation of parts of all of the West Bank.  And while this had existed even 
during the Oslo process, it was under the guise of a two state solution.  The need to pay 
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lip service to a Palestinian state is disappearing rapidly, as is a belief that it even feasible.  
Amongst the Palestinians, support is growing for a single state, the demographic realities 
of which would provide a perhaps insurmountable challenge to the Jewish nature of the 
state of Israel.  Talk of armed struggle as a means to bring this about is on the rise as 
well.  However, a fundamental difference exists between these future visions in their 
1967 and 2013 contexts.  In 1967, no Israelis lived in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  
In 2013, 650,000 Israelis settlers live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  The territory 
is inextricably linked to the state of Israel.  In 1973, Ariel Sharon stated that Israel will 
“make a pastrami sandwich of [the Palestinian territories]. We’ll insert a strip of Jewish 
settlement in between the Palestinians and another strip of Jewish settlement right across 
the West Bank so that in 25 years’ time neither the U.N. nor the U.S., nobody will be able 
to tear it apart.”2  It seems that this strategy, combined with the gift framework of the 
Oslo Peace Process, has made Sharon’s dream a reality.  Throughout all the conflict, 
revolutions, negotiations and changes we have seen over the last 45 years of the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, one thing has remained constant: the 
irreconcilability of the Palestinian and Israeli future visions.  It is impossible to tell what 
the next stage of the conflict may hold.  
                                                 
2
 Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Sharon’s New Map,” Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied 
Territories 12:3 (May-June 2002) 6. 
295 
 
Bibliography 
Abbas, Mahmoud. “Speech to the UN General Assembly,” UN General Assembly, New 
York, NY, September, 23, 2011. 
Abdel Jawad, Saleh. “The Arab and Palestinian Narratives of the 1948 War,” in Israeli 
and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History’s Double Helix, edited by Robert 
I. Rothberg, 72-114. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 
Abdel Jawad, Saleh. “Zionist Massacres: the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
in the 1948 War” in Israel and the Palestinian Refugees, edited by Eyal 
Benvenisti, Chaim Gans and Sari Hanafi, 59-127. New York, Springer, 2007. 
Abdel Karim, Qais and Suleiman, Fahed. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, Emergence and Itinerary; 1969-2007, January, 2010. http://www.dflp-
palestine.net/english/about_dflp/The_Democratic_Front_.doc 
Abdul Hadi, Dr. Mahdi, ed. Documents on Palestine, 8 vols. 1948-1973. Jerusalem: 
PASSIA Publications, 2007. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities, New York: Verso, 2006. 
B’tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics.” 
http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/statistics 
Bar-Tal, Daniel and Salomon, Gavriel. “Israeli-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict,” in Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History’s 
296 
 
Double Helix, edited by Robert  I. Rothberg, 19-46. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006. 
Bhasin, Tavishi and Hallward, Maia Carter. “Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization 
in the Palestinian Territories.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 25:1, (2013): 75-
93. 
Connor, Walker. “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is and Ethnic Group, is a...,” in 
Nationalism, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 36-46. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994.  
Fatah, “The Fatah Constitution,” 
http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/documents/palestinian-documents/97061-
fateh-constitution.html  
Foucault, Michel. “The Orders of Discourse,” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist 
Reader, edited by Robert J. C. Young, 57-78.  Boston: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 
1982. 
Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Israeli Settler Population 1972-2006.” 
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/israeli-
settler-population-1972-2006  
Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Sharon’s New Map.” Report on Israeli Settlement in 
the Occupied Territories 12:3 (May-June 2002), 1-6. 
297 
 
Geller, Ernest. “Nations and Nationalism” in Nationalism, edited by John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith, 63-70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.   
Gelvin, James L. The Israel-Palestine Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
Hamas, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, August 18th, 1988.” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp 
Hobsbawm, Eric. “The Nation as Invented Tradition,” in Nationalism, edited by John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 76-82. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994.   
Kanafani, Ghassan. Palestine’s Children: Returning to Haifa and Other Stories, 
translated by Barbara Harlow and Karen E. Riley. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National 
Consciousness, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S. The Palestinian People: A History, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide, London: Verso, 2003. 
Laqueur, Walter and Rubin, Barry, eds. The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History 
of the Middle East Conflict. New York: Penguin, 1984. 
298 
 
Lukacs, Yehuda, ed. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict A Documentary Record: 1867-
1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Masalha, Nur. Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion, London: 
Pluto Books, 2000. 
Mbembe, Achille. “Necropolitics,” Trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15:1 (2003): 
11-40. 
Netanyahu, Benjamin. “Address by Prime Minister Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University,” 
June, 2009. 
Netanyahu, Benjamin. “Speech to the UN General Assembly,” UN General Assembly, 
New York, NY, September, 23, 2011. 
Paradise Now. DVD, Dir. Hany Abu-Assad; Warner Independent Pictures, 2005. 
Rabin, Yitzhak, “Speech in the Knesset on the Ratification of the Interim Agreement.” 
Jerusalem, 1995.  
Said, Edward. The Politics of Dispossession, New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
Schölch, Alexander. Palestine in Transformation 1856-1882, Translated by William C. 
Young and Michael C. Gerrity, Washington D.C., Institute For Palestine Studies, 
2006. 
Sixth Knesset, The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 5727-
1967, June 27
th
, 1967.  
299 
 
Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Document. 8
th
 
edition. Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2012. 
Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 2
nd
 edition. New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1992. 
Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009. 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, 
September 3, 1947. 
 
 
 
